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Monopolization under the Sherman 
Act: the third wave and beyond
b y  JOHN J. FLYNN*
Like Gaul, m onopolization litigation under section 2 o f the 
Sherman Act has been divided into three parts: -A first part 
beginning with the N orthern Securities case o f  19041 and ending 
with the U.S. S teel case in 1920;2 a second part, the Thurmond 
Arnold era, beginning in the late 30’s with the filing o f the 
A L C O A  case3 and ending in the early 50’s with the decision in the 
U nited Shoe M achinery case;4 and a third part beginning in the 
late 60’s with the filing o f  the IB M  case by the Department o f  
Justice.5 Part three has been kept rolling by a marked increase in
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* Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
2 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
3 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945).
4 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Sugp. 295 
(D. Mass. 1953), a ff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Later opinions 
on remedy 391 U.S. 244 (1968); 1969 Trade Cases 1 72,688 (D. Mass.) 
(consent decree). See discussion, infra note 34.
5 United States v. IBM Corp., 4 T r a d e  R e g .R e r  (CCH) 1 45,070 
Case 2039 (filed S.D.N.Y. 1969) (No. 69-200). For an analysis of the 
IBM case, see L. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paridigm 
and Antitrust, 127 U.Pa.L.R ev. 1104 (1979).
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private treble damage litigation alleging m onopolization, the 
filing o f  a renewed attempt to dissolve A.T.&T. under section 2 by 
the Antitrust D ivision6 and m onopolization cases brought against 
E xxon,7 du Pont" and the cereal com panies9 by the F.T.C. In 
other forum s, wave III has gained added impetus from legislative 
proposals aimed at econom ic concentration ,10 and the recom m en­
dations o f  the National C om m ission for the Review o f  Antitrust
6 United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., [1970-79 
Transfer Binder] T r a d e  R eg .R ep . (CCH) 1 45,074, Case 2416 (D.D.C. 
1974). The case seeks divestiture o f Western Electric and the Long Lines 
Division. A  similar prior case against A.T.&T. was settled by a consent 
decree short of divestiture. United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 
Trade Cases  ^ 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956). The procedure for settling the case 
and the relief achieved are examined and severely criticized in R e p o r t  t o  
t h e  P r e s ,  a n d  t h e  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l  o f  t h e  A n t i t r u s t  S u b c o m m itte e  
o f  t h e  H o u s e  J u d ic ia r y  C o m m itte e  o n  t h e  C o n s e n t  D e c re e  P r o g r a m  o f  
t h e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  J u s t i c e  (1959).
7 Exxon Corp., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] T r a d e  R e g .R e p . (CCH) 
§ 20,388 (1973).
8 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e p  (CCH) 1 21,770 
(1980) (final order and opinion dismissing complaint). The du Pont 
opinion is a significant attempt to monopolize decision by the Commis­
sion. The opinion was issued after completion of this manuscript. While 
the violations charged in the complaint justify treating the case as 
beyond the scope of this article, the opinion deals extensively with 
monopolization precedent and many of the conduct issues discussed 
elsewhere in this article. Appropriate footnote references to du Pont 
have been inserted where relevant to the text analysis of other leading 
wave III decisions.
9 Kellogg Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] T r a d e  R e g .R e p  (CCH) 
1 19,898 (1972).
10 See S. 1167, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on the Industrial
Reorganization A ct Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and M onopoly
o f  the Senate Judiciary Comm. 93d-94th Cong. (1973-76); G o ld s c h m id ,
M a n n  & W e s to n  (eds.), I n d u s t r i a l  C o n c e n t r a t io n :  T h e  N ew  L e a rn in g
ch. 7 (1974); Note, The Industrial Reorganization Act: An Antitrust
Proposal to Restructure the American Economy, 73 C o lu m .L .R e v . 635
(1973); Comment, A Legislative Approach to Market Concentration:
The Industrial Reorganization Act, 24 S y ra c u s e  L .R e v . 1100 (1973).
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Laws and Procedures suggesting relaxation o f  the traditional legal 
test for attempts to  m onopolize and congressional study o f  no 
conduct m onopolization proposals.11
Som e have called these distinct periods o f  section 2 m onopoli­
zation activity “w aves,” 12 thereby invoking the analogy o f  distinct 
oscillations o f  a large mass surging to  and fro. M onopolization  
litigation might also be likened to separate and distinct “erup­
tions” o f  a volcano— which then subsides to  a period o f  peaceful 
slumber when everyone enjoys its presence, ignores its potential, 
and occasionally meditates about the consequences should a new  
eruption ensue. W hether they be called “waves” or “eruptions,” 
each period o f  m onopolization litigation has been followed by a 
relative calm where little or no m onopolization litigation takes 
place.13 The ensuing storm after the calm, usually leads doctrine 
-off in a new direction, presents new procedural and remedial 
difficulties, and has a unique quality all its own. It shall be the 
purpose o f  this article to survey the three distinct waves o f  
m onopolization litigation which have taken place under the Sher­
man A ct, with emphasis upon the current wave and its new 
directions, its peculiar difficulties, and its unique qualities.
- I National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and 
Procedures, ch. 8 (1979) (hereinafter cited NCRALP). The papers 
submitted to NCRALP on section 2 by various witnesses are reprinted
1 in 48 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 813-905 (1979). See also, Applebaum, Shenefield, 
Blecher & Bork, Debate: Should the Sherman A ct Be Amended to 
Broaden the Offense o f  A ttem pt to Monopolize, 48 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 1433
(1979).
>2 Shepherd, The Economics: A Pep Talk, 41 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 595, 598
(1972).
, t-,13 Id. at 595. Surveys of the evolution of monopolization standards 
, and analysis of the current status o f the law may be found in 3 P. 
M A re e d a  & D. T u r n e r ,  A n t i t r u s t  L aw  chs. 6 & 7 (1978); L . S u ll iv a n , 
A n t i t r u s t  ch. II (1977).
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I. W aves I and  II: esta b lish in g  d octr in a l p aram eters
A . Wave I: attacking the “tru sts”
The first wave o f  section 2 m onopolization litigation broke 
out in the second and third decades o f  the Sherman A ct, after 
som e early litigation grappling with the commerce standard o f  the 
A ct14 and the A ct’s application to the railroads.15 Follow ing the 
great merger movement in the late 19th century, m any o f  the 
leading firms o f  the era found themselves involved in government- 
initiated section 2 litigation. United States Steel, Standard Oil, 
American Tobacco, International Harvester, American Sugar, 
Corn Products, American Can, du P ont, Swift & C o., and others 
found themselves enmeshed in section 2 litigation .16 Out o f  the 
welter o f  early litigation, som e general standards were developed  
and still provide the analytical framework for approaching a 
section 2 case as well as the suggestion o f  issues to trouble 
subsequent courts in defining when a section 2 violation should or 
should not be found.
In Northern Securities Co. v. U nited S ta tes,'1 a Sherman Act 
case contesting the merger o f  the Great Northern and U nion
14 See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) holding 
regulation of the manufacturing of goods was not within the commerce 
power and limiting the Sherman Act to economic activity in the physical 
flow of goods across state lines. The lack of enthusiasm for prosecu­
tions early in the life of the Sherman Act has, in part, been attributed to 
the restrictive commerce standard adopted by the Knight case. See 
Corwin, The Anti-Trust A cts and the Constitution, 18 V a .L .R e v . 355 
(1932).
15 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United 
States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
16 For surveys of early monopolization litigation, see Shepherd, supra 
note 12, at 598; Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 
U n iv .C h i.L .R e v . 153 (1947); Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman 
Act: Power or Purpose? 43 I l l .L .R e v .  745 (1949).
I’ 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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P a c i f ic  railways, the Court read the Sherman A ct as establishing 
competition as the rule o f  trade and section 2 as outlawing a 
combination o f  com petitors by merger eliminating competition  
between them  in any p a r t  o f  commerce. The com bination o f  two 
railroads through the device o f  a holding com pany was found to 
have both restrained and m onopolized railroad traffic in northern 
M i n n e s o ta  and transcontinental traffic north o f  the Union  
P a c i f i c ’s line to the west coast. Justice Holm es, in dissent would 
have upheld the com bination under section 1 “until something is 
done with the intent to exclude strangers to the com bination from  
competing with it.” 18 Furthermore, Holmes suggested that con­
duct excluding com petitors was also required before a violation o f  
.section 2 could be found. The majority and dissent implicitly saw 
;the essence o f  the offense as the obtaining or maintaining o f  
overwhelming market power but differed over the definition o f  
^markets (in this case geographic) and whether the defendant’s 
monopoly structure conferred by merger was sufficient to consti­
tute a violation o f  the A ct or whether exclusionary behavior 
toward third parties was required before it could be held that one 
possessing m onopoly power could be said to have unlawfully 
monopolized.
In Standard O il Co. v. U nited S tates'9 and U nited States v. 
{American Tobacco C o .,10 the “rule o f  reason” was read into the
• otherwise literal language o f  section 1 o f  the Sherman Act, while 
section 2 was construed as supplementing section 1 by prohibiting 
every act aimed at achieving a m onopoly.21 Section 2 o f the Act 
was subordinated to section 1 by holding that section 2 is violated 
by achieving or maintaining a m onopoly through section 1 viola­
tions. In A m erican Tobacco, the Court undermined the broad 
rule o f  Northern Securities, by indicating that it was “not alone”
'.V— --------------------------------------------
is Id. at 409.
19 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
20 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
21 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911)-
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because o f  the mergers establishing American T obacco’s “dom in- j 
ion and control” over tobacco trade that section 2 was violated, j 
but because the com binations were done with the purpose and 
effect o f  restraining trade and injuring com petitors that a viola- i
tion o f  section 2 could be fou n d .22 : j
The N orthern  Securities structural standard, suggesting that j jv;
section 2 may be violated by mergers establishing m onopoly j j
power even though not accompanied by anticompetitive behavior, |  j -
was more directly rejected in U nited S tates v. U nited S tates J s
S teel.2* The government claimed the merger o f  180 independent ] l
firms in various phases o f  steelmaking resulting in the control o f  | :
80% -90%  o f  national steel production constituted m onopoliza- 1 ' "
tion in violation o f  section 2. N oting that U .S . Steel’s market j
share had declined substantially by the time o f suit and that its j
position had not been obtained by predatory acts in violation o f  1 jh
section 1, the Court held that no violation o f  section 2 could be j [
found because o f  the absence o f  m onopoly power or any evidence J j
o f  its exercise during the period U .S . Steel dom inated the J f
m arket.24 The Court rejected the argument that size alone, even j
size with a potential for abuse, is sufficient to  show a violation o f  | t '
section 2. The Court held the government must show an unlawful 1 1
exercise o f  that power, either by fixing prices or excluding com - 1 J
petitors, before a violation o f  section 2 would be found. The j  i -
Court stated without citation to  authority or exam ination o f  the j  t
legislative history o f  the Act: I f - ’
. 9 [ r
The corporation is undoubtedly of impressive size and it takes an |  >
effort of resolution not to be affeced by it or to exaggerate its |  j,,
“  221 U.S. at 181-83.
■if
23 251 U.S. 417 (1920). .
24 A survey of the steel industry of that era indicates that rugged \  j 
competition accompanied by predatory tactics excluding competitors ■ 
and exploiting consumers had been replaced with consolidation of the a 
industry by merger, gentlemen’s agreements to limit production and fix  ^’ 
prices, and use o f government powers to facilitate production limita- ; 
tions and stabilize prices. See Shaffer, Responses to Competition in the 3 I 
Steel Industry, 1918-1935, 10 SwU.L.Rev 835 (1978).
I t
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. influence. But we must adhere to the law and the law does not make
- mere size an offense or the existence of unasserted power an offense. 
, It, we repeat, requires overt acts. . . .  It does not compel competition, 
nor require all that is possible.23
" Justice Day, dissenting, embraced the view that section 2 is 
only violated where m onopoly power is gained by section 1 
violations, differing only in interpretation o f  the facts as to  
whether the mergers were done with an unlawful section 1 
purpose and effect o f  eliminating com petition or were done with 
the objective o f  realizing econom ies o f  scale and integration in 
steelmaking.26
With the exception o f  a few railroad merger cases and E ast­
man K o d a k  Co. v. Southern P h o to  M aterials C o .,11 the first wave 
or eruption o f  m onopolization litigation, for all practical pur­
poses, ended with the U nited S tates Steel case. A lthough World 
War I, the laissez-faire policies o f  the presidency o f Calvin
25 251 U.S. at 451. This is the source of the proposition that “size 
alone does not violate the Sherman Act” frequently expressed in the 
meaningless cliche that “bigness is not necessarily bad.” Bigness is not 
.necessarily good, either. Judge Wyzanski has observed: “Fundamentally, 
the Sherman Act’s greatest importance is that it attempts to deal with 
Acton’s disease. That is to say, it deals with the problem of power and 
the tendency that all power has to corrupt, and absolute power corrupt­
ing absolutely.” Antitrust Symposium: Morning Panel Discussion, 10 
"Sw U .L .R ev. 80, 81 (1978). Another meaningless antitrust cliche, “the 
antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors,” is also often 
encountered in monopolization litigation. E.g., California Computer 
Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742 (9th Cir. 1979). There, 
of course, can be no competition without competitors, and the courts 
have, in per se cases, presumed an injury to competition because of a
„ proven injury to a competitor. See Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
- Cliches in antitrust appear to be even less useful than they may be 
elsewhere in law, serving only to confuse or to avoid rational analysis 
rather than further it.
26 251 U.S. at 457.
27 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
|
Coolidge, the 20’s infatuation with stock speculation, a growing 1 
antitrust sophistication in the business community, and the plunge 
into a depression in the 30’s may all have contributed to the |  
decline o f  m onopolization litigation, the state o f  the law post- 1 
U nited S tates S teel probably did more to limit the effectiveness o f  
section 2 than any other factor.28
1
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It appeared clear that a charge o f  m onopolization could only 
be sustained by proof o f  a defendant’s overwhelming power |  j 
coercing others and gained or maintained by violations o f  section  
1 o f  the A ct. The post -U n ited  S tates S teel lull in m onopolization  
litigation was extended by the national preoccupation with World 
War II, despite the filing o f  the A L C O A  case29 in 1937 and the 
TNEC studies o f  1939-1941 urging greater antitrust activism as |  
the way to  bring the econom y out o f  the post-depression  
doldrum s.30 The end o f  World War II, however, signalled a new 
surge in m onopolization litigation with substantial shifts in doc­
trinal developm ent initiated by Judge H and’s opinion in 
A L C O A 31 and a renewed interest in antitrust enforcem ent as a j 
basic tool o f  government management o f  the econom y in the 
post-war era.
B. Wave II: refining the standards and directions o f  
m onopoliza tion  litigation  |
The second wave or eruption o f  section 2 litigation, which has 
dominated the training and thinking o f  today’s generation o f
28 See, Levi, supra note 16, at 160; Rostow, supra note 16, at 748.
29 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945).
30 T h e  T e m p o ra ry  N a t io n a l  E c o n o m ic  C o m m itte e  (T .N .E .C .)  
p u b lish e d  43 m o n o g ra p h s  b e tw een  1938 a n d  1941 o n  sp ec ific  e c o n o m ic  
p ro b le m s  in c lu d in g  a n t i t r u s t  e n fo rc e m e n t . T h e  w o rk  o f  th e  T .N .E .C . is 
su m m a riz e d  in  D . L y n c h , T h e  C o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  E c o n o m ic  P o w e r  
(1946).
31 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Monopolization : 9
judges, lawyers and econom ists, must also be placed in its 
historical context. Wave II evolved after the shattering experience 
o f the depression and national flirtation with cartelization early in 
the New Deal as a remedy for collapse o f  the econom y.32 Wave II 
also developed against the backdrop o f  a significant expansion o f  
governmental involvement in and regulation o f  the econom y in 
order to counter the effects o f  the depression and contain abuses 
perceived as factors contributing to it, including relative inaction  
on the m onopolization front. M ost o f  the m onopolization litiga­
tion  during wave II was government initiated, reflected a growing 
use o f econom ic theory as a tool for analysis, was aimed at the 
.middle-sized to insignificant range o f  companies on the post­
depression industrial horizon,33 had to contend with the ambig­
uous but narrow precedent from the different era o f  wave I, and 
Uncovered the com plexity o f  remedies and the inability o f  en­
forcement officials and the courts to deal efficiently with struc­
tural rem edies.34 Phase two, lasting roughly from the A L C O A  
opinion to the U nited Shoe  case35 and petering out with the 
Court’s application o f  a narrow market test in du P o n t Cel­
- 32 See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), 
invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act.
* 33 Shepherd, supra note 12, at 598.
‘ 34 For an explicit discussion of factors constraining judicial liberality 
in „fashioning remedies in structural monopolization litigation, see
4 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 347-48 
, (Di Mass. 1953), a ff’d  per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). The limited
■ injunctive relief granted by Judge Wyzanski failed to dissipate United 
.Shoe’s monopoly power, thereby necessitating further proceedings. See 
,'United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 266 F.Supp. 328 (D. 
Mass. 1967) (modification denied), rev’d  391 U.S. 244 (1968). Modifica­
tion of the decree, requiring partial divestiture, was finally arrived at by 
consent decree. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 
. 1969 Trade Cases 1 72,688 (D. Mass. 1969).
33 Supra note 4.
lophane36 and the questionable settlement o f  the A.T.& T. case ,37 
was doctrinally significant yet econom ically insignificant.
The highlight decision was, o f  course, Judge H and’s opinion  
in A L C O A ,1’ a case which ended up in the Second Circuit for 
final decision because o f  the lack o f  a quorum in the Supreme 
Court. Although Judge H and’s opinion was not subject to further 
review, he was cabined by trial court findings dismissing the 
com plaint,39 previous antitrust actions against ALCOA attacking 
its conduct and patent practices in obtaining a m onopoly over the 
production o f  virgin in g o t /0 and the Supreme Court precedent o f  
wave I m onopolization litigation seemingly restricting the test for 
illegality in section 2 cases to p roof o f  overwhelming market share 
obtained or maintained by section 1 violations o f  the Sherman 
Act.
In the course o f  circumventing these constraints, Judge 
H and’s opinion in A L C O A  established the m ethodology and 
analytical framework by which modern m onopolization cases are 
analyzed: (1) proof o f  relevant product and geographic markets;
(2) a showing o f  m onopoly power (in the sense o f  power not 
subject to the discipline o f  com petition) to  fix prices or exclude 
com petition in the markets defined; and (3) som e additional 
element o f  conduct in either acquiring, exercising or maintaining 
m onopoly power in the affirmative sense o f  conduct with a 
purpose or effect to acquire or maintain a m onopoly or in the
10 : The antitrust bulletin
36 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956). •
37 United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cases 1 68,246 
(D.N.J. 1956).
3* 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
39 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F.Supp. 97 
(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
40 The history o f previous actions against ALCOA is surveyed in
Judge Hand’s opinion in ALCOA. 148 F.2d at 422-23.
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negative sense o f  an unexplained and unjustified possession o f  
persistent substantial m onopoly power which com petition might 
otherwise be expected to erode. Judge H and’s now familiar 
manipulation o f  factors relied upon for product market tests,41 
the dicta suggesting a quantitative m onopoly power test o f  90% 
yes, 64% maybe, and 33% n o ,42 and the ambiguity regarding 
what conduct over and above the mere existence o f  a m onopolist 
with overwhelming market power would be sufficient to prove 
unlawful m onopolization and who carries the burden o f  proof on  
this issue,43 have provided a generation o f  exam ination questions 
for antitrust teachers and conundrums for all concerned with 
subsequent m onopolization cases.
:-j Viewed in its historical framework, A L C O A  represented a 
sharp substantive departure from the 1920 U nited S tates Steel 
opinion by suggesting the unexplained and long standing m ain^  
tenance o f  an overwhelming market share, as well as the forma- \ 
-tion and unlawful behavior o f  one possessing m onopoly power, J 
could constitute proof o f  unlawful m onopolization. In further  
departures from wave I m onopolization litigation, the H and\ 
opinion broadened section 2 policy objectives from those assumed \  
by, the Court in U nited S tates Steel to include social and political ) 
goals as well as econom ic ones44 and shifted the relationship o f  /
Id. at 424-25.
42 Id. at 424. The court’s more elaborate analysis of the monopoly 
power issue appears id. at 425-29.
-4! Id. at 429-45.
w 44 “Be that as it may, that was not the way that Congress chose; it did 
not condone ‘good trusts’ and condemn ‘bad’ ones; it forbad all. 
Moreover, in so doing it was not necessarily actuated by economic 
.motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral 
effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his 
,success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass 
of'those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These considera­
tions, which we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we 
thmk the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.” Id. at 427.
section 1 and section 2 from a dependency o f  section 2 upon  
proof o f  section 1 violations to that o f an independent prohibi- 1 
tion upon displacement o f  com petition where achieved by the f 
unexplained or unjustified acquisition or possession o f  m onopoly  
power.43
Two other opinions staked out new ground in wave or erup­
tion II m onopolization litigation. In American Tobacco Co. v. 
United States,*6 the Court upheld a charge o f  com bination and |  
conspiracy to m onopolize against the leading cigarette manufac- \ 
turers based upon evidence o f  a joint program o f buying up |  
cheaper grades o f  tobacco with the purpose o f  excluding com p eti-1 
tors manufacturing low priced cigarettes. In one o f  the few cases |  
exploring the meaning o f  the com bination or conspiracy to  J 
m onopolize offense o f  section 2 ,47 the Court endorsed a reading 
o f these offenses as outlawing joint action by which the conspira­
tors acquire power to exclude actual or potential com petition with j 
an intent or purpose to exercise that power.48 The Court stressed 
that the acts done in forming or executing the conspiracy might be 
wholly innocent acts; that the com bination or conspiracy could be 
proved from circumstantial evidence; and, that: “ [njeither proof 
o f  exertion o f  the power to exclude nor p roof o f actual exclusion  
o f  existing or potential com petitors is essential to  sustain a charge 
o f m onopolization under the Sherman A ct.”49
' ~ f
45 “Perhaps, it has been idle to labor the point at length; there can b e |  
no doubt that the vice of restrictive contracts and of monopoly is really 
one, it is the denial to commerce of the supposed protection o f |  
competition. To repeat, if the earlier stages are proscribed, when they 
are parts of a plan, the mere projecting of which condemns them 
unconditionally, the realization o f the plan itself must also be pro­
scribed.” Id. at 428.
«  328 U.S. 781 (1946).
47 See A r e e d a  & T u r n e r ,  supra note 13, at 359-90; S u l l iv a n ,  supra 
note 13, at 132-34 (1977). f
48 328 U.S. at 809.
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“9 Id. at 810.
i
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, Stating what is not required for proof o f  a violation, o f  
course, does not help much in furthering one’s understanding o f  
.what is required to prove a violation. The Court however, en- 
-dorsed and embraced Judge H and’s ALCOA test and concluded 
that joint action to acquire m onopoly power— whether done by 
fair means or fou l— with an intent to acquire or maintain that 
power— whether exercised or not— is sufficient to  prove a viola­
tion o f section 2 ’s prohibition o f com binations or conspiracies to 
monopolize.
United States v. Griffith50 established the proposition that 
“the use o f  m onopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to 
foreclose com petition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to  
destroy a competitor, is unlaw ful.”51 Griffith is often cited for the 
proposition that the use o f  m onopoly power from one market to  
injure or destroy com petition in another market constitutes a 
-violation o f  the m onopolization prohibition o f  section 2 o f the 
Sherman A ct even if  m onopoly power in the first market is 
Jawfully acquired or m aintained.52 ‘
By the end o f  wave or eruption II m onopolization litigation, 
several potential theories for proof o f a section 2 monopolization  
.violation were available. Judge Wyzanski distilled them into three 
distinct tests, summarizing the law in his opinion in United States 
-v United Shoe Machinery Corp.:53
[1] An enterprise has monopolized in violation of § 2 of the 
, Sherman Act if it has acquired or maintained a power to exclude 
" others as a result of using an unreasonable “restraint of trade” in
• violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. . . .
; »  334 U.S. 100 (1948).
* 5> Id. at 107.
' 52 See e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377
(1973).
* ' »  110 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), a ff’d p e r  curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
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[2] [A]n enterprise has monopolized in violation of § 2 if it (a) has 
the power to exclude competition, and (b) has exercised it or has the 
purpose to exercise it. . . . [I]t is a violation of § 2 for one having 
effective control of the market to use, or plan to use, any exclu­
sionary practice, even though it is not a technical restraint of 
trade. . . .
[3] Judge Hand said [in Alcoa] that one who has acquired an 
overwhelming share of the market “monopolizes” whenever he does 
business, . . . apparently even if there is no showing that his business 
involves any exclusionary practice. . . . [T]his doctrine is softened 
by Judge Hand’s suggestion that the defendant may escape statutory 
liability if it bears the burden of proving that it owes its monopoly 
solely to superior skill, superior products, natural advantages, . . . 
economic or technological efficiency, . . . low margins of profit 
maintained permanently and without discrimination, or licenses con­
ferred by and used within, the limits of the law, (including patents on 
one’s own inventions, or franchises granted directly to the enterprise 
by a public authority).54
Judge Wyzanski found U nited Shoe  violated tests two and 
three. His analysis o f  the facts giving rise to those conclusions 
contain interesting harbingers o f  issues which appear to dominate 
wave III litigation. In determining whether the defendant pos­
sessed m onopoly power, Judge Wyzanski found U nited Shoe had 
“75 plus percentage” o f  the market for shoe manufacturing 
machinery. W hile purporting not to base a finding o f  m onopoly  
power on market share alone, the opinion notes that:
[A] bold, original court mindful of what legal history teaches 
about the usual, if not invariable relationship between overwhelming 
percentage of the market and control of the market, and desirous of 
enabling trial judges to escape the morass of economic data in which 
they are now plunged, might, on the basis of considerations of 
experience and judicial convenience, announce that an enterprise 
having an overwhelming percentage of the market was presumed to 
have monopoly power, that a plaintiff bore its burden of proof under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act if it satisfied the trier of fact that defendant 
had the prohibited percentage, and that defendant, to escape liability, 
must bear the burden of proving that its share of the market was
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attributable to its ability, natural advantage, legal license, or, perhaps 
to others’ lack of interest in entering the market.55
Whether the Court was, in fact, being “bold” and “original” 
or not is open to speculation since the additional factors relied 
upon to conclude United Shoe possessed m onopoly power con­
sisted o f  U nited’s practice o f  leasing and not selling machines, 
charging different rental prices for different machines, the supe­
riority o f  its products and services, and U nited’s size giving it the 
ability to attract offers o f  new inventions and inventors’ services 
in the industry. Judge Wyzanski noted these activities were “nat­
ural and norm al,” but were not practices that could be described 
as “inevitable consequences o f  ability, natural forces, or law.”56 
Finding these practices not economically inevitable and the root 
of U nited’s control o f the market— even though not illegal, 
immoral or unnatural— the Court concluded: “the law does not 
allow an enterprise that maintains control o f  a market through 
practices not econom ically inevitable, to justify that control 
because o f  its supposed social advantage.” 57 The upshot o f this" 
analysis is to apply the test o f  a “bold and original” court by 
inferring m onopoly power from an overwhelming market share 
arid then shifting the burden o f proof to the defendant to show  
the power was obtained and maintained solely through superior 
efficiency, patents or other government franchise, or praise­
worthy, pure and untainted competitive superiority in product, 
innovation or service.58 ^
* Wave or eruption II thus appeared to establish expansive 
substantive tests paving the way for section 2 becoming a broad
55 Id. at 343, n .l.
56 id. at 344.
. 57 id. at 345.
- 58 a  test Judge Wyzanski adopted In United States v. Grinnell Corp., 
.236 F.Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), a ff’d  on other grounds and modified as 
to the decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). For an elaboration on this aspect of 
,the Grinnell case, see Note, Section 2 o f  the Sherman A ct—Is a Per Se 
Test Feasible? 50 Iow a L.Rev. 1196 (1965).
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and flexible weapon for attacking firms with an unexplainably  
large market share, a com m on course o f  action by dominant 
firms excluding smaller com petitors, and the use o f  lawfully held 
m onopoly power to  fix prices or exclude competitors from other 
markets. Like wave I however, wave II probably ended as a result 
o f a com bination o f  external factors plus some limiting judicial 
decisions.
The early 50’s witnessed the advent o f  and preoccupation with  
the Korean War, a relatively less activist Eisenhower administra­
tion and at least three significant legal decisions contributing to 
the demise o f  w ave'll m onopolization litigation. The first decision  
weakening the im plications o f  wave II was the U nited Shoe  
M achinery  case and its treatment o f  the remedy phase o f  the case. 
The court noted how little effort the government had devoted to  
the remedy issue and the practical and theoretical constraints 
upon a trial judge dictating the fashioning o f  conservative reme­
dies in structural m onopolization cases.59 N o  radical surgery to  
extirpate the m onopoly power found would be ordered absent a 
clear and convincing case for it, supported by a carefully worked  
but plan. Relief in U nited Shoe  was limited to  injunctive relief 
restricting U nited’s leasing practices; relief later found inadequate 
after a decade o f  experience and therefore requiring a reopening 
o f  the remedy phase o f  the case.60 This result tended to  confirm  
the observation about structural antitrust cases: that the govern­
ment often won the battle but usually lost the war in significant 
m onopolization cases since it seldom  either requested, made a 
viable argument for or received from hesitant courts meaningful 
structural relief in the form o f  dissolution or divestiture.61
Thus the reality that the wave II court decisions eased the 
standards for proof o f  a section 2 m onopolization violation must
59 llOF.Supp. at 348.
60 See note 34, supra.
61 See I NCRALP, supra note 11, at ch. 7; G r e e n ,  M o o r e  &  W asse r-  
s te in ,  T h e  C lo s e d  E n te r p r i s e  S y s te m  ch. 6 (1972).
Monopolization : 17
be tempered by the corresponding reality that the government by 
default and the courts by preference appeared unwilling to seek 
effective relief for the violations found. Even the most ardent 
trustbuster, after realizing the practical consequences o f  the 
United Shoe  case, must have had some pause in advocating 
widespread use o f  section 2 with its liberalized substantive stan­
dards in view o f  the difficult problems with fashioning effective 
yet fair remedies that had a chance o f  approval by hesitant courts.
Two other decisions, one judicial and the other administrative, 
also may have contributed to  the end o f  wave II. In U nited States 
v. E.I. du P o n t de  N em ours & C o .,62 the Court became enamored 
with but superficially applied the econom ic concept o f  cross­
elasticity o f  demand for defining markets to  the degree that it 
appeared to  make the concept itself, superficially applied, the sole 
test for defining relevant markets in which to measure the pres­
ence or absence o f  m onopoly power. Du Pont and its licensees 
were the only domestic manufacturers o f  cellophane, a clear, 
flexible and m oistureproof wrapping material. The Court saw the 
problem as one o f  defining the “market” in which to  determine 
whether du Pont had m onopoly power. The choices advocated by 
the combatants were cellophane or all flexible wrapping materials. 
Noting the interrelationship between market definitions and 
power in differentiated or non-standardized products and there­
fore that “power must be appraised in terms o f  the competitive 
market for the product,”63 the Court held the determination o f  
the market depended on “how far buyers will go  to substitute one 
commodity for another.”64 The Court appeared to settle upon  
cross-elasticity o f  demand as the sole test for determining the 
relevant m arket,65 even though its application o f  the test ignored
«  351 U.S. 377 (1956).
. 63 id . at 393.
<* Id.
65 “In c o n s id e rin g  w h a t is th e  re le v a n t m a rk e t fo r  d e te rm in in g  th e  
'C ontrol o f  p r ic e  a n d  c o m p e tit io n , n o  m o re  d e f in ite  ru le  c a n  b e  d ec la red
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the supply side o f  cross-elasticity and other potential o f
insight for determining the appropriate arena in which to measu 
the presence or absence o f  m onopoly power.64
W hile demand cross-elasticity may be useful in defimng som e 
contours o f  a “m arket,” the Court’s superficial opinion in du  
P on t set back intelligent analysis o f  market by'h y p o *
tatizing, “thingifying,” a concept that does not have= 
nronerties 67 The purpose o f  market definitions is not to measure 
.  s Z e  concrete a u d i t i n g  physical thing but to concePtuahze an 
appropriate arena o f  econom ic activity for determimng wheth 
one has accumulated or maintained undue power or d iscrete  
frx prices or exclude com petition m “any part o f  t ad o 
com m erce.- The way- the Court used the concept o f cross 
elasticity suggested it was seeking and ,t was p o ss .b l= to  ■dtscove 
tangible metes and bounds on the concept o f  a m arkel' f  “  J ?  
with material properties in econom ic analysis but not in I g
analysis.
zation of which may be illegal. Id. at 395.
66 For criticisms of the du Pont opinionsee S^ livan  ^
an analysis o f “supply substitutab.lHy” see Note The■Role 
Substitutability in Defimng the Relevant Market, 65 VaX . k e  .
(1979).
67 “Economic theory does not seem to be ^ ta u g h t  
U .P a .L .R e v . 994, 996 (1979).
68 15 U.S.C. § 2.
Monopolization : 19
Com m on law adjudication is an inductive process,69 and, 
where properly used in m onopolization litigation, the concept o f  
markets— if relevant at all70—is a means to an end rather .than an 
end itself. The end sought involves intangible judgments o f  
whether it is fair, practical and econom ically sensible to determine 
whether a defendant has exercised, obtained or possesses undue 
econom ic power or discretion not subject to the discipline o f  the 
competitive process and in a manner inconsistent with the social, 
political and econom ic goals o f  antitrust policy. Stating the goal 
of section 2 structural litigation and the function o f  market 
definitions in the course o f  analysis in this way, will not appeal to  
courts seeking to  hide discretion behind a seemingly immutable 
rule, litigants seeking certainty in outcom e, and econom ists claim­
ing certainty in their models. The legal process is, however, an 
art— not a simple-minded “science.”71
69 See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional A p­
proach, 35 C o lu m .L .R e v . 809 (1935).
70 See Marcus, supra note 66; Schmalensee, supra note 67, at 1004.
71 Artificial economic models are useful for limited insights so long as 
one is sensitive to the underlying metaphysical assumptions of the 
model; to the fact that the model is theoretical while the controversy is 
not; and, to the subtle distinction that the reasoning used to understand 
the application of the model within the constraints of its assumptions is 
deductive while legal analysis is primarily inductive; a process of 
drawing inferences. See Flynn, The Use o f  Economic Models, i f  Any, in 
Antitrust Litigation—A Reply, 12 S w .L .R e v .____(1980); Wiles, Ideol­
ogy, Methodology and Neoclassical Economics, 2 J. P o s t  K ey n esian  
E c o n . 155 (1979). For example, the neoclassical model is predicated 
upon psychological assumptions about individual human behavior, 
transfers those assumptions to group behavior in the firm, and con­
structs a rigidly coherent model purporting to explain economic behav­
ior in conformity with the assumptions of the model. M . H o l l i s  &  E . 
N e l l ,  R a t i o n a l  E c o n o m ic  M a n  (1975). If the assumptions inaccurately 
or incompletely reflect reality, use of the model as the major premise of 
a syllogism will inexorably lead to distortion or misuse of the minor 
premise and a false conclusion. Facts not consistent with the model will 
be ignored and values inconsistent with the premises of the model will 
not be accounted for even though the purpose of the law mandates
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The Court’s misuse o f  the cross-elasticity concept and its 
m ethodology in du P o n t  plunged section 2 analysis into a process 
that opened m onopolization litigation to a potentially endless 
struggle over drawing physical lines within what is essentially an 
intellectual and non-tangible concept. Pursuit o f  such a task, 
subsequently undermined by the C ourt’s rejection o f  cross-elastic­
ity o f  demand as the sole test for markets in B rown Shoe Co. v. 
United S ta tes,12 can produce a mental cramp similar to that 
experienced when one is asked: “W hat is length?” It is probable 
that the du P o n t op in ion’s superficial reliance on demand cross­
elasticity and the way the Court em ployed the concept produced a 
similar mental cramp by attempting to quantify an intangible 
concept for wave II enforcement officials in exploring new vistas 
where section 2 litigation was practical, justifiable and intellec­
tually defensible under the Court’s du P o n t standard for defining 
markets.73
The third decision signalling the end o f  wave II was an 
administrative one by the Attorney General in 1956 to settle the 
m onopolization suit against American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
and Western Electric Co. by a consent decree.74 The suit was filed f  
in 1949 and sought separation o f  the regulated com munications
otherwise. Many of the assumptions of neoclassical economic theorizing 
are under substantial attack. See H o l l i s  & N e ll ,  supra; A. E ic h n e r  
(ed.), A G u id e  t o  P o s t  K e y n e s ia n  E c o n o m ic s  (1980), reviewed by R. 
Heilbroner, 27 N.Y.Rev. o f  B o o k s  19 (Feb. 21, 1980). As new insights nf 
and ways of thinking about economic behavior come and go courts ‘ 
should consider economic theorizing only as an artificial and potential 
source for limited insights and as one beginning place for analysis and 
not the end of analysis. The function of law is too important to base its 
analysis upon the flimsy evidence produced by “science.” C f ,  Cahn, 
Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L .R ey 150 (1955) (discussing the use of jj{ 
“scientific” evidence to find segregated schools unconstitutional).
72 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
73 See Marcus, supra note 66.
74 United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cases 1 68,246 3  
(D.N.J. 1956).
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inonopoly o f  A.T.& T. from the unregulated manufacturing 
, operations o f  Western Electric charged with m onopolizing sale o f  
equipment to A.T.& T. The circumstances, w isdom , and propriety 
o f settling the suit by relief short o f  divorcement or divestiture 
have been severely criticized;75 apparently with justification, since 
"the Antitrust D ivision has determined it is necessary that virtually 
the same case be refiled, litigated, and pursued to  substantial 
structural rem edies.76
f For wave II m onopolization litigation, the A.T.& T. settlement 
signaled an unwillingness or an inability to litigate a complex 
structural m onopolization case or see it through to an effective 
remedy o f  divestiture. W hen coupled with the reluctance o f  courts 
to grant structural relief, growing com plexity in proving a. viola­
tion caused by decisions like du P on t, and the general non­
activist temper o f  the times, the A .T.&  T. settlement may be 
.^viewed as a statement impliedly confirming the passing o f  wave II 
rather than a cause o f  the passing.77 Like wave I, wave II receded
75 R e p o r t  o f  t h e  A n t i t r u s t  S u b co m m ittee  o f  t h e  H o u s e  J u d ic ia ry  
C om m ittee  o n  t h e  C o n s e n t  D e c re e  P r o g r a m  o f  t h e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  
J u s tic e  (1959).
76 United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., [1970-79 
Transfer Binder] T r a d e  R eg . Rep. (CCH) f  45,074, Case 2416 (D.D.C.
1974) (Civ. No. 74-1698). The district court has held that the action is 
not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, United States v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1976-2 Trade Cases f  61,097 (D.D.C.
' 1976), nor is the action barred by exclusive or primary jurisdiction of 
sthe F.C.C., United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
1976-2 Trade Cases 161,163 (D.D.C. 1976), 1978-1 Trade Cases 
1 61,859 (D.D.C. 1978).
, ' 77 The prevailing view of the health o f competition and the state of 
antitrust doctrine in the mid-50’s is reflected by the R e p o r t  o f  t h e  
A t to r n e y  G e n e r a l ’s N a t io n a l  C o m m itte e  t o  S tu d y  t h e  A n t i t r u s t  L aw s
(1955). Dissenting from the report, committee member Professor Louis 
1 B. Schwartz aptly characterized its tone as follows: “The central thread 
'xof the Majority Report unwinds from a core of belief that the competi­
tive situation in this country is satisfactory, and that the antitrust laws 
require modification chiefly to temper their rigor.” Schwartz, The 
Schwartz Dissent, 1 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  37 (1955).
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with a whimper and signaled a period o f  relative quiet on the 
m onopolization front— a period so quiet, that Professor  
Shepherd has characterized it as a time when section 2 had “gone  
into hiding.” 78
11. Wave 111: growing complexity, the use and misuse o f 
economics, and private enforcement o f section 2
A . The lull before the storm
Wave III will probably be said by future historians to have 
begun with the filing o f  the IBM complaint in 1969, a parting gift 
o f  the Johnson administration to the incoming N ixon administra­
tio n .79 That may not be totally accurate, since there were a few  
intervening Supreme Court opinions on m onopolization o f  some 
note, private m onopolization litigation had begun to increase 
substantially, the related areas o f  Clayton section 7 merger litiga­
tion and antitrust activity in the regulated industries had taken up 
considerable slack in structural antitrust concern and litigation, 
and the F.T.C. had been keeping its hand in m onopolization  
litigation by pursuing m onopolization cases in faternity p ins,80 
baseball cards,81 shrimp peeling machinery82 and m acaroni.83
78 Shepherd, supra note 12, at 595.
79 United States v. International Business Machines Corp., No. 69­
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The ongoing maneuvers in the IBM  case are 
summarized in [1970-79 Transfer Binder] T r a d e  R eg .R ep . (CCH) 
1 45,070, Case 2039.
so L. G. Balfour Co., 74 F.T.C. 345 (1968), a ff’d, L. G. Balfour Co. 
v. F.T.C., 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971). i
81 Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 67 F.T.C. 744 (1965).
82 Grand Caillou Packing Co., 65 F.T.C. 799 (1964), aff’d, sub nom. 
LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966). !
83 Golden Grain Macaroni Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] T ra d e
Reg.Rer (CCH) 1 19,521 (1971). For an analysis of these and other]
Some general observations about wave III should be made in 
order to place the doctrinal evolution in perspective. The actual 
litigated judgments o f  wave III thus far have been primarily the 
r e s u lt  o f  private litigation and not government enforcem ent. 
v Between waves II and III, there has been an explosive growth in 
private antitrust litigation, a widespread dissemination o f  anti­
trust knowledge and skills throughout the private bar, and a 
substantial developm ent o f  antitrust doctrine taking place in the 
context o f  private litigation. Wave III is also characterized by 
increased reliance on econom ic analysis and theorizing, with 
Contending schools o f  ideology seeking supremacy in the litera- 
,ture, in the classroom and in the courts.84 
i
J n  all probability, wave III will also be viewed by historians as 
occurring at a time when the litigation process in the federal 
courts was breaking down under the sheer crush o f  all types o f  
litigation. It will be viewed as a time characterized by the 
complexity o f  the issues encountered by the courts in antitrust 
and other business litigation, and the widespread abuse o f  discov­
ery, pretrial m otions and other devices o f  federal practice and 
procedure in litigating the cases.85
.More broadly, wave III will be viewed as taking place in a time 
of increased integration, yet stress and strain in our national and 
international econom ic systems. The leading cases have been 
^litigated during a time o f  decreased consumer activism and 
increased political power in the hands o f  corporations and gov-
J ^ C .  monopolization cases, see Rockefeller, Monopolization Under 
aF ^ tionS o f  the Federal Trade Commission Act, 41 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 635 
> . '(1972).
$ee Barbash, Big Corporations Bankroll Seminars fo r  U.S. Judges, 
Wash.Post, Jan. 20, 1980, at A-1.
v'. .'5 Th.e first six chaPters of NCRALP, supra note 11, consist of a 
' discussion of judicial management of complex antitrust litigation and 
~ coiitrol of abuse of the litigation process. Several procedural remedies
1 - aJ e P r °P O sed  for abuse and misuse o f the process by all sides in major 
‘antitrust litigation.
ernment bureaucracies and a willingness to use that power in the 
pursuit of corporate or bureaucratic goals and interests in the 
litigation process and in the political process.
Wave III may also be seen as a block of cases filed in the late 
60’s and early 70’s heyday of consumer activism which were then 
litigated in the late 70’s period of a general backlash against 
government regulation and intervention in the market and the rise 
of a conservation brand of neoclassical economic ideology in the 
courts and Congress.
Wave III monopolization litigation has been preceded by 
significant ripples altering the implications of some of the ele-j 
ments of wave II monopolization litigation. The du Pont test of j- 
cross-elasticity of demand as the sole test for defining markets in] 
monopolization cases and the superficial methodology of apply 
ing it were cast in doubt by International Boxing Club o f New) 
York, Inc. v. United States.*6 There the Court took account of a 
broader number of factors than a narrow test of demand cross­
elasticity based on price and the physical similarity of the prod­
uct—including consumer preference, revenues and industry recog-? 
nition—to find championship boxing matches a distinct market' 
for section 2 purposes from other boxing matches, sporting events] 
in general and other forms o f entertainment. i
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,17 a Clayton Act section 
788 merger case, the Court relegated the du Pont version o f the; 
cross-elasticity of demand test to one of defining the “outerj 
boundaries” of markets and invoked the concept of “sub-J 
markets” which “in themselves, constitute product markets for, 
antitrust purposes”89 within the outer boundaries of the market.
86 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
8v 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
88 15 U.S.C. § 18.
89 370 U.S. at 325.
“Submarkets,” the Court held, can be identified by “examining 
such practical mdicia as industry or public recognition of the 
submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar 
characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct 
p ric e s ’ sen si,iv i,y  ,o  p rice  c h a n g K - “ d 
The undermining of the du Pont cross-elasticity o f demand 
test and its methodology, as the primary touchstone for defining 
iparkets in monopolization litigation was completed in United 
States v. Grmnell Corp.,9' an important transition case between 
wave II and wave III In Grinnell the Court cited Brown Shoe for 
tje proposition that for section 2 purposes, as in section 7 cases 
there may be submarkets” which are considered separate 
economic entities for antitrust purposes.92 The concept of “sub­
markets” ls similar to the concept of “proximate cause” in to r ts -  
a fiction bordering on a dangerous illusion, if taken literally but 
necessary verbiage used by the law to circumvent some contrary 
egal proposition, to achieve policy goals not presently concep-
r rfW In r f8f rUlCS ° r t0 Change the law without appearing to 
do so. Legal fictions are a device, as Maitland put it “to get
modern results out of medieval premises.”94 The risk o f leea l
act I T  1S’ ° f coJirse>that the unwary will believe them and try to 
act accordingly. Invocation of the “submarket” concept in Brown
£ 5  r " r miuf racape ,rom thePont. The concept opened up analysis of relevant markets in 
merger and monopolization cases to a myriad of different tests
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*> Id.
-*1 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
Id. at 572.
(19MV*Thode’ w * ? ’ € ™sa} ion Doctrines, 41 T e x a s  L .R ev . 42
Determine C a u J t * * Use °f  the Hypothetical Case to veiermme Cause in Fact, 46 T e x a s  L .R e v  423 (1968).
p '0 " E ssavs p “ s™ > t o c „ « l e s  W il- 
ams U4 (1947). See also, L . F u l l e r ,  L e g a l  F ic t io n s  (1967).
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and m ethodologies fractionating market definitions for defining S 
the appropriate arena in which to  measure com petitive effects in \ 
merger cases or power to fix prices or exclude com petition in I 
m onopolization cases in light o f  the goals o f  the statute involved. |
- fif
J
Grinnell also suggested that tests for defining markets in 
Clayton A ct section 7 analysis were interchangeable with tests |  
used for defining markets in m onopolization cases under section
2. The Court stated:
i
We see no reason to differentiate between “line” of commerce in the A
context of the Clayton Act and “part” of commerce for purposes o f f
the Sherman Act.95 .
, /e
A  bit o f  reflection might suggest som e reasons for sensitivity I 
to  potential circumstances for drawing a distinction between'] 
market definitions in m onopolization and merger cases. The goals |  
o f the statutes differ— section 7 is concerned with incipient threats;] 
to  the com petitive ideal as a result o f  stock or asset acquisitions.!] 
Section 2 is concerned with the actual displacement, by market j 
structure or unlawful conduct, o f  the com petitive process as the j 
mechanism for allocating resources, stimulating and determining, 
the rate o f  innovation, establishing price, and establishing the 
terms and conditions for entry and exit from markets. J
The tendency to “thingify” markets and believe they exist, 
rather than view market tests as an intellectual means for fairly 
and constructively engaging in the analytical process o f  determ in| 
ing whether or not to  draw an inference from the facts that thej 
policy o f  the particular law involved has been violated, caif 
produce both confusion and error. C onfusion and error occur” 
where interchangeability o f  market tests takes place oblivious tq 
the different policy goals o f  the laws involved from case to  case|
A  mechanical jurisprudence replaces a sensitive and sensible’ 
analytical process.96 The Clayton A c t’s concern with incipien|
________________________________,________________ ___________________ i
■ I
** 384 U.S. at 573. J
96 See Comment, Relevant Geographic M arket Delineation: The Ing 
terchangeability o f  Standards in Cases Arising Under Section 2 o f  tht
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Threats to the com petitive ideal may result in narrow market tests 
in light o f  the more clearly populist goals o f  the statute.97 
Moreover, the degree o f  incipiency, the facts o f  a particular case 
and the ideology-of the decisionmaker trigger legal condemnation  
o f an acquisition well short o f  monopoly. Actual displacement o f  
.competition by the persistent possession or use o f  m onopoly  
power, the primary concern o f  section 2 o f  the Sherman A ct, may 
occur through a variety o f  means ranging from abusive behavior, 
fixing prices or excluding com petitors, to the structure o f  a firm,
\ where structure itself is claimed to have the necessary effect o f  
fixing prices or excluding com petitors.98 Each type o f  case is 
^analyzed pursuant to the A L C O A  formula o f  proof o f  markets, 
proof o f  power in the markets defined and proof o f  conduct even 
though behavioral cases emphasize the conduct element o f  the 
formula and structural cases emphasize the market-power part o f  
the formula. Thus, the same verbal test for a market may produce 
different conceptualizations o f  a market, depending upon  
\yhether it is claimed com petition has been displaced by behav­
ioral means, structural effects or some com bination o f  both. 
Viewing market tests as objective criteria capable o f  establishing 
physically identifiable products and places, rather than functional 
means for sensibly engaging the facts in the process o f  rationally 
^achieving a judgment in conform ity with the goals o f  the particu-
Sherman A ct and Section 7 o f  the Clayton Act, 1979 Duke L .J. 1152. 
For an analysis of “mechanical jurisprudence” see, R. Aldisert, The 
Nature o f  the Judicial Process: Revisited, 49 U.Cinn.L.Rev. 1, 4 (1980).
97 “The dominant theme pervading Congressional consideration of 
..the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising 
tide of economic concentration in the American economy.” Brown Shoe 
vCo? v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962). For a comprehensive 
review of the legislative history of the Clayton Act see D. M a r t in ,  
M e r g e r s  a n d  t h e  C la y to n  A c t  221-310 (1959).
s-'58 Judge Wyzanski’s summary of the different legal tests for proving 
, unlawful monopolization in United Shoe, quoted in text accompanying 
note 118 infra, is a reflection of the court’s responding to different 
■means perceived as displacing competition in violation of the goals of 
‘the Sherman Act.
lar statute involved and the theory o f  illegality, can generate 
confusion, misapplications o f  the law, mistaken remedies and, 
what is aptly described by Felix Cohen, as the “transcendental |  
nonsense” o f  attempting to  “thingify” abstract legal concepts.”
The majority in Grinnell purported to  apply objective tests to |  
define narrow local markets from which it could and should be \  
inferred the defendant had obtained m onopoly power. The result I 
was called “procrustean” by the dissent;100 i.e ., that the majority § 
had tailored its market definitions to the defendant’s business, 
rather than analyze the facts in light o f  econom ic criteria and the I 
policy goals o f  the law for defining markets. In the dissenter’s 
view, an objectively defined market was essential to  a proper ‘ 
determination o f  whether a violation had occurred and in order t o ; 
shape a decree “to deal with the consequences o f  the m onop­
oly.” 101 C onfusion in the Grinnell market tests is attributable to 
the circumstance that the facts, at best, supported a behavioral; 
theory o f  illegality,102 while the Supreme Court chose to uphold s 
the lower court’s finding o f  behavioral m onoplization on a; 
structural theory o f  m onopolization. The lower court finding o f  f 
illegality clearly stressed anticom petitive behavior to obtain and! 
maintain m onopoly power as the predicate o f  section 2 illegality:
In cases like this where the Sherman Act ban against monopoliz­
ing is invoked against defendants who have secured dominance of a
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99 Cohen, supra note 69.
100 384 U.S. at 587. Judge Wyzanski, the trial judge in Grinnell, hasj 
recently stated that he now agrees with the dissent that the market was| 
improperly defined in Grinnell. Wyzanski, The Judicial View o f  Sectionyi
2 Litigation, 10 Sw .U .L .R ev . 45, 48 (1978).
101 384 U.S. at 586.
102 Defendants were charged in the trial court with a conspiracy to; 
restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, an unlawful; 
combination or conspiracy to monopolize trade in violation of section 2, 
an attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2, and monopolization] 
in violation of section 2. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F.Supp. 
244, 248-49 (D.R.I. 1964).
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small industry by imposing unlawful restraints of trade and by a 
steady stream of acquisitions of competitive enterprises, the usual 
rhetoric is out of place. All that is at stake here is the rooting out of a 
plant of minor importance in the rich forest of the American 
economy, not because it overshadows us, or even many of us, but 
because it represents an ultimate growth from seeds which have been 
declared unlawful. Congress in Section 1 of the Sherman Act out­
lawed the means and in Section 2 outlawed the end achieved by those 
means.103
,  By seeking to conform  the facts o f  a behavorial theory o f  
monopolization to a structural theory o f  unlawful m onopoliza­
tion, the Supreme Court’s application o f  market criteria in 
Grinnell indeed appeared procrustean and confusing. Since the 
lower court viewed Grinnell’s behavior and not its structure as the 
source o f  the displacement o f  the competitive process, market 
tests were given relatively short shrift by the trial court. In effect, 
the trial court adopted a market test similar to that proposed in a 
critical com ment on the du P o n t  case: if a thing may be restrained 
in violation o f  section 1 o f the Sherman Act, it may be m onopo­
lized within the meaning o f section 2 o f  the A c t.104 This may be 
an appropriate test in a purely behavioral case under section 2, if 
one views the statute as banning unilateral as well as conspirato­
rial displacements o f  the competitive process.
’ ~ Confusion in applying market tests can become manifest if 
fone fails to recognize two strains o f  unlawful m onopolization < 
, precedent: structural m onopolization and behavioral m onopoliza- 
1 tion. Confusion can be com pounded by a m ethodology that views 
1 legal principles as operating with the machine-like logic o f a
<r .
, 103 Id. at 258.
*9iMarcus, supra note 66, at 195. The trial court concluded its opinion 
on violation with the observation: “though the government may be 
jarred from getting under Section 1 relief directly against the restraints, 
'CiFmay, nonetheless, under Section 2 get relief against the consequences 
restraints if, but, of course, only if, they have gone so far as to 
•yi0qlve continuing monopolization. Having failed to nip the bud, the
* {Government may still pluck the flower of evil.” 236 F.Supp. at 258.
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“gumball dispenser.” 105 Wave III courts have continued to analyze 
both behavioral and structural cases pursuant to the general " 
analytical scheme o f  A L C O A  for m onopolization cases and often ‘ 
by a m ethodology akin to a “gumball m achine” m odel o f  the j 
legal process: definition o f  markets, determination o f  m onopoly I 
power in the markets defined and som e “plus” o f  conduct ? 
indicating the m onopoly power identified has been obtained or 5 
maintained by conduct at odds with legitimate and acceptable ■ 
com petitive tactics. The facts are plugged into the m odel and out j 
pops the “right answer” neatly packaged for consumption; a , 
form o f  long-discredited legal positivism . Standards and policy j  
are used to categorize facts, rather than being used as intellectual j 
guides for a beginning place to inductively analyze facts. Thus, I 
wave III courts are faced with a legacy from A L C O A  and ; 
Grinnell requiring categorization o f  the facts into a market - 
definition, power, and conduct sequence without regard to 
whether the thrust o f  the evidence is a behavioral theory o f '  
unlawful m onopolization or a structural theory o f  illegality. »
Categorizing the analysis in this way can mislead one into 
believing proof o f  the m onopolization offense can proceed in a ' 
linear fashion much like the parsing o f  sentence structure in a 
grade school grammar class. Instead, the problem is a circular one 
o f  the interdependence o f  market definitions and m onopoly j  
power, since court's are seeking to define workable and predictable I  
legal standards (with which to begin an analysis o f  the facts) j 
prohibiting displacement o f  the com petitive ideal by m onopoly * 
where achieved by a variety o f  different means. Moreover, untidy |  
facts not fitting the formula are ignored and the interaction o f  the 5 
factors deemed relevant are not seen. Thus, the em ployment o f  
market tests in primarily behavioral cases may bear only a verbal ■ 
likeness to the em ployment o f similar tests in structural cases o r ' 
section 7 merger cases and vice versa, with a variety o f  changing J 
meanings for the elements o f  the offense across the spectrum' 
from behavioral to structural m onopolization cases. '
105 See Flynn, The Role o f  Economic Analysis, I f  Any, In Antitrust4
Litigation—A Reply, 12 Sw .U .L .R ev.____, ____(1980). 'J
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 ^ As the level o f  predation in a case rises, the level o f  judicial 
concern with market definition and the niceties o f locating market 
power justifiably decreases; and, in some cases, concern about 
closely analyzing each becom es minimal or even nonexistent— 
although seldom expressly admitted. For example, in Woods 
Exploration & P rod . Co. v. A L C O A , 106 the Fifth Circuit upheld a
- market definition o f  natural gas production from a 4 ,000-acre gas 
^ field in Texas in a m onopolization case. The court did so because 
the defendant’s illegal and predatory actions, including the falsifi-
• cation o f  production inform ation filed with regulatory authorities 
‘and designed to trigger regulatory action excluding the plaintiff 
: : from the gas field, warranted the im position o f  antitrust liability. 
The traditional analytical model for structural m onopolization  
litigation was conform ed with in name only,' while the goals o f  
antitrust policy were served by punishing exlusionary behavior 
depriving the plaintiff o f  the right to succeed or fail by virtue o f  
the competitive process and not the defendant’s econom ic power.
- In at least one m onopolization case, D enver P etroleum  Corp. 
v..Shell O il C o . , 107 a district court held market analysis unneces- , 
sary in light o f  illegal practices (denying plaintiff access to a 
common carrier pipeline) specifically intended to and done with 
the purpose o f  excluding the plaintiff from the market. The court 
.stated:
When one must “look” for a monopoly, determining a relevant 
^ market in which to look and in which to evaluate competitive effects 
is obviously and essential first step. But when, with an illegal practice 
, such as is present here in mind, one can look to an area and see the 
existence of monopoly power, not by inference from market share, 
but by determining actual ability to exclude competition and control 
prices, there appears to be no real need to go further.101
t •-. The structural line o f  cases, on the other hand, involves an
- 'analytical process focusing on market structure or the unex-
'
^106 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
; J«306 F.Supp. 289 (D.Colo. 1969).
, !08 Id. at 304.
plained persistence o f  an overwhelming market share in a firm in 
the tradition o f  the A L C O A  case. Litigation falling in this 
tradition confronts an ongoing process o f extrapolating the mean­
ing o f  the broad and vague categories o f  analysis in m onopoliza­
tion cases o f  market definitions, power and conduct in the 
context o f  factual circumstances exploring the persistence o f  a 
firm’s large market share. W here the distinctiveness o f  the 
markets involved becom es clearer and power in those markets 
more pronounced in cases like A L C O A  and U nited Shoe, judicial 
concern with the level o f  predation in the conduct element 
becom es less and even nonexistent in som e cases. A  sliding 
evidentiary scale appears to  be employed; one which deempha- 
sizes the conduct element where proof o f  persistent and signifi­
cant m onopoly power is present. A n implicit recognition and 
assumption that the ideal o f  maintaining the com petitive process 
as the rule o f  trade requires the fashioning o f  legal standards 
permitting the dissipation o f  persistent and substantial m onopoly  
power, even where it is not obtained or maintained by predatory 
conduct, appears to  underlie this line o f  analysis. The m ethodol­
ogy is a confirm ation o f  the inductive nature o f  legal analysis 
where the facts shape and give meaning to  legal principles; rather 
than a primarily deductive process where the principles dictate the 
facts regardless o f  the circumstances o f  the case.
Wave III, therefore, has found itself left with a confusing state 
o f affairs for litigating m onopolization cases. The general analyti­
cal framework for identifying unlawful m onopolization is w e ll' 
known, but its meaning and the interrelationship o f  the elements I 
o f  the framework shifts and changes with the facts o f  each case. j 
The resulting uncertainty may be disquieting to  those whose 1 
world is predicated on a simple-minded and symmetrical model |  
into which all recalcitrant facts must either be classified or i 
ignored. It is not disturbing however, to pragmatic lawyers trained J 
in the com m on law process and accustomed to dealing with facts |  
and reality in light o f  policy and in the context o f  the lim itations! 
o f  the judicial process rather than subjecting reality to the dictates^ 
o f  a preordained theological model o f  what “ought” to  be.
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. Despite legal positivist tendencies to treat law as a deductive 
process from fixed a priori models or rules and som e significant 
academic clamor that the positivist model ought to  be followed in 
antitrust analysis, legal analysis under a com m on law system o f  
adjudication remains a process o f  drawing inferences from facts 
in light o f  general principles and not the jurisprudentially discre­
dited process o f  deductive logic from fixed rules. 109 The distinc­
tion is o f  more than academic interest; since much o f  the confu- 
. sion in wave III litigation stems from this ongoing difference in 
methodology and failure to distinguish between facts giving rise 
to a behavioral theory o f  m onopolization and those giving rise to 
a'structural theory o f  m onopolization.
Wave III at this point in its evolution is characterized by the 
filing o f  a relatively minimal number o f large government struc­
tural cases, the failure to litigate those government cases expedi­
tiously, and a large number o f  private m onopolization cases, 
primarily structurally based, which are producing the significant 
court opinions fashioning the wave III law o f m onopolization. 
Many o f  the leading private suits stress a structural theory o f  
liability, but became heavily involved in conduct issues because o f  
the necessity o f  proving the violation alleged caused the plaintiff 
measurable antitrust damage.
’ Conduct issues became involved at two levels o f  causation  
each often confused with the other. One level o f  “causation,” 
causation in a legal sense, is the proof o f  conduct necessary to 
make out a violation o f  the law according to the traditional 
 ^analytical scheme for section 2 cases. On a second level, causation 
in fact, conduct evidence is relied upon to link the violation o f  the 
 ^ law to measurable antitrust injury suffered by the plaintiff. Both '• 
forms o f  causation are present in a private suit seeking damages 
for unlawful m onopolization and conduct evidence to prove the 
one is often relied upon to prove the other. But, as Brunswick
i 109 See Flynn, supra note 105; Aldisert, supra note 96.
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Corp. v. P u eblo  B ow l-A -M at, I n c .'10 demonstrates, proof o f  a ' 
violation o f  the antitrust laws does not necessarily supply proof ’ 
that the violation caused antitrust injury or the particular injury a j 
plaintiff’s damage proof seeks to  establish. Conversely, proof that j 
a defendant’s actions injured a plaintiff does not warrant an | 
assumption that the antitrust laws have been violated. The court j 
must still find that the defendant has violated antitrust policy by I 
breaching duties im posed by the antitrust laws. The latter issue, |  
posing the legal questions o f the scope o f  the duties im posed by |  
the antitrust laws and the standard o f  proof for demonstrating a 4 
breach o f  the duties, is one o f  determining the policy and goals o f  '  
the statute. These issues are determined by the legislative history |  
o f the Sherman A ct, experience in enforcing the antitrust laws, I 
the limits o f  the judicial process, the wisdom  that can be derived * 
from related disciplines, the facts and circumstances o f  the case, * 
and current perceptions o f  econom ic and business reality. 111 r
• 'A
Wave III m onopolization litigation has also been faced with j 
the ambiguity left by wave II o f  drawing an intelligible line i 
between conduct the court may identify as m onopolistic and that i 
which can be identified as consistent with short-run and long-run I 
goals o f  maintaining the ideal o f  a com petitive process as the rule 1 
o f trade. f
Wave II m onopolization litigation, particularly A L C O A  and i  
U nited Shoe  left tw o issues unclear and am biguous with regard to % 
conduct in acquiring and maintaining m onopoly power in such a I 
way that it could be concluded that one with m onopoly power in J 
a relevant market had unlawfully “m onopolized .” The first issue 1
no 429 U.S. 477 (1977). See, also, Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble , 
Co., 1979-1 Trade Cases 5 62,675 (9th Cir. 1979); Areeda, Antitrust ■ 
Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 H a rv .L .R e v . 1137 (1976). *
111 For an antitrust opinion following this form of duty-risk analysis, 
see Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prod., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970). |  
Duty-risk analysis has been applied explicitly, but not generally followed \ 
in federal securities litigation. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th 
Cir. 1974). I
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... is what kind o f  conduct in acquiring or maintaining a m onopoly
'is “not honestly industrial” ; not attributable to  superior skill, 
foresight and industry, or not attributable to natural m onopoly  
forces in the industry.
Judge H and, it will be remembered, held som e added element 
of conduct necessary in order to  draw a line between m onopoly  
‘‘ power obtained or maintained as a result o f  praiseworthy com ­
petition and m onopoly power gained or maintained by means 
other than praiseworthy com petitive tactics. H e did so on the 
premise that section 1 o f  the A ct urges the firm to  com pete and 
“the Act does not mean to condem n the resultant o f  those very 
; forces which it is its prime object to  foster: fin is  opus coronat. 
" The successful com petitor having been urged to com pete, must
- not be turned upon when he w ins.” 112 The logic o f  this analysis 
has always been quite attractive, so long as one does not question  
the premises on which it is based.
- Section 1 o f  the Sherman A ct, however, does not command 
. one to com pete but is a negative prohibition against one com bin­
ing or conspiring n o t to  com pete. It is the statement o f  a basic 
public policy prohibiting the displacement o f the competitive
- process by a contract, com bination or conspiracy in unreasonable 
restraint o f  trade. Section 1 o f  the A ct may more fairly be read as 
a statement o f  public policy mandating com petition as the rule o f  
trade by which whoever chooses to  engage in trade governs their 
conduct and not as a specific instruction to  individual competitors 
to compete to the death in a Spencerian struggle for survival.
■ - In accord with this understanding o f  section 1, section 2 
means that the unilateral displacement o f  com petition by monop- 
~ ply or by an attempt or conspiracy to fix prices or exclude 
competition as the rule o f  trade in an industry is prohibited, just 
as section 1 prohibits the displacement o f  com petition by con­
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tract, com bination or conspiracy restraining trade. 113 The section
2 prohibitions on displacing com petition extend to conspiratorial 
or unilateral conduct, and persistent possession o f  m onopoly  
power fixing prices or excluding competitors as the result o f  
behavior or structure unreasonably displacing com petition as the 
rule o f  trade and not in conform ity with the long-run prom otion  
o f  the competitive process. 114 This reading o f  the statute views it
113 This is the implication of Judge Wyzanski’s reading of the Act in 
his Grinnell opinion, quoted supra note 104 and Judge Hand’s state- ; 
ment in ALCOA: “[T]here can be no doubt that the vice of restrictive 
contracts and of monopoly is really one, it is the denial to commerce of i 
the supposed protection of competition.” 148 F.2d at 428. ;
114 Sorting out joint action, unilateral predatory conduct, and industry s 
structure which is antithetical to the maintenance of competition in an 
industry from that which is not, is a difficult but not insurmountable 
task. As in the case of tort litigation, it must be done on a case-by-case 
basis. Over time, recognizable categories of joint or unilateral conduct 
and industry structure in light of the characteristics of the industry 
provide a reasonable guide for litigation and industry activity. For 
example, the exchange of specific and current price information by 
competitors in a concentrated industry or joint buying programs should * 
be understood as likely unlawful under section 1 or 2 of the Sherman 
Act. See, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978); United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Ameri-' 
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. ’ 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Refusals to deal by 
natural or regulated monopolist pose clear risks of antitrust liability. 
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United 
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 
Inc., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1980). Business practices by a persistent' 
monopolist enhancing or maintaining entry barriers, even though nor­
mal business practices, may provide the bases for finding a monopolist 
has monopolized. See United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d ' 
Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra note^ 
34. But see, Note, The Conduct Standard fo r  Legally Acquired Monop­
olies Under Section 2 o f  the Sherman Act, 49 U.Cinn.L .R e v . 206, 
(1980). '
On the other hand, merely intending to take advantage o f innovation 
and efficiencies to attain a larger share of the market, without some,, 
added element of conduct inconsistent with the competitive process, is 
not sufficient evidence to support a finding that section 2 is violated,^ 
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 3 T rad e  Req.Reh (CCH)  ^21,770 
(F.T.C. 1980) (dismissing complaint charging an attempt to monopolize"' 
the titanium dioxide market).
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as stating as public policy that the competitive process governs 
conduct in the sphere o f  private econom ic activity, not as a 
command to individuals to com pete nor does the statute necessar­
i l y  reward the successful com petitor achieving a m onopoly with 
:the quiet life o f  a m onopolist. Since this understanding does not 
Command individuals to com pete but mandates com petition as 
the regime governing private conduct, the Hand premise finding 
' unfair the prosecution o f  a m onopolist obtaining m onopoly  
'•power by fair means rather than foul does not pertain. The 
possibility o f  criminal penalties visited upon a violator however, 
supports a claim for proving moral blameworthiness before 
'criminal sanctions for the prohibited conduct or structure are 
employed. 115
'"'t J
Under this approach, the questions posed are: whether there is, 
an unreasonable displacement o f  the competitive process; if  there 
is,' whether it is pursuant to conduct or structure which is 
anticompetitive and not procompetitive; and, what, if  any, rem­
edy is necessary to restore com petition as the rule o f  trade in the 
industry. A L C O A ’s use o f  conduct evidence for fairness purposes 
'in a case o f  a persistent structural m onopolist shifts section 2 
from analyzing whether com petition has been displaced to an 
^analysis o f  the means by which the displacement was achieved or 
'is maintained. Such a standard may be rational for behavorial 
cases j but the consequence has been to  shift subsequent structural 
-monopolization litigation into the void o f  sorting out conduct 
which is “honestly industrial” from that which is not in circum­
stances where the concern o f  the law is structural and not 
’behavioral; a “black hole” which subsequent structural litigation 
has not escaped from but has becom e overwhelmed by.
.£ £  ■ ■fy*
The second issue left unclear and ambiguous by A L C O A  and 
- United Shoe  is who bears the burden o f  proving or disproving the
J is Sec- United States v. United Gypsum Co., 428 U.S. 422 (1978); 
cGarvey, The Sherman A ct and Vicious Will: Developing Standards fo r  
Criminal Intent in Sherman A ct Prosecutions, 29 C a th .U .L .R e v . 389
(1980);
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requisite plus o f conduct labeling the obtaining or possession o f  
m onopoly power unlawful m onopolization? The answer remained 
ambiguous even after the Supreme Court’s last generalization  
about the legal standards for unlawful m onopolization in United 
States v. Grinnell. 116 In Grinnell, the Court defined the offense o f ; 
m onopolization as follows:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two 1
&elements: (1) the possession o f monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power I 
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a \ 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 117
The Grinnell trial judge, Judge W yzanski, purported to  adopt ; 
the structural m onopolization test suggested by him self in United J 
Shoe that a “bold, original court mindful o f  what legal history |  
teaches about the usual” might follow  in section 2 cases, namely: ■
[0]nce the Government has borne the burden of proving what is the: 
relevant market and how predominant a share of that markets 
defendant has, it follows that there are rebuttable presumptions that j  
defendant has monopoly power and has monopolized in violation of j  
§ 2. The Government need not prove, and in a well conducted trial I  
ought not to be allowed to consume time in needlessly provingjj 
defendant’s predatory tactics, if any, or defendant’s pricing orj 
production, or selling or leasing, or marketing, or financial policies] 
while in this predominant role. If defendant does wish to go forward, ! 
it is free to do so and to maintain the burden of showing that its] 
eminence is traceable to such highly respectable causes as superiority J  
in means and methods which are “honestly industrial,” as JudgeJ 
Hand characterized the supposititious socially desirable monopoli--^ 
zer."*
The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to adopt or reject 
Judge W yzanski’s test in view o f  a record demonstrating that the; 
m onopoly power acquired was achieved “in large part by unlaw-| 
ful and exclusionary practices.” 119 The Court however, stated, in aj 
footnote, the following:
384 U.S. 563 (1966).
iii Id. at 570-71.
'I* 236 F.Supp. at 248. 
us 384 U.S. at 576*
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Since the record clearly shows that this monopoly power was 
consciously acquired, we have no reason to reach the further position 
of the District Court that once monopoly power is shown to exist, the 
burden is on the defendants to show that their dominance is due to 
skill, acumen and the like. 120
The consequences o f  these issues left ambiguous by wave II 
for wave III litigation include considerable controversy over what 
conduct will prove or disprove the additional element o f  conduct 
fo r  unlawful m onopolization; who bears the burden o f  proving or 
disproving that conduct; and, in private litigation, whether con­
duct evidence proving unlawful m onopolization is interchange­
able with or identical to evidence required to prove the causation  
element in treble damage litigation. These kinds o f  issues have 
come to predominate wave III litigation to date, along with 
confusion over the interrelationship, changing meanings, and 
application o f  the concepts o f  markets, m onopoly power, and 
conduct in proving a violation and controversy over the basic 
policy goals o f  section 2 o f  the Sherman Act.
B. Analysis o f  the leading wave III monopolization cases
, The leading wave III m onopolization opinions, court decisions 
noteworthy for the novelty o f  the issues presented, changes in the 
4octrinal evolution o f  the law and quality or lack thereof o f the 
analysis involved, may be divided into three categories: ( 1) the 
computer cases: Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,12' Greyhound Com­
puter Corp. v. IBM Corp.,'22 California Computer Products, Inc. 
v. IBM Corp.,'21 and, Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM 
Corp.;'1* (2) the Berkey case: Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
J20 Id. at 576, n.7.
‘?i 367 F. Supp. 258 (D.Okla. 1973), rev’d, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir
1975), cert, dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1976).
“ 1^ 559 F-2d 488 (9th cir- 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
‘v  613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
.-‘24481 F.Supp. 965 (N.D.Cal. 1979).
I|
K o d a k  C o .; '25 and (3) the “R ea L em o n ” case, B orden, In c .'16 I t * 
should be noted, that to  date and with the exception o f  the I 
B orden  case and the R euben H . D onnelley C orp. case, 127 to be •;
I--------------------~ ' J
125 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, den ied,____U.S---------(1980). §
126 [1976-79 Transfer Binder] T r a d e  R e g .R e r  (CCH) 1 21,490 (F.T.C. J 
1978).
127 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e r  (CCH) 1 21,650 (1979), rev’d, sub nom., Official 
Airline Guides, Inc. v. F.T.C., 1980-2 Trade Cases f  63,544 (2d Cir.. 
1980). In that case, the F.T.C. held that the “arbitrary” refusal by the 
sole publisher of a comprehensive listing of airline schedules to integrate, 
the schedules o f certificated carriers with commuter airlines constituted j 
unlawful monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
The Commission found that the refusal to integrate schedules causedj 
competitive injury to commuter lines where they competed with certifk 
cated carriers and that Donnelley’s refusal to integrate schedules wasj 
without justification in view of less restrictive alternatives available for 
resolving any concerns Donnelley may have with misleading consumers’ 
on the quality and safety of commuter carriers. The Commission held 
that a monopolist had affirmative duties to the market it served, an 
issue discussed infra, part III.
The case raised unique issues which were creatively dealt with in an 
outstanding opinion by Commissioner Pitofsky; and then reversed by a 
curious opinion of the Second Circuit. In view of the uniqueness of the 
issues and the relevance of the case to the discussion in part III infra, it 
is not discussed in the main text at this point. In addition, the.! 
substantive issues of the case fall within the line of cases concerning 
refusals to deal by a monopolist, a well-defined area of monopolization 
litigation not generally dealt with in this analysis. See Otter Tail Power 
Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 
U.S. 383 (1912); City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co.,5!’ 
616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843" 
(6th Cir. 1980); Note, Refusals to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopo­
lists, 87 H a rv ,L .R e v . 1720 (1974).
After the completion of this manuscript, the F .T .C . issued its opinion 
in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 3 T r a d e  R eg .R ep . (CCH) 1 21,770
(1980). In that case du Pont was charged with attempting to monopolize 
the titanium dioxide market by consciously expanding the capacity of its 
plants to absorb new demand in circumstances likely to result in a 
significant increase in du Pont’s market share. Drawing upon monopoly 
zation precedent and recent scholarly comment on predatory pricing!
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discussed infra  in part III, the evolution o f  wave III legal 
standards in decided cases has been taking place in the context o f  
.private antitrust litigation.
This is a significant factor in assessing the meaning and 
implications o f  third wave legal standards for the m onopolization  
offense o f  section 2 o f  the Sherman Act, since private litigation  
requires p roof o f  standing,” causation and damages as well as 
proof o f  the substantive elements o f  a violation. Private damage 
actions, unlike m ost government litigation, usually entail a jury 
trial, further com plicating the evolution o f  substantive standards 
by the need to separate judge and jury functions. 128 D oubts about 
these added factors or confusing them with proof o f  a violation in 
. a private suit may influence or significantly alter assessment o f  the 
elements o f the substantive offense, com plications usually not 
present in the analysis o f  government cases charging a violation o f  
section 2 o f  the Sherman Act.
I ' 1. t h e  c o m p u t e r  c a s e s  The series o f  computer industry cases 
 ^ selected for analysis does not include all the private computer 
. cases;129 but represents the leading opinions on substantive mono-
,aiid other strategic conduct by firms with market power, the Commis­
sion unanimously rejected the complaint. Although an attempt to 
monopolize case, the discussion of conduct issues by Commissioner 
Clanton provides insights into the Commission’s views on conduct 
issues for monopolization cases generally.
;128 See, Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in 
' Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U .Pa.L .Rev. 829 (1980).
129 See, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F.Supp. 423
1978)> af f ’d p e r  curiam ,____F.2d____ (1980). The appeal in
’ the Ninth Circuit presented many of the same issues as the other 
’ .computer cases, but resulted in a per curiam panel affirmance on the 
' basis of CalComp. The trial court analysis of market definitions, 
'.monopoly power and predatory pricing are less detailed and, in many 
respects, superficial when compared to the other computer cases. The 
' th^i 1 controversy of the case was the trial court’s ruling that, in 
/the event of remand, the demand for a jury trial would be considered 
stricken in view of the complexity o f the case. This holding has 
jProvoked considerable controversy, ably summarized, analyzed and
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polization standards to date. The computer cases also illustrate1 
well the difficulties o f  assessing the evolution o f  legal standard! 
for proof o f  violation when the law evolves in the context ofil 
private litigation where p roof o f  standing, causation in fact and] 
damages are also present.
In Telex,'10 a manufacturer o f  peripheral equipment used i |  
conjunction with computer “main frames” charged IBM wit$ 
m onopolization and attempts to m onopolize the markets foj; 
peripheral equipment used with computers generally and in “sub| 
markets” for peripheral equipment which was “plug compatible.! 
with IBM computers. “Peripheral equipm ent” included magnetic 
tape products, memory products, impact printer products a n | 
com munications products which are used by plugging them in t o l  
computer processing unit or “C P U .” The com patibility o f  peripra 
eral equipment with a C PU  is determined by the electronil 
tolerances o f  the CPU and the design and configuration o f  th | 
plug interface device between the C PU  and the peripheral devic<§ 
Consequently, peripheral devices are not readily interchangeable! 
without m odification, between one manufacturer’s C PU  ancy 
another’s nor between the different C P U ’s manufactured by $1 
single firm.
In Telex, the trial court focused on what buyers could do iii 
defining the market; rejecting IBM ’s claim that the market should; 
be defined to include all peripherals and not just those plug* 
com patible with IBM C P U ’s or the yet narrower claim o f  suli] 
markets consisting o f  specific devices plug com patible with spra 
cific models o f  IBM C P U ’s. The trial court held: ^
[A] manufacturer’s product or product line may constitute a relevant! 
product market for purposes of section 2 if in the realities of th| 
market-place widespread competition has been developed around||
' n
found wanting in Arnold, supra note 128. The brief opinion affirming/ 
the lower court decision added little to the law of monopolization or\| 
reliable basis for predicting the views of the other judges on the Nintnj 
Circuit.
^  Supra note 121.
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,■>. as a separate economic entity recognized and acted upon by the 
\  manufacturer, competitors and end users as such. 131
IBM’s argument that the market should be defined by “supply 
substitutability” or the ability o f  manufacturers to shift the 
compatibility o f  their peripherals from one brand o f  computer to  
another, was rejected. This significant and central trial court 
finding was reversed by the court o f  appeals after a selective 
search o f  the record by the appellate court.'33
>■ The court o f  appeals agreed with IBM’s contention that 
manufacturer ease in switching manufacturing o f  peripherals 
from those compatible with one brand o f  CPU to that o f  another 
required the market be defined to include all peripherals. Relying 
on Uu P on t, the court o f  appeals reasoned that peripherals plug 
compatible with other computers were interchangeable with pe­
ripherals plug com patible with IBM computers. 134 The trial 
court’s factual inquiry into the cost and com plexity o f  modifying 
CPU’s to achieve compatibility resulted in a narrow definition o f  
markets and submarkets o f  peripherals plug compatible with IBM 
CPU s dictated a finding o f  overwhelming market share and 
hence m onopoly power in IBM. The appellate court’s indepen­
dent factfinding o f  peripheral manufacturer ease o f  switching 
peripheral compatibility to other C P U ’s and conclusion empha­
sizing supply substitutability” as determinant o f  market dimin­
ished IBM s market share, thereby undermining the trial court’s 
inference o f  m onopoly power based on market share.
The Tenth Circuit opinion signaled a reversion to the du P on t 
methodology o f  deductive reasoning for a market definition  
based on a superficial application o f  cross-elasticity and a disin-
?31 367 F.Supp. at 339.
132 Id. at 336-39.
\l
-133Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 914-19 (10th Cir. 1975), 
cert, dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1976).
-~MId at 918-19.
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clination to look further by more refined market tests. The circuit!
J  \
relied solely on a superficial application o f  cross-elasticity ofj 
supply to  define markets and ignored demand inflexibility caused J 
by factors like IBM ’s large share o f  installed C P U ’s, widespread J 
buyer unwillingness to switch, and the actual cost o f  changing 
over peripheral plug com patibility from one brand o f  C PU  to 
another. 135 In these circumstances, competitors seeking to supplyJj 
buyers with peripherals plug com patible with IBM main fram es| 
faced entry barriers; barriers IBM could further exploit by itsj 
leasing, pricing and “bundling” practices. The trial court ob­
viously defined the relevant market in light o f  IBM ’s conduct and' 
the nature o f  the industry; while the court o f  appeals treated the! 
problem o f  market definition as an independent element o f  the 
offense and an element capable o f  objective isolation distinct 
from the dynamics o f  the industry and the unique status o f  IBM; 
in the industry. In jurisprudential terms, the trial court analyzed 
the facts in light o f  the law by reasoning inductively from the'; 
particular to the general in light o f the general principles of 
previous cases; while the court o f  appeals analyzed the law in light’.) 
o f the facts by reasoning deductively from the general to the* 
particular. On another level and much like Grinnell, the trial court 
theory fell within the behavioral tradition o f  unlawful m onopoli­
zation in view o f  substantial evidence o f  an intent to exclude"! 
peripheral manufacturers, 136 while the court o f  appeals treated the,j 
case as a structural one to be decided by the application ofj 
seemingly “objective” econom ic and legal tests. 137
135 See, Development, Telex v. IBM: Implications fo r  the Businessman’ 
and the Computer Manufacturer, 60 V a.L .R ev . 884, 889-92 (1974).
136 3 67 F.Supp. at 299.
137 See, Note, The Development o f  the Sherman A ct Section 2 Market,[ 
Share Test and Its Inapplicability to Dynamic Markets, 49.
So.Cal.L.Rev 154, 198-204 (1975), supporting the court of appeals, 
rejection of narrow market tests in light of “the dynamics of the: 
industry” and the inability of market tests to “adequately account for a 
time dimension over which dynamic market processes may operate to.
erode temporary market advantages.” Id. at 205. The riddle of Telex.
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The Telex circuit court opinion also found itself entangled in 
the question o f  what conduct, assuming IBM did have m onopoly  
power in a relevant market, would suffice as conduct “not 
honestly industrial” and therefore evidence that IBM had unlaw­
fully m onopolized. The trial court had found that IBM ’s pre­
announcement o f  new equipment and pricing o f  competing pe­
ripheral equipment, fixed term leasing o f peripheral equipment 
locking in lessees, and other marketing practices were not 
economically inevitable or honestly industrial but were done with 
an intent to exclude com petition. 138 Here too  the circuit court 
reversed the trial court and did so by rejecting the implication that 
only involuntary conduct by a m onopolist was exculpatory for 
one holding m onopoly power— a view o f the conduct element 
many had read into A L C O A  and U nited Shoe. The court rejected 
the standard that one possessing m onopoly power was greatly 
.circumscribed in following normal competitive tactics, since the 
normal would be not “honestly industrial” when done by a 
monopolist unless it was either involuntary or inevitable. The 
court observed:
, There must be some room to move for a defendant who sees his
- marked share acquired by research and technical innovations being 
eroded by those who market copies of its products. It would seem 
that technical attainments were not intended to be inhibited or 
penalized by a construction of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to 
. prohibit the adoption of legal and ordinary marketing methods 
already used by others in the market, or to prohibit price changes 
' which are within the “reasonable” range up or down. 139
•iincludes the further inquiry of whether observed “dynamic market 
-processes” were dictated or imposed by competition or by monopoly 
power, thereby requiring a definition of markets in light of conduct, 
sMarket tests are a means to an end, not an end unto themselves, and 
;should be employed inductively in light of the goals of section 2 and not 
deductively in the sense of objective rules or in an effort to define 
■tangible things in measurable space.
" ,,3*367 F.Supp. at 340-42.
' 3^9 510 F.2d at 927. This constitutes departure from wave II precedent 
and a reversion to the standards of wave I. See, Comment, Draining the 
-ALCOA "Wishing Well”: The Section 2 Conduct Requirement After 
yKodak and CalComp, 48 F o rd h a m  L .R ev . 291, 294 (1980).
■.m? ; .
The circuit court discounted the trial court finding o f noi 
honestly industrial conduct by virtue o f IBM aiming its introduc-1 F* 
tion o f new peripheral equipment, interface changes, favorable 
lease terms, and price cuts at peripheral markets where Telex had 1 , 
made its greatest inroads. The important lower court finding o f v 
fact that lost revenues from selective price cuts were offset b y ' 
price increases in C P U ’s was ignored since the circuit c o u r t . 
viewed IBM ’s conduct as “ordinary com petition” 140 and for 1 
conduct to be found exclusionary it had to be “predatory.” T h e ;| ■ 
Tenth Circuit concept o f  “predatory” apparently does not em- - 
brace ordinary com petitive tactics specifically aimed at small j  
com petitors, including the support o f  low prices in a competitive j  \~ 
market by high prices in a noncom petitive one, at least by a i  
m onopolist which gains m onopoly power by means “honestly., -* 
industrial.” Rather, the court found that the m onopolistic con­
duct must be shown to be predatory in the sense o f  “sinister” 141— 
an unsupported and undefined m odification o f  wave II conduct, 
analysis— before a court can find a m onopolist unlawfully m o­
nopolized by use o f  lawfully gained m onopoly power. '
Thus, Telex may be read as a retreat from wave II standards!! U 
on the conduct front as well as the market analysis front; a "= 
pulling back from the negative standard o f  not honestly industrial, * 
conduct to one where the conduct proving m onopolization m u st' ;, 
be affirmative conduct characterized by som e sinister flavor ■§ 
beyond the lawful but exclusionary tactics found sufficient to , 
prove m onopolization in A L C O A  and U nited Shoe. It would j  
appear that the court may have arrived at this conclusion for an * 
unarticulated reason; viz, the suit was a private one brought by a f 
com petitor whose claim for damages required p roof that th e jf  
conduct relied upon to prove legal causation in the sense that one . |  
with m onopoly power had unlawfully “m onopolized” was also '!  - 
the evidence relied upon to prove the causal nexus in fact between J§ , • 
the violation and Telex’s claimed injury to its business. In order t o - f
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escape the risk o f  proving a violation without damage, a private 
litigant must prove that the conduct showing unlawful m onopoli­
zation is also the conduct that caused the damage claimed to be 
suffered. 142 Because o f  this focus in private cases, sorting out 
conduct which is acceptably competitive from that which is not, 
, particularly in structural cases, is far more difficult than in 
government cases. The touchstones for drawing lines between 
conduct which is com petitive and that which is anticompetitive 
are limited by the com petitive relationships o f  the plaintiff to the 
defendant. Thus a determination o f whether a defendant has 
unlawfully m onopolized, can becom e confused with the issue o f  
 ^whether the plaintiff has been injured by virtue o f  a violation o f  
•the law and that the injury is one compensable under the antitrust 
laws.
In Telex, IBM ’s marketing practices were relied upon to prove 
both that the law had been violated and that the violation 
“caused” the injury Telex claimed it had suffered. Viewed from  
the perspective o f  causation o f  a com petitor’s injury, conduct may 
appear to be normal and procompetitive behavior or difficult to 
characterize as “predatory.” Viewed from the more general per­
spective o f whether m onopoly power has been obtained or main­
tained by displacing the competitive process, the issue usually 
involved in a government case, the same conduct may discount a 
finding o f  inevitability, superior skill or business acumen in 
explaining the existence or persistence o f m onopoly power. Con­
sequently, acknowledging the enforcement purpose for which the 
question o f  “not honestly industrial” conduct is being asked is 
significant in treble damage m onopolization litigation, as well as 
in evaluating the precedential value o f a case like Telex for 
government enforcement o f section 2 and in private injunction
* 142 In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 
(1977) the Court held that a private damage plaintiff “must prove more 
:than injury linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiff must 
prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust 
■laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendant’s acts unlawful.”




actions where the causation issue is principally one o f  legal 1
causation and not factual causation. 143 |
Telex, with its strict interpretation o f  the conduct element in j  
private litigation, set wave III private damage litigation on a 1 
pursuit o f  more objective standards to determine the legitimate I  
scope o f  a m onopolist’s conduct vis-a-vis com petitors claiming 
damages which would both define conduct legally beyond the pale j  
(displacing the com petitive process) and establish factual causa- <| 
tion for purposes o f  proving damages (injuring a com petitor). 4  
One o f  the potential objective touchstones, a factor generally k  
discussed in Telex, is an objective standard for measuring the * 
competitive legitimacy o f  a m onopolist’s pricing practices; a I 
standard which could draw a line between the competitive and the j 
unreasonably exclusionary in conform ity with business reality and I 
a standard which is manageable by the judicial process. This, in i  
turn, has provoked the academic debate over the use o f  neoclassi- f 
cal pricing theory to define predatory pricing, an issue that has I 
become deeply involved in wave III litigation— particularly the f  
subsequent “computer cases.” ?
Telex was followed by the G reyhound C om puter  case, 144 a 
case in which the market alleged to  be m onopolized was the B  
market for leasing general purpose computer systems. The market 3  
issues presented on appeal from the the trial court’s directed I  
verdict for IBM at the end o f  the p laintiff’s case145 included >1 
whether a m ethod o f  marketing could be a “market” for section 2 J ___ _ ____________________.
143 Section 16 of the Clayton Act providing for injunctive relief for i 
private plaintiffs requires proof of “threatened loss or damage” (15 1 
U S,C ' f ,? 6) as °P P °sed to Proof o f actual injury to “business or T 
property” in treble damage actions under section 4 o f the Clayton Act - 
(15 U.S.C. § 15). See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260 v  
(1972).
144 Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir 
1977). ‘ *
145 Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 1972 Trade Cases '
!  74,205 (D.Ariz. 1972). v
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purposes; whether leasing was a market distinct from the other 
.methods o f  distributing data processing services, viz sale o f  
computer systems, time sharing, and contracting with computer 
service bureaus; and, whether leasing o f  IBM ’s products consti­
tuted a further submarket within the general market for leasing 
computer services.
The Ninth Circuit, in an intriguing and well-written opinion  
by Chief Judge Browning, held on the first issue: “N o rule o f  law 
or econom ic principle bars application o f  Section 2 o f  the Sher- 
rman A ct to alternative means o f  distributing a product.” 146 
Explicit recognition o f  m ethods o f  distribution as potential rele­
vant markets for section 2 purposes may be a significant holding 
o f wave III litigation if  widely accepted, since it opens up new 
; vistas for antitrust analysis o f  restricted channels o f distribution 
at a time when section 1 strictures upon vertical market restraints 
are being loosened as a result o f  the Sylvania  case. 147 Further, this 
holding may serve to  detach the conceptualization o f  market 
analysis from concrete products and places and further a deeper 
understanding o f  the use o f  market tests as a means for intellec­
tually assessing the intangible question o f  whether market power 
has unreasonably displaced the competitive process as the rule o f  
trade in an arena o f  significant econom ic activity.
* . On the second issue, whether leasing computer services as 
distinguished from other methods o f  distributing the product 
should be considered a distinct “submarket” for section 2 pur­
poses, the court found the question a close one but one where the
146 559 F.2d at 494.
147 Compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977) with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967). See, Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis o f  Non­
Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 C o lu m .L .R e y  1 (1978); Bohling, A 
Simplified Rule o f  Reason fo r  Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social 
Goals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 64 Iow a L .R ev . 461 (1979).
u t ^ hC,° UTd ,lUT rt a. jUry co"dus“  ™ the affirmative."1 
S v l  in V l  t h ^ '  5 superflcial “ 1 mechanistic market 
o f t nZ  8e BrownmS Probed along a number of lines
dence conH H T " f  "  3 iUry inference from the evi‘
stand a m o. f  i eaS1”8 WaS a dislinct market couW with- 
t a n d  a  m o t i o n  f o r  j u d g m e n t  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  v e r d i c t  T h e
th a t  ? " ?  311 infCrenCe C° Uld be  o n  a
end users o f  th " ’ mC‘udm g:o(1) leasin8 serves different needs o f  
r e c o S  2 , CU (2) the indU5try and its customers
(lu h e c^„ , T ng “  StmCt fr°m ° 'her me,hods of distribution; 
other m^h S  re,qu'rem' ms f° r ‘“ sing differed from those for
teTe te T l ?  "0n; a"d (4> customer advantages in
d S ™ ?  f  distinguishing leasing from other methods of 
aistnbution for antitrust purposes. 149
t h e m a r k ^ h n ^ r K  Ufnnecessary a further inquiry into whether 
IBM ea u fn ' ° ? ld *  fra<f onated further by treating the lease o f
evidence f ^ ^  S * ^  ^  WaS Sufficient
leasTn, n f t  T *  t0 “ fer IBM had m on° P ° ly P °we  ^ “  the 
w e ^ n d u d e T n  ,COmpUterS even if  equipment
factors in a t ^ ne 0 1 aSt analytically developed and elusive 
“m onooolv n ” ysis 1S the ^ term ination  o f  whether
s t r e n S t r  T  ?  ° T n o t * I n  e s tim £ « i n g  a  f i r m ’s
~ r  v, p U r p o s e s - f o r  e x a m p le ,  c o u r t s  h a v e  n o t  
u s u a  ly  d r a w n  s h o r t - t e r m / l o n g - t e r m  d i s t i n c t i o n s  b u t  h a v e  s o u g h t
comoeTwon ,e‘her 3 P° SSeSS“  P0Wer t0 fix pric“  or
time hv I SPeC1 P0,Di time or over a limited span of
y  x a m in m g  m a r k e t  s h a r e  a t  a  f ix e d  p o i n t  in  t i m e . 150 T h e
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marJiiTetn0nClU^e ? * • the evidence was sufficient, though by no great
Md sen’ina £ en , JUFV t0 find that the differences between leasing and selling general purpose computers were of sufficient siunificanre to  
justify treatment of the two forms o f distribution 
for competitive purposes.” 559 F.2d at 495. suomarkets
149 Id. 494-95.
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*■ ” task o f  identifying m onopoly power is inextricably bound up with 
*• ;’?%inarket tests, since the configuration o f  the market selected can 
lend  to magnify or diminish, as the case may be, market share, 
an d  hence the apparent strength o f the defendant to achieve the 
•1 ' goals prohibited by the law . 151 Identification o f  m onopoly power
* ’ should also seek to take account o f short- and long-range time 
fframes, since markets are dynamic and short-run benefits or 
^detriments may turn out to be the converse in the long run. 
"Economic models tend to view reality by snapshots rather than by 
^long-term m otion pictures o f  the evolution o f  specific practices 
J|ind their consequences in the context o f  the industry. Insensitivity 
;to time as a dimension o f  the analysis o f m onopoly power is one 
of the more serious limitations upon the reliability o f  economic 
^models to sort out whether specific market structure or conduct 
Vindicates the presence o f  m onopoly power or n ot. 152
f|f The dimension o f time, however, has not generally been 
^accounted for in m onopoly power analysis. Ever since Judge 
:Hand’s numerical test o f  90% yes, 64% maybe and 33% no in 
A L C O A '”  courts haye continued to attach great weight to per- 
r ” ' centage share o f the “market” measured at a specific point in 
, < time. In most cases, a market share in excess o f  70% appears to 
result in a finding o f  m onopoly power, while less than 50% 
' market share results in a finding o f  no m onopoly power. 154 In the 
„ \  50% to 70% range, evidence beyond market share appears to be 
"» required before a finding o f m onopoly power will be sustained. 155 
i ‘ # r .
 ^  ^ " _ ' “
5i See, Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979).
- > * • 152 See, Flynn, The Role, I f  Any, o f  Economic Analysis in Antitrust—
• A Reply, 12 Sw.U.L.Rev. ____, ____  (1980); J. H icks, C a u s a l i ty  in
* ’> 'E conomics ch. 4 (1979).
J 'is  148 F.2d at 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
|%c>54 For an empirical analysis of the cases, see, Stein & Brett, Market 
S?Definitions and Market Power in Antitrust Cases—An Empirical 
^Primer on When, Why and How, 24 N.Y.L.S.Rev. 639, 672 (1979).
; >» Id.
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The commentators, as well as som e courts, are unanimous in 
pointing out that market share— big or little—is a factor, but f 
should not be the sole factor in determining whether or not 
m onopoly power exists. 156 A  firm may have a large market share 
yet lack the ability to  fix prices or exclude com petitors because 
entry barriers are low. Conversely, a firm with a relatively small 
market share may still possess the power to fix prices or exclude 
competitors particularly where entry barriers are high, there is 
excess capacity and the firm is earning excessive profits. M ore­
over, m onopoly power may be inferred from factors not so 
directly dependent upon market definitions like entry barriers, 
excessive profits over a sustained period o f  time, the relative size 
o f  com petitors, the actual use o f  econom ic power by predatory 
conduct, and a trend toward greater or lesser econom ic power. 157
In G reyhound  the court relied in part on  market share to  draw 
the inference o f  m onopoly power, finding IBM had 64% to 82% 
o f revenues from leasing computers and 77% to 83% o f  revenues fr 
from leasing by firms that also manufactured com puters. 158 In 
addition, the court found a jury could draw the inference o f  
m onopoly power from the fractionated nature o f  the rest o f  the 
market—with no other firm having more than 4% o f lease? 
revenues. 139 Entry barriers were inferred from IBM ’s leverage^  
over customers by virtue o f  having 80% o f  the installed base o f i  
general system equipment and the high cost to customers o f»  
changing equipm ent. 160 IBM ’s pricing policy, targeting a 30% f  
return, and its ability to  maintain market share and a high rate o ff  
return while charging a 5% to 15% higher price than competing
156 See, 2 A r e e d a  & T u r n e r ,  supra note 13, at 396 (1978); S u ll iv a n , ’ 
supra note 13, at 76 (1977). ^
157 See, S u ll iv a n ,  supra note 13, at 74-89; Stein & Brett, supra note 
154, at 671-75. 1
•58 559 F.2d at 496-97.
'” Id. at 497.
iso Id.
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leasing firms, added further evidence from which an inference o f  
monopoly power could be drawn. 161
- Greyhound  reflects a more sophisticated wave III attempt 
than that found in Tenth Circuit’s Telex opinion to  examine 
factors beyond a mechanical measurement o f  market share at a 
fixed point in time to determine whether or not m onopoly power 
is present or was exercised. The nature o f the industry, the use o f  
leasing by a firm with a dominant share o f  the installed base, and 
,the return to IBM as compared with its competitors leasing 
peripheral equipment were all deemed relevant.
On the conduct front, the court in G reyhound  also differed  
‘-from the Telex opinion on whether the conduct relied upon to  
.prove one with m onopoly power had unlawfully monopolized  
required proof o f  conduct that was “predatory” in the sense o f  
“sinister.” N o requirements o f  the conduct being “predatory” let 
■alone “sinister” was found necessary, rather, the court held:
If the jury concluded IBM possessed monopoly power in the leasing 
of general purpose computers, IBM would be precluded from em­
ploying otherwise lawful practices that unnecessarily excluded com­
petition from the submarket. The question is whether the jury could 
have found that the alleged practices were in fact adopted, and, if so, 
whether they had the prohibited effect.162
f  ' i6i Id.j  .
* *\i62 Id. at 498. The F.T.C. adopted the same test in E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e r  (CCH) 1 21,770 (1980), an attempt 
to monopolize case. In drawing the line between procompetitive and 
I ' 'anticompetitive conduct, the Commission saw as its task determining 
 ^ “whether DuPont’s conduct represents legitimate competitive behavior 
C  *iOr an unreasonable effort to propel the firm into a dominant position in 
iffgphgttitanium dioxide] . . . market.” 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e p . at p. 21,972. In 
’^ ^pplying the test, the Commission engaged in an extended rule of reason 
:^ |^alysis with due regard for the facts and circumstances of the industry 
particular case. Among the factors weighed, the Commission 
“especially pertinent”: “(1) The extent to which the conduct 
T '/ffnhances efficiency or innovation, including profitability considera-
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Several specific marketing tactics by IBM were relied upon asj 
conduct from which a jury could conclude “unnecessarily ex-f 
eluded com petition from the submarket.” The court held a jury! 
could find several o f  IB M ’s practices were intentionally designed^ 
to  disadvantage com peting leasing companies dependent on IBM! 
for equipment by raising their costs, making more difficult the| 
acquisition o f  equipment, locking in lease customers to  IBM and! 
hobbling the ability o f com peting lease companies to  be flexible irij 
lease terms by manipulation o f  maintenance rates on  new equip-] 
ment. 163 In categorizing these otherwise admittedly lawful tactics' 
as not “honestly industrial” and appropriate candidates for con-^ 
duct which a jury could infer caused unlawful m onopolization,! 
the court adopted as its standard Judge W yzanski’s language intj 
U nited Shoe: If-as*
[T]hey are not practices which can be properly described as thej 
inevitable consequences of ability, natural forces, or law. Theyj 
represent something more than the use of accessible resources, thej 
process of invention and innovation, and the employment of thosel 
techniques of employment, financing, production and distribution,) 
which a competitive society must foster. They are contracts, arrange-fs 
ments, and policies which, instead of encouraging competition based! 
on pure merit, further the dominance of a particular firm. In this! 
sense, they are unnatural barriers; they unnecessarily exclude actuals 
and potential competition; they restrict a free market.164
tions; (2) the extent to which the conduct is a reaction to competitive" 
behavior, demand shifts, new technology or other market consideraj: 
tions; (3) the permanence or reversibility of the challenged actions; (4); 
the alternatives available to the firm; and (5) the effect of the conduct] 
on entry barriers and rival firm behavior.” Id. at p. 21,982, n.38. The; 
Commission also recognized that it would be “unwise policy . . .  to- 
focus solely on the benefit side of the equation, while ignoring the! 
adverse effects of dominant firm behavior.” Id. at p. 21,978. Rather a] 
balancing test is required, where standards are the beginning of the] 
analysis and an informed judgment based on all the facts is the end o f | 
the process.
559 F.2d at 498-505. t
' %164 559 p_2d at 502-03, quoting United States v. United Shoe Maif 
chinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 344-45 (D.Mass. 1953), a ff’d  pen$ 
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). *
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t
V^  This qualitative standard for assessing the conduct element 
falls short o f  the Telex standard o f  predatory in the sense o f  
-“sinister.” It clearly is more in line with the A L C O A  and United  
Shoe precedent from wave II and at a minimum suggests a 
structu ra l approach to section 2 more narrowly circumscribing the 
conduct o f  one possessing m onopoly power, regardless o f  how  
{that power was acquired, than the other wave III m onopolization  
.cases. 165 It is not a standard that is capable o f  being used for easy >
$5 Although our principal concern here is wave III monopolization 
"litigation it is worthwhile noting that Greyhound Computer also in­
volved reversal of the dismissal of a claim that IBM had attempted to 
monopolize by the judge who authored the Lessig opinion, Lessig v. 
'T idew ater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 111 U.S. 
993; (1965), and launched the Ninth Circuit on its separate path for 
-.defining the attempt offense under section 2. Judge Browning rejected, 
asjjie did in Lessig, requirements of proving a relevant market and a 
1 dangerous probability of achieving a monopoly in the market defined in 
4 >fder to prove an attempt to monopolize. Rather, Judge Browning held: 
„ A prima facie case of attempt to monopolize is made out by 
' evidence of a specific intent to monopolize ‘any part’ of commerce, plus 
(Anticompetitive conduct directed to the accomplishment of that unlaw­
ful,purpose. . . .
>• “If proof of an economic market, technically defined, and proof of a 
dangerous probability of monopolization of such a market were made 
M?sential elements of an attempt to monopolize, as a practical matter the
- attempt offense would cease to have independent significance. A single 
" 'firm that did not control something close to 50 percent of the entire 
market, . . . would be free to indulge in any activity however unreason­
’ ablet predatory, destructive of competition and without legitimate busi-
*iness, justification. Any concern not dangerously close to monopoly 
power could deliberately destroy its competitors with impunity. These 
-fre jiot abstract hypotheses. A market share approaching a monopoly is 
, not^required to enable one concern seriously to impede the capacity of 
Others to compete by use of abusive trade practices. A construction of 
spl^Sherman Act that would immunize such practices would be contrary 
S ^ fee purposes of the Act; it is not required by the Act’s language or 
.legislative history.” 559 F.2d at 504.
'tf||nja footnote, Judge Browning went further to suggest: “Specifically 
f  ttherj|is support in the decisions and legislative history for the conclusion 
*f||^|Section 2 was intended to prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade 
••^ hjt^cxclude competition even when they are imposed by a single
line drawing, nor is it one that elevates short-term “consumer 
welfare” as the primary goal o f  antitrust policy. Rather, it is a- 
standard recognizing broader econom ic, political and social goals 
o f antitrust policy166 and one requiring greater restraint by a firm 
possessing m onopoly power than the “predatory standard of 
Telex if  the firm wishes to  avoid antitrust liability.
Conduct evidence to prove causation in fact, that IB M V  
alleged violation caused the injury Greyhound claimed, was 
treated by the court as a jury question, separate from con d uc | 
evidence to  prove the alleged violation. In finding that G rey| 
hound introduced sufficient evidence from which a jury c o u l |  
“infer Greyhound had sustained damage and that IBM c a u se | 
j{»i67 court relied on  evidence o f  the alleged impact o f  IBM £ 
conduct (proving a violation) on Greyhound’s business and evjj 
dence showing a specific intent on IBM ’s part that the conduct 
have an adverse impact on Greyhound’s business. 168 C ou n terva || 
ing IBM evidence discounting Greyhound’s causation in fac| 
proof was properly found to raise “conflicting inferences foj
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trader.” Id. at 505, n.37. Judge Browning’s approach would therefore 
ban unilateral predatory conduct by a firm w ith o u t monopoly powg 
under the attempt to monopolize offense, and otherwise lawful conduj 
by a firm with monopoly power under the monopolization offense if the 
conduct is “unnecessarily exclusionary.” See also, E.I. du Pont d| 
Nemours & Co., 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e p . (CCH) 1 21,770 (F.T.C. 1980). •->
166 “Congress’ general purpose in passing the Sherman Act was to linuj 
and restrain accumulated economic power, represented by the trust| 
and to restore and preserve a system of free competitive enterprise. Thj 
Congressional debates reflect a concern not only with the consuiM 
interest in price, quality, and quantity of goods and services, but also 
with society’s interest in the protection of the independent businessman^ 
for reasons of social and political as well as economic power.” Brow|| 
ing, J., dissenting in GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 51 
F.2d 980, 1019 (9th Cir. 1976), aff’d, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). I
167 559 F.2d at 505.
168 Id. .
169 Id. at 506.
- resolution  by the jury, rather than a failure o f  p roof as a matter o f  
jaw o f  the added element o f  cause in fact. By keeping causation
' for purposes o f  proving a violation separate from questions o f  
’ causat’on f ° r purposes o f  proving injury as the result o f  a 
violation o f the law, the court avoided the Telex confusion o f  
damage “causation” with illegality “causation,” as well as pre­
served the distinction between judge and jury functions. The 
.failure o f  the Telex court to make this distinction generated the 
s -sa g iie  standard o f “sinister” conduct to prove a violation o f  the
- law.
i1 ; ''.l:' >The confusion over various levels o f  causation became mani­
fest in the third computer case. In California C om puter Products, 
'/Inc. v. IB M  Corp. , 170 (C alcom p ), on  review o f  a directed verdict 
%flljrJlBM at the end o f  p laintiff’s case, a peripheral manufacturer
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lilfifir  marketing practices injured it in the general purpose com-
Stlisk drives and controllers complained that IB M ’s leasing and
limiter systems market, the leasing market and the market for
l«S |IflM -com patible p e rip h e ra l e q u ip m e n t.
r “Si; *
- ^ * * 7
® 2® ln  a less than analytical and understandable finding, the court 
p 2 ©L1 -CalComp lacked standing to sue for alleged anticompetitive 
M lp ebts in the general purpose computer systems market and the 
SS^ijtsing market. The court announced a “ripple” standard for 
plaintiff standing and that CalCom p’s claims in the 
; >|eneral purpose computer systems and leasing markets were based 
\on an “indirect ripple effect” o f  injuries in markets where
* CalComp did not com pete with IBM as a general systems manu- 
or leasing company. 171 O f course, if  CalCom p’s claims 
. w|re based on  its status as a buyer or supplier o f  peripheral
WI&13 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
, ll;xl}jId. at 732. A result appropriately characterized as “terribly me­
- 4hanicaP’ and “ultimately naive” by Professor Sullivan. Remarks de­
livered to the Antitrust Section Meeting, Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n, 
ll&fSullivan, Recent Antitrust Developments, p.23, Los Angeles, 
fornia (October 10, 1980). .
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equipment in those markets and IBM ’s alleged conduct in thf 
peripheral markets excluded CalCom p from those markets^ 
CalComp may well have had standing. 172 The court’s cryptic 
treatment o f  the standing issues however, leaves unclear what 
CalComp claimed “caused” it injury and why the court conclude^ 
the injuries claimed were not “direct” or were the result o f  an 
“indirect ripple effect.”
1
A s in other recent treble damage actions, 173 the -“standing^ 
issues in C alC om p  appear not to be either clearly identified dr 
rationally analyzed. It is unclear whether the court considered 
“standing” to  be a question o f  the scope o f  the duty and rislc 
imposed by the statute, an issue o f  who is owed the duty, an issuf 
o f  causation in fact, or a problem o f  proof o f  damage. While 
sorting out the appropriate meaning and use o f  “standing” | s  
beyond the scope o f  this article, suffice it to  say “indirect ripplf 
effect” is scarcely an intelligible or useful standard likely to  finjtj 
widespread acclaim in the litigation. Like “target area,” “direct 
and indirect purchaser,” and “bull’s-eye” and “carom shot&
___________________________________________________________ I
1172 The Ninth Circuit has developed the “target area” test for standing 
in antitrust cases. “[I]n order to state a cause of action under the 
antitrust laws a plaintiff must show more than that one purpose of the 
conspiracy was a restraint of trade and that an act has been committjfd 
which harms him. He must show that he is within that area of the' *iiiPeconomy which is endangered by a breakdown of the competitijg 
conditions in a particular industry. Otherwise Jie is not injured ‘bj 
reason’ of anything forbidden by the antitrust laws.” Conference oj 
Studio Unions v. Loew’s, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-5 (9th Cir. 1952). S |  
also, Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cjr 
1970); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 361 (9th C |  
1955); Alioto & Donnici, Standing Requirements fo r  Antitrust Plain­
tiffs: Judicially Created Exceptions to a Clear Statutory Policy;jp" 
U .S .F .L .R e v . 205 (1970); Tyler, Private Antitrust Litigation: The ProM 
lem o f  Standing, 49 U .C o lo .L .R e v . 269 (1978); Note, Standing to Sue! 
Antitrust: The Application o f  Data Processing to Private Treble Dam 
age Actions, 11 T u l s a  L.J. 542 (1976). g
173 See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 R2 
1269 (2d Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Readi 
Industries v. Kennecott Copper Co., 477 F.Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 197
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“indirect ripple” should be consigned to Von Jehring’s heaven o f  
legal concepts174 along with “proximate cause,” “submarkets” 
' anB the like. The “standing” concept should be confined to issues
• ^concerned with insuring a case or controversy and determinations 
1 of the appropriate limits o f  the judicial process vis-a-vis the other 
branches o f  governm ent. 173 It should not be used as a confusing 
surrogate for causation, duty or intent issues.
r The confusion over causation was extended into the analysis 
of IBM’s conduct in the remaining market where the plaintiff was
■ found to have standing, the market for IBM -compatible periph­
eral equipment. A lthough expressing reservations, the court was 
willing to accept, for purposes o f  review, that IBM-compatible 
peripheral equipment was a relevant market and that IBM had 
v monopoly power in that market. 176 On review, therefore, the 
principal issues were whether IBM ’s conduct could support an 
inference that one with m onopoly power had m onopolized and 
whether it could be inferred that CalCom p’s claimed injuries 
resulted from the alleged section 2 violation.
:fcalComp relied on three categories o f  conduct evidence to 
prove IBM unlawfully monopolized: (1) that IBM engaged in 
predatory pricing o f  its peripheral equipment; (2) that IBM made 
unnecessary design changes on IBM main frames to frustrate 
competition from plug com patible peripheral manufacturers; and 
^(3) .that IBM unlawfully raised main frame prices to  offset price 
' reductions in peripheral markets. CalCom p’s evidence on the 
IBM’s pricing practices showed substantial IBM price reductions 
in disk drive peripherals and an IBM change in marketing periph­
eral products from a sale or 30-day only lease policy to a policy o f  
„g’iying customers the added option o f  a 1- or 2-year lease with 
-significant additional discounts over the life o f  the lease. The
>m See Cohen, supra note 69.
■ ft175 See, Tyler, supra note 172, at 272. 
-■'J1I76 613 F.2d at 739.
court found IBM ’s new lease policy, while initially producing! 
reduced revenues, was expected to produce added profits over th |j 
long run from increased market share and longer equipment life !  
Since IBM ’s pricing tactics and profit calculations were takingi 
place in a relatively long-term leasing context, the court chose t | |  
measure the legality o f  the exclusionary effect o f  the pricing! 
conduct on the basis o f  profits over the life o f  the lease anm 
whether those profits fell below marginal or average variably  
costs. 177
Aside from  the more general and serious questions with th | 
propriety o f  using marginal cost as the standard for predatoif 
pricing to be discussed infra, the court relied on the theory of, 
marginal cost pricing without regard to the implications o f  leaj| 
ing. It is at least probable that the initial lease returns on IBM’s 
peripheral equipment were below the cost o f  the installed eq u i|| 
ment during the early life o f  the leases; a cost gradually recovered 
and exceeded over the later life o f  the lease. Smaller competitors 
without similar investment resources or access to relatively low! 
cost financing may well have found themselves disadvantaged ®  
the initial struggle to  sign up and lock in lessors, compared J |  
com peting in a market where IBM sold or leased on a short-terl 
basis rather than leased on a long-term basis. The use o f  margin!)] 
cost pricing theory in a long-term lease market does not make] 
sense if  the critical element o f  time in which to  measure costs a]jg 
return becom es significant because o f  other com petitive fa c to rs^  
the industry like differentials in financing capital, use o f  retaiiMj 
earnings derived from m onopoly profits elsewhere, or financing 
leased equipment with m onopoly profits from other markets, m
The C alC om p  court did not explore these ramifications JoS 
IBM ’s pricing conduct or permit a jury to  do so, but simply relied 
on the long-run profitability o f  IBM ’s leasing plan, the questions 
able line o f  marginal cost as the test for predatory pricingl
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™ Id. at 741.
jrr?;
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I C o n d u c t , 178 and the short-term goal o f  lowering prices to con-
jfsumers without regard to long-term effects on maintaining a 
< competitive process as the primary goal o f antitrust policy179 to 
(J§elnclude the pricing evidence did not prove IBM m onopolized. 
I j lp h e  court also appeared to  confuse conduct evidence for proof o f  
Jfcfjnlawful m onopolization with causation evidence for proof o f  
K ^am ages as the result o f  a violation o f  the law. The court found  
had a “right to reduce prices” so long as the prices were 
fw^pjofitable in the long run because the price reductions were in 
-;'|Jf||pdnse to price com petition by peripheral manufacturers includ- 
jing the plaintiff. Reasoning that price com petition and IBM ’s 
A "* ‘were a part o f  the very competitive process the
-Sherman A ct was designed to prom ote,” 180 the court held that it 
was impossible to find CalC om p’s alleged injury from IBM price 
S|i||ftsi\vas the kind o f  injury com pensable under the antitrust laws. 
Moreover, the court held that:
ijIfegSSft
F°r a discussion of the validity of marginal cost as the test of 
• .predatory pricing, see the text discussion of Transamerica Computer 
‘ Corp. v. IBM, 481 F.Supp. 965 (N.D.Cal. 1979), text accompanying 
i ^ ® B 8 - 2 1 8 ,  infra.
'
, 1*79 The following statement from the court’s opinion would seem to be 
’ particularly at odds with the ALCOA  and United Shoe objective of 
1 ' controlling monopoly power in the long run: “Granted that IBM’s 
rfS^Snological innovations resulted in ‘growth as a consequence of 
- s^uperior product, it was entitled to maintain its consequent dominant 
™ ^ e  market it created through ‘business acumen,’ which we... _ _ 
j '/'iak6 to include shrewdness in profitable price competition. The Sher- 
; - -®§n Act does not draw a distinction between competition on the bases 
M H P * .  •an(* Performance: the two are inseparable parts of any 
j .. competitive offering. Where the opportunity exists to increase or protect 
share profitably by offering equivalent or superior performance 
price, even a virtual monopolist may do so.” 613 F.2d at 742.
^ Iljew d ness in profitable price competition by a deep pocket monopolist 
M l l S f f iSt save United Shoe from being found to have monopolized by 
^ue-of its leasing practices. United States v. United Shoe Machinery 
10 F.Supp. 295, 343-45 (D.Mass. 1953), aff’d  per curiam, 347 
(1954).
’.613 F.2d at 742.
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[t]o accept CalComp’s position would be to hold that IBM could not! 
compete if competition would result in injury to its competitors, anj 
ill-advised reversal of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the| 
Sherman Act is meant to protect the competitive process, not com-J 
petitors." 1 jj
Use o f  the cliche, “the Sherman Act is meant to  protect! 
com petition, not com petitors,” overlooks the fact that we cannot! 
have com petition or a com petitive process without com petitors.! 
Like the “bigness is not necessarily bad” cliche (bigness is not’ 
necessarily good either), the com petitive process— not competi-- 
tors cliche avoids grappling with the difficult problem o f  deter-: 
mining which com petitive tactics by a firm possessing market 
power are legitimate in light o f  the goals o f  the law and which are 
not. Cliches distort analysis by implying more than they sa y / 
Evidence that a firm is receiving profits far in excess o f  marginal® 
cost indicates m onopoly pricing may be taking place and a c lich | 
will not aid in sorting out when such evidence ought to  lead to |  
conclusion that a firm has or has not m onopolized.
i
C a lC o m p ’s  simplistic use o f  marginal cost pricing theory anc| 
the com petition, not com petitors cliche scarcely advances clarity 
in the analysis o f  som e o f  the more difficult issues o f  section 21 
litigation. One is still left without meaningful guidelines f o l  
drawing the line o f  legality between permissible conduct that is| 
consistent with maintaining a regime o f  com petition from thajj 
which is not, since injury to com petitors and receipt o f  profits i i i  
excess o f  marginal cost can be benchmarks pointing in either,; 
direction.
C alC om p  also appears to  end up with a catch-22 standard fo p  
p roof o f  unlawful pricing in private m onopolization cases, /s i  
defendant’s pricing tactics injuring a plaintiff in response to thej 
plaintiff’s price cuts do not violate the law because the injury  
suffered by the plaintiff is a part o f  the “very com petitive  
process” which the Sherman A ct was designed to prom ote. Om
Id.
' /  the other hand, even if  a plaintiff is injured by the unlawful 
|? fS |ta lia to r y  pricing practices o f  a m onopolist, the plaintiff does 
"iSSffet have standing to sue since it is impossible to say the plaintiff’s 
.'iiijuries “represent compensable ‘injury’ from acts o f  . . . [the 
^defendant] unnecessarily excluding or restricting  com petition.” 182 
' , ’ "QED the difficult process o f  sorting out the standards for impos- 
" ling duties upon an antitrust defendant possessing m onopoly  
'SjpoWer through the process o f  defining standards for proof o f a 
“ Violation o f  the law should not be confused with the age old 
^mystery o f  proving causation in fact for purposes o f  establishing 
a nexus between the violation and the fact o f  dam age. 183 Cases 
. like C alC om p  mingling one with the other, leave legal standards 
Tor assaying whether the law has been violated by a particular 
' course o f  conduct in a confused state, needlessly generate 
K g ^ lk w a rd  standing questions, confuse the lines between questions 
i^ ig f ila w  for the judge and those o f  fact for the jury, 184 and deflect 
J|S§®n|Uysis from the underlying policy goals o f  the statute and the
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„ atfaSts o f  the case in favor o f  cliches and unanswerable and 
!i&’%SBetaphysicaI causation questions. 185
% • '«*V,»j-3u*k  ^ -T? ’
w-viw^-The C alC om p  court’s reliance on pricing above short-run 
marginal cost as the line between lawful com petition and unlawful 
^predation by a m onopolist, 186 tempered by recognition o f  the
l&Id. (emphasis added).
|%See Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 Y a le  L .J .  239
. ' •' 184 For a discussion of a rational method for allocation of judge and
• ; . |ury functions, see W. Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty Risk v. Proximate 
and the Rational Allocation o f  Functions Between Judge and
1977 U ta h  L .R ev 1.M m m mfT J  ^ 1
L . G re e n ,  T h e  L i t ig a t io n  P r o c e s s  in T o r t  Law  (1965); Cohen, 
’"“^ J^note 183.
V-
5|Mj‘[P]rice reductions up to the point of marginal cost are consistent 
R g p feo m p e titio n  on the merits, since in this case only less efficient firms 
H^i|l|t)e disadvantaged, while a firm pricing below marginal cost by 
IlSiflefinition incurs losses, so that competition on the basis of efficiency in 
^his situation is frustrated.” 613 F.2d at 743.
i*
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“possibility” that price reductions to  som e point above short-run 
marginal costs plus som e other conduct might be held unlaw 
fu l, 187 was less than binding precedent in the fourth significan 
computer case: Transamerica C om puter Co. v. IB M  C o rp . 188 The 
Transamerica case, decided by a Ninth Circuit district court, was, 
tried to a jury for over 7 months upon a pretrial stipulation that if'f 
the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict the case would; 
be decided by the trial judge. The jury was unable to reach 
verdict, and Judge Schnacke rendered a verdict in favor o f  the- 
defendant IBM , accom panied by a thoughtful, analytical, and- 
significant opinion.
Transamerica financed the equipment leased by peripheral 
manufacturers com peting with IBM thereby relieving those manu­
facturers o f  heavy capital investments in leased equipment and 
enabling them to  maintain a better earnings record to support new 
financing. Transamerica’s objectives in the financing program 
included the obtaining o f  a “window on the com puter industry” 
and the more mundane objective o f  taking advantage o f  the 
investment tax credit for its corporate parent as owner o f the 
leased peripheral equipm ent. 189 Transamerica claimed antitrust^ 
injury by reason o f  IBM ’s alleged exercise o f  m onopoly power in, 
three markets: (1) the manufacture and placement o f  general 
purpose computer systems; (2) the market for tape drives and: 
their controllers plug-com patible with IBM C P U ’s; and (3) the. 
markets for disk drives and their controllers plug-com patible with" 
IBM C P U ’s.
Unlike C alC om p, the court did not deny standing to the no 
manufacturer p laintiff on a “ripple” theiory, but did hold th 
Transamerica’s market definitions were either faulty or resulted j 
markets where IBM could not be said to  possess m onopoly power;
I®7 Id.
188 481 F.Supp. 965 (N.D.Cal. 1979). 
is9 id. at 973.
%
Since the significant wave III aspect o f  the Transamerica opinion  
. C oncerns analysis o f  predatory pricing concepts as conduct prov- 
, ing m onopolization, no extended examination o f  the court’s 
market and m onopoly power analysis will be undertaken here 
. .  other than salient points in light o f  the other computer cases.
- . * & '■
**‘r  Unlike the Tenth Circuit Telex opinion, the court examined 
numerous factors including supply and demand substitutability, 
' ‘price and profit data, technological pace, entry barriers, the 
strength o f  the rest o f  the market, and industry recognition in 
determining relevant markets. 190 IBM ’s successful “supply substi­
tutability” argument in the circuit court opinion in Telex, viz, that 
the IBM -compatible disk and tape drive markets should be 
defined as including potential suppliers manufacturing tapes and 
disk drives for other systems, was rejected in Transamerica. The 
! court did so because “ [ijnterface changes would cost hundreds o f  
^'thousands, if  not millions o f  dollars, and might require a year to 
' /carry out,” 191 therefore making it improper to include that poten- 
1 -tial com petition in the definition o f  the “submarket.” 
r„ ■**
'* In all three markets claimed to be the relevant markets by 
Transamerica however, the court found IBM lacked monopoly
- .power, either because IBM ’s market share was below 60% , IBM’s 
 ^ share was rapidly dropping from an earlier high market share
conferred by technological innovation, or because the plaintiff’s 
method for com puting market share was faulty. 192 The court’s 
 ^ .'analysis o f  market power was not as generous as that employed in 
$ $ 0 & yh o u n d  and indicated a proclivity to place primary reliance
- upon market share in relation to market definition. Conduct 
gti|$cience, a frequent source from which to infer m onopoly power
# ® 4 tiehavioral cases, 193 was not considered since conduct wasm-iSQ,¥ •'S -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
. .■ M id .  at 975-87.
Id. at 985.
'}■■■ Id. at 986.
, H 93.See the discussion of Greyhound in text accompanying notes 144- 
^ 8 6 9  ~supra.
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treated as an element analytically separate from the question o f'l 
whether the defendant possessed m onopoly power in a relevant /  
market. Like the plaintiffs in Telex and C alC om p, Transamerica 
found itself presenting a case based on a theory o f  structural * 
m onopolization while its injury was claimed to be caused by 
allegedly predatory behavior having the effect o f  fixing prices and 
excluding com petition. ’
Proceeding on  a structural track to prove markets and m o n o p -; 
oly power and a behavioral track to  prove conduct and causation, 
resulted in Transamerica winning neither. The court went further, 
however, in case if was reversed on the market and m onopoly  
power issues and proceeded to  analyze IBM ’s conduct in three _ 
areas: (1) IBM ’s pricing conduct; (2) its design conduct; and (3 );  
its long-term leasing practices.
The pricing practices o f  a firm with market power present 
particularly troubling questions for the conduct element o f  a,' 
section 2 case, since a m onopolist’s prices can be both an 
expression o f  a response to a functioning com petitive process', 
which the statute seeks to foster as well as an anticom petitive! 
weapon to fix prices or exclude com petition signaling the posses-f 
sion or exercise d f power displacing the com petitive process w h ich j  
the statute condem ns. Wave III litigation has com e to  see the! 
problem presented as how to sort out the latter from the form er! 
in a practical and predictable way that can be managed in the?, 
courts, provide workable standards for those subject to  the law,^  
and achieve the goals o f  the Sherman Act. I*Pli
It should be noted that the ambiguity about conduct left byft 
wave II litigation might still be interpreted as embracing pricing; 
practices not found to  be “sinister” or “predatory” if  one were tot 
follow  the philosophy o f  A L C O A , U nited Shoe  and G reyhound4 
That philosophy holds that one possessing m onopoly power is. 
precluded from  em ploying otherwise lawful practices that “unnec­
essarily” or avoidably exclude com petition and further the domi­
nance o f  a particular firm. This approach sees as the objective of; 
section 2 the displacement o f  m onopoly power governing a
66 : The antitrust bulletin |
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•inarket, not control o f  the abusive exercise o f  power, as the 
„ essence o f  the offense. Under this view o f  the purpose o f the 
'•statute, for exam ple, reductions resulting in prices above average 
cost might be considered proof o f  prescribed conduct where there 
is evidence like that in Telex, that price reductions are aimed at 
/  specific customers, have a long-term exclusionary effect, are 
unnecessary and are accompanied by com pensating price rises in 
markets where the m onopolist does not face com petition. The 
facts o f  the particular case and a more com plex understanding o f  
’the goals o f  antitrust policy require a more refined analysis. Such 
attest might sacrifice short econom ic efficiency as defined by 
some, in the name o f  the longer term econom ic, social or political 
goals o f the Sherman A ct. 194 To coin a cliche, the Sherman Act 
protects the com petitive process not the short-run maximization 
,of consumer welfare. The com petitive process in turn is under­
, ^tood as embracing broader econom ic, political and social goals
- .than those admitted by neoclassical price theory.
fV? Transamerica did not wholly adopt this philosophical ap­
proach to section 2 , since the court viewed lower prices in part as 
fa reflection o f  increased “efficiency” and the goals o f  section 2 as 
’ “ Including maximizing consumer welfare and encouraging dynamic 
.competition by encouraging maximum “efficiency” even by those
• ■ possessing m onopoly power. 193 On the other hand, the Trans- 
%%erica court recognized that a m onopolist’s lower prices mightK;.' // : _
^ s | | | f e a t e  entry barriers or be so low as to reflect predatory conduct 
vas .the result o f  the exercise o f  m onopoly power and thereby 
j ,  exclude competitors not by virtue o f  com petition but as the result 
i  itff. undue market power. Thus the search becom es one for a 
H ’l 3 © ndard— a measuring stick—by which to  judge when a 
|nopolist’s lower pricing tactics m ove from efficiency produc- 
;j!and praiseworthy com petition into the realm o f  predatory and
4
I
See Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework fo r  Analyzing Predatory 
•ing Policy, 89 Y a le L .J . 213 (1979); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: 
rategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Y a le L .J . 284 (1977).
I;481 ESupp. at 987-88.
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exclusionary conduct which the courts ought to declare unlawfu  
for section 2 purposes in light o f the goals o f the statute. 196
A  standard, one derived from the model o f  som e schools o'., 
econom ic thought, for reflecting pricing, costs, and demand in af 
market, was advocated by Areeda and Turner in their 1975 article,| 
P redatory Pricing and R ela ted  Practices Under Section 2  o f  the 
Sherman A c t . 1,7 The Areeda-Turner position, one which has® 
provoked rejoiners, 198 rebutters, 199 surrebutters200 and so o n ,201|  
suggests that pricing conduct relied upon to prove section 2 
violations should be analyzed on the neoclassical theory of
196 “The great problem in fixing a legal standard by which pricing, 
conduct should be measured is that it is extremely difficult to distinguish 
between a monopolist’s price reduction that is a normal, expected 
component of the dynamic competitive process, and the predatory,
• undesirable conduct just described. If the law is overzealous in guarding 
against predatory pricing, it may well inhibit the competitive process it 
seeks to promote.” Id. at 990. ^
■97 88 H arv .L .R ev . 697.
198 Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A  Comment, 89, 
H a r v .L .R e v .  869 (1976); Williamson, supra note 194.
■"Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A  Reply, 89'" 
H a r v .L .R e v .  891 (1976); Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory 
Pricing, 87 Y a le  L .J .  1337 (1978).
200 Greer, A Critique o f  Areeda and Turner's Standard fo r  Predatory 
Practices, 24 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  233 (1979). Scherer, Some Last Words on 
Predatory Pricing, 89 H a r v .L .R e v .  901 (1976); Williamson, A Pre­
liminary Response, 87 Y a le  L .J .  1353 (1978).
201 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing: A  Rejoinder, 88 Y a le  L.J. f 
1641 (1979); Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing II, 88 Y ale*  
L.J. 1183 (1979). For a comprehensive review of the debate and a more' 
refined analysis, see 1 NCRALP, supra note 11, at 149-50; S u ll iv a n , 
supra note 13, at 116-125 (1977); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 194,T 
For an excellent summary of the debate see, E .I .  du Pont de Nemours 
Co., 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e p . (CCH) 1 21,770 (F.T.C. 1980). The leading* 
articles on predatory conduct are collected and reprinted in 10 J, 
R e p r in ts  f o r  A n t i t r u s t  L. & E c o n . #\ (1979).
ir*?-. ^
parginal cost pricing and that pricing conduct should be conclu- 
„ifi«ely presumed legal if price levels exceed either a defendant’s 
-'short-run marginal cost or its accounting surrogate o f  average 
.r S ^ iia b le  cost.
Transamerica claimed that IBM ’s pricing practices constituted
- ^predatory conduct not honestly industrial, thereby plunging the 
" ■"court—despite the C alC om p  precedent adopting a marginal cost 
ttest202—into the mysteries o f  predatory pricing controversy. 
Without fully tracing the conflicting points o f  the debate exten­
sively discussed by the court in Transamerica, it was held that 
i price reductions resulting in prices above average fu ll  cost (the 
„ average o f  fixed plus variable cost per unit) were to  be conclu- 
t sively presumed lawful and those below average variable costs 
, - (the average o f  variable cost per unit not including fixed cost per 
<ljnit) unlawful.203 On the other hand, the court rejected the 
' ' Areeda-Turner suggestion that price reductions resulting in prices 
1 at or above short-run marginal costs and below average full cost 
» • ^should be conclusively presumed law ful.204 The Transamerica 
■>' court held that price reductions by a firm possessing m onopoly  
‘ spower resulting in prices in the range below average full cost but 
'above marginal cost or average variable costs were not to be 
, "'.'presumed lawful conduct but pricing subject to judicial inquiry in
■ Monopolization cases as to whether there is a reasonable explana- 
\  tion for the firm selling at such a price.205
1 u*§r -
\ ^02 The trial court distinguished CalComp on the grounds that the 
„ i CalComp court limited its “pronouncements to the facts of the case
- - '  /before it,” recognized “limit pricing” to discourage new entrants might 
, 3 .call for holding profitable prices unlawful and “held out the possibility 
' that other aspects of a defendant’s conduct might make prices in excess 
?■ pf marginal cost predatory.” 481 F.Supp. at 989.
" 203 Id. at 991.
& t.
' “ W. at 991-95.
,r t205 The court held that “reasonable” explanations might include: 
‘ '“Rrices below average cost would be reasonable if the monopolist was 
purely liquidating excess, perishable, or obsolete merchandise. Prices
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The court’s rationale was based on the belief that average fu | 
cost “is the point to which the normal forces of competition wifit 
tend to lower price”;206 that if a firm sells below average full cost 
“it is incurring a loss, equally efficient firms are incurring a loss| 
and more efficient firms (if their average cost is lower than thf 
monopolist’s average cost but greater than the price) will also b|j 
incurring a loss”;207 that “[o]nly firms able to withstand losses fog 
as long as the monopolist chooses to inflict them will survive” ;2|J  
and that “ [i] f a monopolist is permitted to set a price below itf| 
average cost, competition on the basis of efficiency is frustrated!! 
and competition on the basis of wealth replaces it.”209 Moreover^ 
the concept of marginal cost was judged a “figment of the| 
economist’s imagination”210 and an impractical standard to adf 
minister in the context of court litigation. But even if all this werf 
not so, the court held it would still reject the Areeda-Turnert 
thesis:
[I]f all the world’s economists were of one voice, and like Areeda and’ 
Turner, placed their faith in the monopolist to maximize sociaU 
welfare by eliminating competitors from crowded industries through? 
temporary provision of more and lower priced goods, the Congress] 
and the Courts have placed their faith elsewhere. The goal of welfare’ 
maximization through proper resource allocation is to be accom*
below average cost would be warranted if shrinking demand forced thf 
monopolist to minimize its losses by selling at the best price-cost 
relationship available to it, or where the industry suffers from chronic 
excess capacity. And the same might be true of promotional pricing! 
meeting competitors’ prices, or even occasional price wars, if carried out; 
under appropriate circumstances. Intent evidence can prove helpful 
here. The monopolist’s own evaluation of the situation, whether it 
thought it was cutting losses or cutting throats, can help to clarify the 
nature of the acts undertaken.” Id. at 996.




2>0 481 F.Supp. at 994.
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plished by a system of effective competition, not by reliance upon the 
presumed beneficence of a monopolist.
' ' ’
E conom ic considerations aside, ju stifiab le  ap p re h en sio n  o f  exces­
s i v e  econom ic pow er co n cen tra tio n s underlie the  law ’s aversion  to
3 'm onopolies.
Areeda and Turner have made a policy judgment. The economic 
^analysis used to justify that judgment is incomplete, and the judg­
ment itself stands contradicted by the economic, political, and social 
^policies of the Sherman Act.
A conclusive presumption of the legality of an unprofitable low 
, price, merely because it is above marginal cost, a cost which is all but 
‘incapable of proof, would truly be a “defendant’s paradise.” This 
Court rejects it.111
- In other words, the court applied the old cliche of the antitrust 
laws protecting competition and not competitors with a new twist. 
Jhg antitrust laws protect the competitive process and not a 
/monopoly competitor engaged in unreasonable exclusionary pric­
ing'"tactics or short-run maximization of consumer welfare as 
defined by neoclassical price theory.
* H
The court proceeded to measure IBM’s pricing conduct on a 
standard of whether prices were above average full cost, a 
(calculation requiring complicated and unavoidably arbitrary ac­
counting analysis and adjustments.212 It is also a standard subject 
to the same policy conclusions the court used against adoption of 
the marginal cost test. Although the court’s finding that IBM’s 
ipncmg practices were above average full cost sought to take 
laccpunt of a number of variables, it unavoidably may not have 
takai account of several others. One factor is the dimension of 
th^time coupled with the factor of leasing. As with CalComp, 
IBM’s profits on leased equipment in Transamerica may not have 
!]§g(tn>‘profitable in the time frame when it is alleged pricing
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practices were exclusionary even though the payout on  the leased 
equipment ultimately exceeded average cost. The court measured*, 
IBM ’s return over the life o f  the lease rather than examining its 
return at a particular point in time vis-a-vis sunk costs in the$ 
leased equipment.213 Although Transamerica provided no evA 
dence to the contrary, it is conceivable that a deep pocket9! 
m onopolist may have cheaper capital costs derived from excess}! 
m onopoly revenue elsewhere to deploy in a leasing system than dcHj 
small com petitors. Competition in those circumstances would be; 
based on wealth and not com petitive merit, an argument the court;- 
relied upon to reject the test o f  pricing above marginal cost and if 
below average cost as conclusively lawful. ^
A  further difficulty, attributable to the belief that law ought toj 
and can conform  reality to an a priori model or theory rather  ^
than generate a theory out o f  the facts in light o f  precedent and] 
the policy goals o f  the law ,214 is the evidence that many businesses  
do not price products in neat conform ity with average cost theory,! 
let alone marginal cost theory.215 This, in turn, means that thej 
burden o f  extrapolating data from the alleged m onopolist’s book^ 
with reference to all costs properly attributable to a product line! 
and conform ing the data to a m odel detached from reality will be^  
both costly and controversial at every step o f  the litigation': 
process. Consequently, the court’s conclusive presumption that?
' t213 id. at 1002. For a critical analysis of the court’s market definition! 
and failure to consider leasing in the context of analyzing predatoryj 
pricing theories, see Sullivan, Recent Antitrust Developments, remarks 
before the Antitrust Section, L.A. County Bar Ass’n. pp. 23-30 (Octo-T 
ber 10, 1980). M
214 See Flynn, supra note 152. Jf|
215 For an analysis of the empirical data see Harris & Sullivan, Passingg 
on the M onopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Analysis, 128« 
U .P a .L .R ey  269, 303-309 (1979). If the assumptions of the neoclassical
economics do not pertain, the entire analysis is irrelevant. Those; 
assumptions are under significant attack, particularly by the poslif 
Keynesians at Cambridge, England. See, E ic h n e r , supra note 71,? 
H o l l i s  & N e l l ,  supra note 71.
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~ ipnces above average cost are lawful and its willingness to examine 
and conform com plex cost accounting calculations and a reality 
that is otherwise to the concept o f  average cost will probably 
foreclose all but deep pocket plaintiffs in private suits, unless 
-there is substantial and easily obtained evidence that a defendant 
fs pricing well below average full cost or is pricing below marginal 
cost and the plaintiff is willing to expend the resources to prove it. 
.Even then, a p laintiff may encounter a judge unable or unwilling 
,to endure the travail o f  understanding or listening to  the proof.
v
- » .
When these realities o f  meeting even an average cost standard 
are realized, it is doubtful that many plaintiffs will be willing to  
.rely solely on predatory pricing conduct to prove their case unless 
some amelioration o f  the standard is adopted. For example, the 
.-■burden o f  proving price reductions are above average cost might 
Cbe'placed on the defendant in cases where it is found that the 
.defendant has m onopoly power in a relevant market and its 
'pricing tactics are specifically intended to exclude competitors or 
t have an exclusionary effect. In som e cases, even if  prices produce 
a return above average cost, it might be wise to make the 
■presumption o f  legality less than conclusive where other and 
,suspicious conduct is present like frequent and unnecessary design 
changes^ long-term leasing, price increases in other product lines, 
substantial entry barriers, excess capacity, or a specific exclu­
sionary intent. Otherwise the practical result o f  adopting average 
,cpst rather than marginal cost as the line o f legality o f  pricing 
. f e t ic e s  will be as practically adverse for plaintiffs injured by 
pricing below that line as would be a standard drawing the line at 
.marginal cost. In neither case will proof o f  a claim be certain, 
inexpensive, efficient, nor even appropriate.
£ > .
. l-;P n o t^er hand, too lax a standard can result in “private
• Pj&datory pricing actions carrying] with them the seeds o f  protec­
tionist abuse.” 216 Sorting out procompetitive from anticompeti-
i tjXe^conduct through the use o f  shorthand formulae relying upon
; —- ----------------------
f  Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 194, at 221.
74 : The antitrust bulletin
“objective” criteria rooted in an artificial and unrealistic model of £ 
one school o f  econom ic thought is scarcely empirical or indue-'l 
tively based decisionmaking. A bout all that may be said for it, is 'jj 
that it gets rid o f  d ifficult cases relatively rapidly even though the 
process may not accurately determine whether there has been a ? 
violation o f  the law or not or one that ought to be compensable’ 
under the antitrust laws. Only a sophisticated and empirically, |  
based analysis o f  the type advocated by Joskow and Klevorick217, 1 
would serve the goals o f  antitrust policy and justice to the * 
litigants by taking account o f  the facts peculiar to the case before * 
the court; i.e ., industry structure, the dynamics o f  the industry £  
and the problem o f  predicting long-run consequences from short- f  
run pricing activity. Such an analysis, however, might strain the  ^
capacity o f  litigants, the court and a jury to com prehend and: 
adjudicate fairly all the facts and considerations involved. ^
* H8Predatory pricing cases consequently, will probably conlinue,* 
to present a practical as well as a theoretical quandary to all’* 
concerned, until such time as a more expeditious way to deal with’! 
the fact and exercise o f  undue power in the econom y is imple- J 
m ented.218 By the same token, predatory pricing cases m a$  
continue to pose a threat to the vitality o f  the com petitive process* 
if  too  loose a standard is adopted for proof that pricing practices, 
displace the process rather than signal its appropriate operation
217 Id. at 213-270.
218 Avoiding unduly complex treble damage litigation is one factor^
behind my advocating adoption of a no-conduct monopolization stan-' 
dard before the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws? 
and Procedures. See, Flynn, Statement, 48 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 845 , 849^ |
(1979); Flynn, No Conduct Monopolization: An Assessment fo r  the
Lawyer and Businessman,____A n t i t r u s t  L .J ._____ (1980). Adoption-*
of the standard and a more active and expeditious enforcement program*
by the Antitrust Division pursuant to a “no-conduct” standard would; 
alleviate the need for private plaintiffs seeking protection frorr; struc | 
tural monopolists by complex treble damage litigation.
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The Ninth Circuit’s direction on each element o f  an unlawful 
monopolization claim is difficult to predict. The basic philosophy  
4n d  m ethodology o f  G reyhound  and C alC om p  differs. Trans­
. hmerica, with its theoretically sensible yet heavy practical burden 
■on private plaintiffs to prove predatory pricing, makes it impossi­
ble to predict what direction the ideologically divided Ninth 
C ircuit will go on the issues o f  markets, m onopoly power, 
■conduct, and predatory pricing in a m onopolization case under 
section 2. For wave III purposes however, the computer cases 
demonstrate that the ambiguities o f  wave II remain unresolved  
arid the difficulties o f  seeking to work them out in the context o f  
private litigation are not subject to resolution by superficial or 
shorthand formulae deductively applied which only raise more 
"questions than the ones they resolve— if any.
- 2. t h e  b e rk e y  ca se  In the case o f  B erkey P h oto , Inc. v. 
Eastman K od a k  C o .,2'9 the Chief Judge o f  the Second Circuit, 
Judge Kaufman, left little doubt about the direction in which he 
, believes the Second Circuit should go on conduct issues. B erkey  is 
a-sprawling case which was tried to a jury over 7 months and 
resulted in an $87 m illion treble damage verdict for Berkey. Judge
’ 219 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). For 
an interesting analysis of the Berkey case from the perspective of tying 
^arrangements, see Note, An Economic and Legal Analysis o f  Physical 
Tie-Ins, 89 Y a le  L.J. 748 (1980). The analysis here focuses on Berkey 
from the more general perspective of a monopolization case. See also, 
Comment, supra note 139 for an analysis of the case on the conduct 
element of a section 2 violation; and Comment, Antitrust Scrutiny o f  
Monopolists’ Innovations, 93 H a rv .L .R e v . 408 (1979) analyzing Berkey 
from the perspective of permitting innovation by a monopolist. A 
further insight, perhaps entitled to more weight than the academic 
^speculation about Berkey, may be gained from the unusual step of 
printing the dissenting opinion of Justices Rehnquist and Powell on the 
Menial of certiorari in the case. 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Rehnquist and 
Powell, characterizing the Second Circuit opinion as “bizarre” in some 
respects, apparently wished to use the Berkey case as the occasion for 
cutting back even further than the Second Circuit did from the implica­
tions of wave II monopolization precedent.
f | ;
Kaufman managed to reverse the trial judge, Judge Frankel, at |  * 
every turn, whether the trial court found for Berkey or Kodak. |  
The case involved numerous m onopolization issues arising out o f ; j 
Berkey’s relationship to Kodak as a competitor in the camera and |  
photofinishing markets and as a customer o f  Kodak for photofin- |  
ishing equipm ent, film , chem icals and photographic paper. { 
Berkey claimed Kodak possessed m onopoly power in the film, . J 
color print paper and camera markets in violation o f  section 2 I
■ 'jr . -v -.i.
and used that power to injure Berkey in the camera and photofin- >f‘ 
ishing markets and to  charge Berkey excessive prices for film, ■ 
color print paper and photofinishing equipment. Little dispute or * 
debate existed at the appellate level over the selection o f  four I 
relevant markets220 and K odak’s m onopoly power in at least three J-
o f  them: ' l |  ‘
-rt
1. Amateur conventional still camera market where Kodak, be- * 
tween 1954 and 1973 never had less than 61% of unit sales, 64% [’ < 
of the dollar volume, and, in its peak year, 90% of industry * 
revenues;221
2. The film market where Kodak’s annual sales since 1952 have 
always exceeded 82% of annual unit volume and 88% in * 1 
revenues;222 and ' c
3. The market for specially treated paper for making color prints .■ 
where Kodak’s market share dropped from 94% to 67% be- , • 
tween 1968 and 1975, while earnings from paper operations as a > > 
percentage of sales averaged a constant 60% over the period A  
and its only domestic competitor dropped out of the market in ‘ “
197 7.223
'
The other markets involved in the litigation, photofinishing  
services and equipment, were at one time also dominated by 
Kodak as a result o f  K odak’s power in the film market. Until <|
1954, Kodak had tied photofinishing services to the sale o f  film 1
_____________________________________________________________ 'I "
220 The definition of markets was strenuously contested in the trial 
court. 457 F.Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). c»j
221 603 F.2d at 269. “* s
222 Jd. at 270. •:
223 Id. at 271. . ; J
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by including an advanced charge in the price o f  the film for 
photofinishing services. A  government consent decree in 1954224 
enjoined the tie and K odak’s share o f  the photofinishing market 
subsequently dropped from 96% in 1954 to 17% in 1970 and 10% 
by 1976.225 Over 600 com peting photo finishing firms have entered 
the market, with Berkey one o f the largest. Despite the dramatic 
growth o f  com petition in the photofinishing market, Berkey 
claimed Kodak used its leverage in the film market to injure 
competition in the photofinishing market even though Kodak was 
. not charged with m onopolizing or attempting to m onopolize the 
*- photofinishing market.
With little debate on appeal over markets or K odak’s power in 
' those markets, since Kodak did not appeal the resolution o f  these 
controversial issues below, the case focused on conduct issues; 
namely, the legitimacy o f  K odak’s behavior in markets where 
Kodak possessed m onopoly power, the impact o f  that behavior in 
related markets and the relationship o f  all o f  the above to the 
injuries Berkey claimed it suffered. The court introduced its 
analysis o f  specific Berkey claims, an analysis that reads in many 
areas like the deliberations o f  a jury rather than appellate review 
of a jury’s verdict, with an overview o f  the evolution o f  m onopo­
lization standards. Recognizing precedent suggesting the gist o f  a 
violation o f  section 2 is the possession o f  m onopoly power, the 
court nevertheless held the law requires proof o f  some kind o f  
conduct element proving “willful acquisition or maintenance o f  
. . . [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or develop- 
“ ment as a consequence o f  a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.” 226 Condem nation o f  m onopoly power as the 
evil the act was intended to prevent, yet requiring som e element o f  
conduct in the acquisition, use or maintenance o f  m onopoly
224 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1954 Trade Cases 1 67,920 
(W.D.N.Y. 1954).
225 603 F.2d at 270-71.
226Id. at 274, quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
570-71 (1966).
t: ' '
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power before a monopolist would be held to have violated the law 
was viewed as the “paradox” or “conundrum”227 of section 2. 
This led the court to conclude:
The mere possession of monopoly power does not ipso facto con-' 
demn a market participant. But, to avoid the proscriptions of section *
2 the firm must refrain at all times from conduct directed at 
smothering competition. This doctrine has two branches. Unlawfully., 
acquired power remains anathema even when kept dormant. And it is |  
no less true that a firm with a legitimately achieved monopoly may 
not wield the resulting power to tighten its hold on the market. . . .
. . . We tolerate the existence of monopoly power . . . only insofar 
as necessary to preserve competitive incentives and to be fair to the 
firm that has attained its position innocently. There is no reason to 
allow the exercise of such power to the detriment of competition, in 
either the controlled market or any other. . . .
. . . But as we have indicated, a large firm does not violate section 2 
simply by reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its efficient 
size, nor does an integrated business offend the Sherman Act 
whenever one of its departments benefits from association with a 
division possessing a monopoly in its own market. So long as we 
allow a firm to compete in several fields, we must expect it to seek the 
competitive advantages of its broad based activity—more efficient i 
production, greater ability to develop complementary products, re- * 
duced transaction costs, and so forth. These are gains that accrue to | 
any integrated firm, regardless of its market share, and they cannot ’^  
by themselves be considered uses of monopoly power.228 ; ?
The court’s opinion, quite appropriately in view of the issues 
presented, evidences an attempt to paint with the artistic touch of, 
a Learned Hand in ALCOA, assessing the landscape o f prior' 
section 2 litigation in light o f the philosophical goals o f the 
Sherman Act and the factual controversy before the court. The-1 
attempt, however, parts company with the wave II cases restrict­
ing the voluntary actions o f a monopolist and does not take full, ? 
account o f the structure/conduct dichotomy in the history of^l 
section 2 litigation. Consequently, the opinion creates a “para­
-1
227 603 F.2d at 273.
228 id. at 275-276.
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,dox” where none may exist, although a “conundrum” in the sense 
of a difficult problem may certainly be present. Judge Hand, in 
the seldom noted 1916 opinion of United States v. Corn Products 
Refining Co., 229 recognized two differing circumstances generat­
ing two different theories or tracks for proving a violation of  
’section 2. Judge Hand suggested one test of legality was “power 
-only and not the manner o f its exercise”:
*' If the decisions of the Supreme Court are to be so understood, it is 
the mere possession of an economic power, acquired by some form of 
a combination, and capable, by its own variation in production, of 
changing and controlling price, which is illegal. . . . Under such an 
interpretation of the act, Corn Products Refining Company is cer- 
<- tainly a combination in restraint of trade, and its excuse is irrelevant,
> if it were true, that it has had a beneficent effect upon the industry. If 
the statute condemns an industrial integration of producing units
- sufficient to fix prices, so long as the total producing capacity 
remains unchanged, that policy mpst be respected and enforced, 
whether it is a good one or a bad.230
' In other circumstances, Judge Hand recognized that the exer­
cise of power, not its existence, is the crucial factor relevant to the 
section 2 question of whether competition has been displaced by 
unilateral behavior antithetical to the long-run value o f maintain­
ing a regime o f competition. Judge Hand stated it this way: 51
Under that theory the injuries to the public are shown by the means 
? - which the combination has employed in its efforts either to gain or to
■ _ maintain its position. . . . While the statute under this theory relies 
upon competition as a proper stimulus to the maintenance of indus­
trial advance and as the chief protection to the consumer, it takes a 
long view, not a short. It recognizes that with the customer in the end 
must lie the decision between producers, and that those who fail to 
secure the market by the quality and cost of their service must pass
* out of the field; but it does not identify permanent capacity with the 
inability to endure a transitory or local appeal to customers. Its 
presupposition is that there may well be competitors capable in the 
end of giving a service which will serve the public as well as their
229 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
230 id. at 1012.
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. #  
neighbors, who may yet succumb to concerted competition ap- :- 
parently more serviceable, but only because it is temporary, and is put 
forward with no purpose of universal application. Possibly it would “ 
be hazardous to attempt an absolutely general statement, bul it  ^
would yet be true to say that nearly all the devices condemned by the V' 
courts contain this sporadic element, either of time or place; that is to ' 
say, that they cover only a competition which was not intended to be '! 
permanent, and which the combination knew was only for the Jj  
temporary purpose of extirpating a competitor who had at least some , ? 
chance in the long run of establishing a service which would be as 1  
acceptable as any within the power of the combination itself. '
It is on this account that the intent of the combination so often ! 
appears in the cases as the determinating factor in illegality. It is not !• 
because unfair competition is a crime, but only because a monopohs- ' j? 
tic intent is the clearest evidence that the competition attempted is I 
shown to be temporary and local, and that there is on this account a /  
reasonable expectation that it will be succeeded by competition which t  
the newcomer might well be able to meet, had his development been 4  
all the while left unimpeded. If that temporary or local competition /§  
were not coupled with such an intent, if there were honest grounds j i  
for supposing that it would or could remain to the permanent 
advantage of the consumer, the public would have no ground to , t  
complain, so long as the organization of industry remains on a $  
competitive basis. The intent is the touchstone, not because we are 
concerned with moral delinquency, but with a test of probable 4  
persistence of the combination’s course of conduct.231
*
.  .  ^  
The 1916 dichotomy in monopolization cases and conceptual
approach to them reognized by Judge Hand is not a 1979 f |
paradox. It is a recognition o f the previously discussed two
broad categories o f circumstances where it is claimed that the |
competitive process has been displaced by monopoly power: (1) ,'f
structural cases where the source o f  displacement o f competition *
is the persistent, unexplained and overwhelming market share of /
the defendant as in ALCOA  and United Shoe; and (2) behavioral ■»
cases where market definitions and market share are not as k
significant, but the conduct o f a defendant with significant }
economic power is alleged to be the inappropriate cause o f  the >
displacement o f the neutral hand o f  competition as in Woods
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Exploration,™2 Otter Tail233 and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern 
photo Materials C o.214 Structural and behavioral theories of 
illegality derived inductively from different factual circumstances 
do not present distinct and firm models or rules but broad, 
shifting and amorphous generalities o f principles and methods of 
analysis taking their meaning and content from the facts before 
the court in light o f the policies o f the law rather than a priori 
models and generalities dictating what facts will be allowed 
relevance to the analysis and what goals o f the law will prevail to 
the exclusion o f all others.
; Rather than presenting a “paradox” o f conflicting rules, the 
evolution o f divergent monopolization tests reaffirms the induc­
tive nature o f legal reasoning in a common law system and the 
refusal o f reality to conform to preordained rules. Judicial re­
sponsibility for antitrust enforcement is premised upon the fact 
that reality is a chugging and churning state of affairs continually 
giving rise to new facts testing old values, thereby necessitating a 
broad and general statutory delegation of authority to the courts 
for the purpose o f  analyzing that ever-changing reality to achieve 
a variety o f political, social and economic goals—goals occa­
sionally in apparent conflict with one another. Rigid and fixed 
rules or models are a snare and a delusion in such a process. In 
the process o f resolving disputes in a manner that will achieve the 
institutional goals o f  antitrust policy while justly resolving the 
dispute, facts ought to be analyzed in light o f those goals and be 
organized by principles from previous litigation, the policies 
underlying the statute at stake, and new meanings for the princi­
ples o f prior cases generated by the facts o f the dispute before the 
court.
232 Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. ALCOA, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th 
Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
233 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
a* 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
The converse process o f following a preordained rule, select­
ing only those facts which the rule admits as relevant, and then 
analyzing the facts within the constraints o f the rule is a discredi­
ted form o f legal positivism producing undue inflexibility in the 
law, an ignoring o f facts not consonant with the rule, and a 
frustration o f goals o f the law not embraced by the assumptions 
of the rule or ignored in the process o f applying the rule. It is the 
process o f analyzing the light o f the model, rather than the £  
dispute it is intended to illuminate. 1 1
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Berkey’s discovery o f  a section 2 “paradox” is the result o f an £ 
apparent need in the mind o f the court to discover a coherent and ,'  
symmetrical rule to govern and dictate decision of the dispute ; 
before the court in accord with the maxims o f deductive logic.
The court proceeded upon a deductive rather than an inductive 
path, thereby failing to recognize fully the differing threads of f  
analysis developed by Judge Hand in Corn Products and clearly 
carried forward in the six decades o f section 2 litigation since that * 
time. This is not to say that a “conundrum” is not presented by I t’ 
these divergent lines o f authority in section 2 litigation since the « 
theoretical distinction between structural and behavioral monopo- ^  
lization is relatively easy to detect and state but difficult to apply .*£ 
and the line between conduct which is acceptably competitive and 
that which is not, whichever theory is followed, is not susceptible^ 
to a rigid definition by generally stated rules. The court’s analysis 
did not either resolve the “paradox” or the “conundrum” it 
discovered in section 2 litigation, but simply restated it in a way 
which required, in the mind o f the court, an extended factual ^  
analysis o f Kodak’s conduct to determine whether the inference 
of “not honestly industrial” should be drawn or whether the |j 
conduct should be inferred as stemming from the court’s newly 
discovered, but undefined, permissible efficiencies o f size and 
benefits o f business integration.235
235 6 03 F.2d at 276. No authority was cited for the propositions or for > 
the assertions that for section 2 purposes the law tolerates “competitive 
rewards attributable to . . . efficient size, nor does an integrated? 
business offend the Sherman Act whenever one of its departments r _
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One o f Berkey’s central claims involved Kodak’s introduction 
of a new and smaller camera utilizing a cartridge format for a new 
type and size o f color film. The new film required a different 
photofinishing process conducted at higher temperatures. Berkey 
contended that the introduction of the new camera system using 
the new film coupled with a refusal to predisclose the system and 
the film and Kodak’s refusal to make the film available for new 
formats developed by competing camera manufacturers, consti­
tuted monopolization of the camera market and an unlawful 
leveraging o f Kodak’s monopoly power in film and cameras into 
the photofinishing markets. The court held that it was error for 
\the trial judge to leave the question o f whether Kodak had a duty 
to predisclose its new 110 camera system to competing manufac­
turers for the jury; and, that as a matter o f law, Kodak had no 
such duty:
If a firm that has engaged in the risks and expenses of research and 
development were required in all circumstances to share with its rivals
benefits from association with a division possessing a monopoly in its 
own market.” Id. Neither proposition was elaborated upon, nor were 
terms defined. Both propositions would appear to have some grain of 
truth to them, while also carrying implications at odds with the 
ALCOA-United Shoe line of authority suggesting narrow constraints 
upon firm conduct where the firm approaches or attains monopoly 
-'power and the Griffith-Otter Tail line of cases limiting use of monopoly 
power from one market to injure competition in another. Since these 
propositions formed the predicate for most of the court’s analysis of 
Kodak’s conduct, they obviously deserved greater thought and elabora­
tion. As in Telex, part of the explanation for the court’s broad policy 
■pronouncements backing away from previous precedent may reside in 
the reality that Berkey was a private damage action whereas most of the 
precedent involved government civil actions. Either the penalty of treble 
damages or confusing the standards for proof of antitrust damage with 
the issue of proving a violation of the law may explain the court’s 
penchant for ignoring previous precedent. Neither explanation, how­
ever, justifies the court’s failure to explain its rationale. There would 
appear to be even less justification for the expression of opinions going 
jeven further by two Justices of the Supreme Court on denial of the 
■, petition of certiorari and before any arguments on the merits of the 
^case. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) 
(Rehnquist & Powell JJ., dissenting).
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i
the benefits of those endeavors, this incentive would very likely be 
vitiated.
Withholding from others advance knowledge of one’s new prod-  ^
ucts, therefore, ordinarily constitutes valid competitive conduct. 
Because, . . .  a monopolist is permitted and indeed encouraged, by 
section 2 to compete aggressively on the merits, any success that it 
may achieve through the “process of invention and innovation” is 
clearly tolerated by the antitrust laws.236
The court held Berkey or any antitrust plaintiff “bears a heavy 
burden” in urging a predisclosure rule and that Berkey’s attempt 
to carry its burden by claiming that Kodak enhanced its camera 
monopoly by use of its film monopoly was not satisfied. No |  
definition o f the burden nor how it could be sustained was set out j? 
by the court, nor was Berkey permitted to have a jury consider £ 
the evidence it did present pursuant to adequate instructions on 4  
the issue. Introduction of an advantageous new film format  ^[; 
usable only in Kodak’s new 110 camera system by the f ir m ly  
possessing monopoly power in the film market and not predis- J§ 
closing the unique character of the film thereby excluding other 
camera manufacturers for a substantial time period from making 
cameras capable o f accommodating the new film, was viewed by 
the court as “a benefit o f integration and not, without more, a 
use o f Kodak’s power in the film market, to gain a competitive, 
advantage in cameras.”237
! 226 Id. at 281. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 3 T rade R e g .R ei . 
(CCH) K 21,770 (ET.C. 1980), the ET.C. appeared to ameliorate the' 
Berkey opinion’s inference that aggressive competition based on inven­
tion and innovation can never be a basis for finding a section 2 
violation. After summarizing the Berkey opinion, the Commission * ’1 
stated the appropriate course was to weigh “the efficiencies and com- * 
petitive virtues of the practices under scrutiny against their exclusionaiy >1 
characteristics and effects.” 3 T rade R e g .R e p . (CCH) at p. 21,978. The 
test was restated and followed later in the Commission’s analysis of du 
Pont’s conduct. Id. at p. 21,982. The Commission’s test is the moref' 
appropriate standard, because it permits a refined analysis of the facts 
peculiar to the case and a more sensitive weighing of short’term versus , 
long-term consequences of the conduct in question. A*
237 603 F.2d at 283. %■ XT
w
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A Berkey’s further attempt to justify a predisclosure rule with 
respect to the new film format because o f past anticompetitive 
conduct by Kodak in refusing to make film formats to meet the 
needs o f new camera designs o f competing camera manufacturers 
was rejected by the court, since the cause o f Berkey’s claimed 
injuries in the case was not refusal to sell different film formats 
for a competitor’s cameras but for refusal to predisclose the new 
Kodacolar film in the 110 format for Kodak’s new cameras.
-* The significance o f wave III monopolization standards being 
developed in private rather than public litigation is apparent in 
this ruling o f the court, since the court was implicitly requiring 
that evidence relied upon to prove the conduct element must also 
carry the burden of proving causation in fact for a plaintiff’s 
claimed damage. Failure on the latter count was relied upon to 
reject Berkey’s claim that refusal to predisclose the new film 
format was unlawful conduct in the context o f Berkey’s suit for 
monopolizing the camera market. Whether Kodak’s refusal to 
make film formats available for competing camera manufacturers 
would constitute unlawful monopolization in a private case by a 
competing camera manufacturer or in a government monopoliza­
tion case remains unclear since the court intermingled conduct 
issues for proof o f violation with causation issues for proof of  
damage.
' A similar fate befell Berkey’s claim that Kodak’s restriction o f  
the new film format to the new Kodak 110 system, thereby 
’promoting the sale o f one by the sale o f the other, injured 
competing camera manfacturers. In order to prove this claim, the 
•court required Berkey to prove that some customers who would 
-have purchased Berkey cameras were “dissuaded from doing so” 
because the film was only available in the 110 format.238 Berkey 
"produced no evidence to show lost camera sales for this reason, 
thereby failing to prove both causation and injury.
as id, at 285-88.
Whether Kodak’s refusal to produce the new film in sizes 
usable in competing camera systems would constitute conduct 
sufficient to prove unlawful monopolization in a government case 
remains unclear. If, however, the court’s initial and unsubstan­
tiated premises—that monopolists are encouraged to “compete 
aggressively” and that gains which accrue to an integrated firm 
solely by virtue o f integration, regardless of its market share in 
one or another market, cannot by themselves be considered uses 
of monopoly power—be followed in a similar government case, it t 
would appear the Berkey court would conclude the conduct not 
sufficient to prove unlawful monopolization. The subtle and 
difficult question o f assessing economic power, one unaccounted 
for by theoretical economic models but very real in most commer­
cial relations, is excluded by this kind of analysis. The “en- ‘ 
couragement of aggressive competition by a monopolist” premisea 
is inconsistent with wave II precedent limiting the actions o f a ^  
monopolist because o f the presumed impact o f a monopolist’s "i 
power in the market and the idea that the statute is designed to * 
protect, maintain and foster a regime of competition by forbid- r 
ding the displacement o f that process by monopoly. ^
il
\
The “benefits o f integration” standard—one not identified as ,f 
having a heritage by any citation to authority or extended ex- 
planation—was given no definition, nor is it clear what implica­
tions the court’s newly discovered premise will have in pendingf 
government cases like Exxon239 and A.T.&T.240 Carried to its* 
logical end, the “benefits o f integration” standard would support 
a holding that non-predatory conduct exercising monopoly power f  
in one market (refusal to predisclose the new film or make it for 
competing camera formats) having an exclusionary impact in 
another market (competition for camera sales) is not a violation 
of the law. This would amount to a significant departure from ,
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Exxon Corp. [1973-76 Transfer Binder] T rade  R e g . R ee  (CCH) 
t  20,388 (1973).
240United States v. A.T.&T. [1970-79 Transfer Binder] T r a d e R eg . F e p "
(CCH) 1 45,074, Case 2416 (D.D.C. 1974) (Civ. No. 74-1698).
t,wave II cases strictly limiting the translation o f market power
► 'from one market to another and limiting lawful conduct o f a 
monopolist which is unnecessarily exclusionary, unless again it is a 
case o f confusing causation issues for proof o f damage purposes 
'with conduct questions for proof o f a violation of the law 
^'purposes in the context o f a private damage action.
< %
».t Two °ther conduct holdings in Berkey are o f significance. 
Berkey claimed that Kodak’s introduction of a new film format
■ caused it injury in the photofinishing and photofinishing equip- 
r ment markets, markets where Kodak did not have monopoly 
-power. Berkey claimed that its injuries were the result o f Kodak 
"introducing a new film needing a different photofinishing process 
and equipment, services that only Kodak could perform for 
 ^several weeks prior to others learning the process and being 
‘ equipped to perform it. Berkey also claimed that Kodak charged 
excessive prices for the chemicals and film processing equipment 
t when it was made available by Kodak to competitors in film 
' .processing.
 ^ . In reversing verdicts for Berkey on some o f these claims and 
ordering a new trial, the court held that gaining a “competitive 
advantage in markets where Kodak did not have monopoly 
power by use o f monopoly power possessed in other segments of
- the industry was actionable.241 In applying this standard, how­
ever, the court found the lower court jury instructions “did not 
"draw with sufficient sharpness the distinction between exercises of  
fpojyer and the natural benefits o f size and integration.”242 Little 
guidance was given in how instructions should or could be drawn 
sharpening the “exercise o f power/natural benefits” distinction,
, nor is it an easy line to draw once one departs from the ALCOA
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^ ‘ 603 F.2d at 291. A holding Justices Rehnquist and Powell ap­
parently believe to be “little less than bizarre.” Berkey Photo, Inc. v. 
^astman Kodak Co., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (dissenting from denial of 
Petition for certiorari).




and United Shoe implications that one possessing monopoly , 
power is severely restricted in their conduct in the market; 
“natural advantages” o f size and integration and legality o f the 
conduct to the contrary notwithstanding. «
Only the inevitable and unavoidable appeared permissible in 
ALCOA and United Shoe, while Berkey appears to broaden I he 
realm o f permissible conduct to include normally competitive and 
non-predatory conduct attributable to a realization o f  the unde­
fined “natural benefits” of size and business integration. A 
natural advantage o f size and integration of a monopolist is the 
ability to exclude less powerful competitors by tactics that of 
themselves are not predatory in the short run but are unnecessar­
ily exclusionary in the long run. The premise contains its conclu­
sion and forecloses a careful analysis of whether monopoly power 
is dictating the functioning o f the market or whether competition.? 
is doing so.
Whether this too is a shift in the law necessitated by private ? 
monopolization litigation in the mind of the court to insured 
factual causation and antitrust damage are present, as well as a,-jj 
violation o f the law, is impossible to assess. The source, meaning^ 
and implications o f the court’s concept o f “efficiencies o f size’1 
and “natural benefits” o f integration are opaque at best. If;!  
similar standard is held applicable in government cases, thenj 
Berkey is indeed a significant departure from wave II conduct 
standards for proof o f unlawful monopolization and will consid: 
erably narrow the implications o f  wave II doctrine circumscribing-] 
the use o f monopoly power in one market to injure competition1 
in another. Moreover, it is clearly an abandonment o f the wave II§ 
limitation upon ordinary business conduct by a monopolist which 
is unreasonably or unnecessarily exclusionary.
A second holding o f further significance in Berkey is thel 
court’s anafysis with regard to claimed monopolization of fiffij 
and color print paper markets by overcharging buyers o f those! 
products. The court held that a firm which gains or maintaiiisf 
monopoly power over the supply o f a product by anticompetitive!
conduct may be held liable for overcharges even where excessive 
prices were charged many, years after the unlawful conduct 
conferring or maintaining the monopoly power. The court stated:
So long as a monopolist continues to use the power it has gained 
. illicitly to overcharge its customers, it has no claim on the repose that 
’ a statute of limitations is intended to provide.243
^  monopolist s purchasers suffer injury for purposes o f treble 
damage litigation when the excessive prices monopoly power 
t makes possible occur, not when the unlawful conduct conferring 
or maintaining the monopoly takes place. Thus, purchasers do 
not suffer injury and limitations do not run in a private case until 
overcharges are made, conduct which might not take place until 
several years after the conduct conferring or maintaining the 
monopoly, yet conduct which is itself an unlawful use o f monop­
oly power.
: ; The court’s willingness to stretch out the limitations period—a 
holding in line with prior precedent244—in cases of a monopolist’s 
overcharges to purchasers was considerably tempered, however, 
by its significant holding on the appropriate measure o f damages 
-in such cases. The court reversed the trial court standard that a 
purchaser may recover for the entire excess o f the monopolist’s 
price over that which would prevail in a competitive market in 
favor o f a standard the court labeled “the wrongful conduct 
rule.” The court’s “wrongful conduct rule” limits the recovery to 
the price increment caused by the anticompetitive conduct that 
originated or augmented the monopolist’s control over the 
■qiarket.”245 The restatement o f the rule later in the 
indicates the court combined and confused the
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opinion 
elements of
i ™ at 295 • Another holding Justices Rehnquist and Powell ap­
parently believe to be bizarre. See note 241, supra.
J 4!inenitl1 Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, .338-
■ ■ ' - Wheeler & Jones, The Statute of Limitations for Antitrust 
. ;vamage Actions: Four Years or Forty? 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 72 (1973).
F.2d at 297.
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causation and proof o f damage: “ [a] purchaser may recover onljfg 
for the price increment that ‘flows from’ the distortion o f th | 
market caused by the monopolists’ anticompetitive conduct.”2i |  
The court did so out o f  a concern for the pristine monopolist, free 
to charge whatever the market will bear, who might be held liable| 
for treble damages if it committed any anticompetitive conductj 
no matter how unrelated to the damage claims before the court.24^
• J. vjy,
The court’s concern is a theoretical one which might better bqf 
solved by keeping the elements o f causation and damages separate 
for analytical purposes, rather than confusing the two into a test?: 
that will be difficult or impossible to apply. Proving a factuap 
linkage between an overcharge, itself unlawful conduct by j j  
wrongdoing monopolist, and the wrongful conduct conferring or 
maintaining a monopoly would challenge a medieval scholastic’l l  
mastery o f causation and logic demonstrating the connectioii! 
Solicitation for the pristine monopolist and fear o f unwarranted 
treble damage suits would appear a bit overblown by the court|f 
while the costs and complexities o f proving a damage claim under® 
the court’s “wrongful conduct” rule by limiting recovery to, 
damage traceable to anticompetitive conduct conferring monop>| 
oly power may prove overwhelming to the victim o f “non- 
pristine” monopolists, particularly in cases where overcharge! 
occur many years after the unlawful conduct conferring theL 
monopoly power which makes possible a latter-day overcharge? 
Should one encounter a “pristine” monopolist, liability should
,,4<:' •­
not be imposed in the absence o f proof o f a violation of the la^
conferring the power to fix prices at a monopoly level. The ‘ f
than pristine monopolist should be liable for displacing competi:
tion as the rule o f trade to any person injured by reason of it|,?
non-pristine violation o f the law within the limits established byf
standing requirements and certainty in the proof o f damage. J |
Berkey’s recognition o f a broader range o f competitive tactics 
f .considered honestly industrial for monopolists is in line with the 
}* ideology o f the wave 111 cases o f Telex, Transamerica, and 
t 'QalComp but parts company from the ALCOA, United Shoe,
• , ,knd Greyhound Computer standard of limiting a monopolist to 
, “ <- conduct which is inevitable, unavoidable or untainted by an 
fj,, ,unnecessary exclusionary effect.248 Whether one approves o f this 
^ . [philosophical drift o f the law in this series o f cases o f not— 
‘ > ' {specific criticism o f doctrinal development and analytical method- 
$ ^ology to one side—depends on at least three factors: First, one’s 
[■ ' View o f private enforcement accompanied by treble damages and 
t whether standards different from public enforcement ought to 
‘ apply in private cases for proof o f violation; second, what policies 
v I o^r goals one believes ought to be served by enforcement o f section 
% \2'Of the Sherman Act—displacement o f monopoly power over a 
significant segment o f  the economy in order to insure competition 
\erves as the long-run rule o f trade or, that the purpose o f section 
2<is only to curb the abuse o f monopoly power in the belief that
■-____________________________________________________
See, Comment, supra note 139, where the endorsement of hard 
Cr icompetition by the Kodak and CalComp courts is appropriately 
^described as “a dramatic departure from the more traditional concern 
’ /or detecting an exclusionary ‘course of conduct.’ ” To those schooled 
jy" "'4 the “niceties of antitrust litigation” this is not a startling conclusion.
.. Jhose not so schooled and unwilling to attach any significance to 
M I|(|B ak’s status as a monopolist, the conclusion may be startling. See the 
R en tin g  opinions on denial of certiorari by Justices Rehnquist and 
supra note 235, for two who were apparently “startled.”
J F-T.C. opinion in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 3 T r a d e  
r/iREG.REE (CCH) 1 21,770 (1980), an “attempt to monopolize” case 
y  'drawing heavily from monopolization precedent, grapples with many 
' ; * similar difficult conduct issues. The du Pont opinion is more consistent 
the wave II cases by recognizing that the analysis must go beyond 
. _ determining whether the conduct is “competitive” and take account of 
'■v;3fee a^ct that the conduct is engaged in by a firm with market power and 
procompetitive effects must be weighed against anticompetitive 
^jlflects. The final decision on legality or illegality of conduct in difficult 
JjfilP like Berkey and du Pont is one of judgment based on all the facts 
circumstances, rather than an objective conclusion produced by the 
€|p!iuctive logic of applying fixed assumptions to fixed facts.
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market forces will more efficiently and effectively deal with the® 
power itself over time than will intervention by public and private;/ 
court actions directed at monopoly power; and, third, whether* 
one agrees with the premises o f CalComp and Berkey thati 
aggressive competition by a monopolist should be presumed^ 
lawful and that objective rules can determine when aggressive! 
conduct becomes unlawful predatory conduct in light o f the goals t’ 
o f section 2 and the methodology o f a common law legal process. * 
On all three factors, Berkey departs from wave II monopolization 
standards and assumptions and is, for these reasons, a significant 
though not persuasive wave III decision.
3. i nt: b o r d l  n  t Abi The leading wave 111 public enforcements1, 
case to date, Borden, Inc.,1** involved an F.T.C. challenge to’ 
Borden’s domination o f the processed lemon juice market with its 
“ReaLemon” brand o f  the product. The Commission held marketj 
tests developed under section 2 o f the Sherman Act and section 7* 
of the Clayton Act were applicable in monopolization cases, 
brought pursuant to section 5 o f the F.T.C. Act. The Commission; 
evaluated numerous factors in reaching its conclusion that proc-i,; 
essed lemon juice was an appropriate market in which to measure,, 
market power, invoking cross-elasticity tests to define the broad*’ 
outer boundaries o f the market and the Brown Shoe concept of& 
“submarkets” as a necessary further refinement to determined 
whether Borden had monopolized “any part” o f commerce.230 
The Commission majority then proceeded to examine a number’'' 
o f factors including unique characteristics o f the product, in:a 
dustry and public recognition o f  the product as a separate,1 
product, the degree o f price difference and price sensitivity in’.
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2“9 [1976-79 Transfer Binder] T r a d e  R e g .R e p .  (CCH) 1 21,490 (1978).> 
See also, The Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e p .  (CCH)’
1 21,650 (F.T.C. 1979) discussed infra part III; E.I. du Pont de Nemours,' 
& Co., 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e p .  (CCH) 1 21,770 (F.T.C. 1980) (an attempt to* 
monopolize decision by the F.T.C.). gj
250 [1976-79 Transfer Binder] 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e r  (CCH) at pp. 21,497­
498.
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/-relation to similar products and such additional factors as use o f  
distinct manufacturing and marketing facilities to infer processed 
' lemon juice is a distinct market for section 2 purposes.231
. Professor Schmalensee in a thoughtful and significant article 
on the ReaLemon case criticizes the opinion’s methodology in 
„ analyzing the market, as a matter o f  economic theory, while 
agreeing with the Commission’s finding o f monopoly power.232 
The Schmalensee criticism stems from the Commission’s apparent 
use o f inherently coherent economic models premised on assump­
tions about reality that do not comport with the relevant facts o f  
the dispute before the agency or court. 233 Schmalensee suggests— 
a suggestion at odds with my experience and much that is passed 
*off as the use o f economic analysis in law—that students o f  
economics are taught to engage in “creative theoretical analysis” 
by examining the host o f  theoretical and internally coherent 
.models available in light o f and consistent with the “principal 
.facts at hand”234 if they wish to arrive at defensible predictions 
about the consequences o f change or explanations o f observed 
Behavior. This methodology o f economic analysis is analogous to 
iKuhn’s model o f  paradigm construction or the creative process by 
which a new hypothesis explaining observed reality is created in 
'science as opposed to normal science or research aimed at filling 
out a known and accepted paradigm or hypothesis by repeatedly 
testing and applying it to reality.233
-  ^ Economic theorizing is seldom presented to courts or agencies 
in this way, nor is it understood by many proponents o f economic 
theorizing that courts are always confronted with questions o f
i,251 Id.
252 Schmalensee, supra note 67.
< Id. at 995-96.
J 254 Id. at 996.
5 '255 S ee , T. K u h n ,  T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  R e v o lu t i o n s  (2d ed. 
1966).
$“ought” which can only be determined by a process o f analysis j 
which is primarily inductive and creative, and not the wooden and j  
deductive process of applying a theoretical model to that reality^ 
which fits the model. Determining whether a particular activity H] 
ought to be found a “market” for section 2 purposes cannot b e ; 
dictated by a model or by a pat formula. Proceeding upon such a - 
path is dangerous since recalcitrant facts not accounted for by the * 
model are usually ignored, or not even observed, and goals o f the 
law not compatible with the artificial assumptions and method- , |  
ological restrictions o f the model are ignored.
It is in this sense that the Commission’s methodology in 
analyzing the market in ReaLemon may be criticized. In 
Schmalensee’s view, the Commission bent the model to fit the 
facts236 which is at least less objectionable than bending the facts 
to fit the model. It indicates the Commission was proceeding^  
upon an inductive path in its investigation of whether an inference? I  
of monopoly power ought to be drawn. The Commission inferred * 
monopoly power, in part, from the “ReaLemon” brand’s share of ^. 
the market defined: 75% to 88% of the gallonage sold and 77%% 
to 88.9% of the dollar sales and over 75% of sales in most of the-.1 
local markets examined.237 M onopoly power was also inferred? 
from Borden’s ability to command a price premium even though- 
the product was found indistinguishable from competing brands,!^ 
by virtue o f its “almost generic” tradename providing substantial^ 
product differentiation and preferred shelf space; high entry«' 
barriers to existing and new competitors; and, a profit rate> < 
excluding goodwill, o f from 16.9% to 35.2% compared to a 5.0% 
to 6.97% rate o f return for all manufacturing concerns and 5.5% 
to 6.4% for the “food and kindred products industries.”258 The 
persistence o f excessive profits, coupled with relationships in the^  
market from which entry barriers may be inferred are indicative^
94 : The antitrust bulletin
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of short-run monopoly power in a relevant market.239 This kind 
/  of profit picture coupled with successful exclusionary conduct 
may also be an indication of long-run monopoly power or the 
‘ power to prevent erosion o f profits by new entry or by control of 
[ existing competitors.260
"i  - ■
256 127 U .P a .L .R ev. at 1044.
257 [1976-79 Transfer Binder] 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e p . (CCH) at p. 21,501.
258 id. at pp. 21,501-503.
The Commission held that it was not sufficient to show 
Borden had monopoly power in a relevant market but that “it 
must also be shown that that power was willfully acquired or 
, maintained.”261 In other words, some conduct in obtaining, main­
taining or using monopoly power must be identified and it must 
‘ be concluded that the conduct identified is “not honestly indus­
' trial”—to borrow a phrase—behavior, but is the product o f the 
defendant’s monopoly power rather than a permitted competitive 
response.
The Commission entered the black hole o f conduct issues by 
observing that the conduct relied upon “need not . . .  be inde- 
' pendently unlawful or predatory to constitute acts and practices
■ of monopolization.”262 The majority fastened on Borden’s use of 
geographic price discrimination in marketing ReaLemon, keeping 
prices high in most markets while lowering list prices, increasing 
promotional allowances, and expanding advertising where it faced 
r competition. These practices were done in the context of a 
„ trademark differentiated, but physically fungible, product able to 
'jcommand a substantial premium price by virtue o f a strong 
trademark and preferred shelf space. Price cuts and promotional 
' allowances to retailers were aimed at markets where “ReaLemon” 
faced competition; evidence the majority appeared to rely upon to 
conclude that the price cuts and allowances were used with the 
specific intent o f excluding competitors or that Borden’s main-
' 259 Schmalensee, supra note 67, at 1016.
J^v  260 id. at 1044.
[1976-79 Transfer Binder] 3 T r a d e  R e g . R e r  (CCH) at p. 21,503.
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tenance o f monopoly power over the market defined was not 
economically inevitable in the tradition o f the ALCOA  test for 
conduct.263
It is unclear whether the majority believed that this evidence, 
standing alone, would have been sufficient to support a finding of 
unlawful monopolization. The complaint, however, went further 
by charging Borden with selling ReaLemon “below cost or at 
unreasonably low prices with the effect o f injuring, suppressing or 
destroying competition.”264 The majority found that Borden sold 
ReaLemon in at least two local markets where it faced strong 
competition below average total cost but above average variable 
cost. The majority found sales below average total cost to be 
predatory pricing, adopting the Posner argument263 that the 
predatory pricing line be drawn at average total cost since a 
monopolist’s pricing below that level could drive out an equally 
or more efficient competitor. The reason this is so, at least in 
theory, is because short-run marginal costs may not include a 
variety of past and current expenses which have become fixed 
costs for existing firms but are yet to be incurred by the new 
entrant seeking to gain part o f the market. A  deep pocket 
monopolist could therefore price below an equally or more 
efficient new competitor with impunity if the predatory line be 
drawn at average variable costs driving the latter from the 
market. Thus the majority relied in part on Borden’s pricing 
below average total cost, with no contrary evidence o f increased 
efficiency or innovation justifying lower prices, to conclude that 
Borden unlawfully monopolized by predatory pricing.
It is difficult to assay whether any one factor o f Borden’s 
conduct analyzed by the majority—product differentiation and
z«/d. 21,503-506.
id. at 21,506.
265 R . P o s n e r ,  A n t i t r u s t  L aw; A n  E c o n o m ic  P e r s p e c t i v e ,  188-92,
(1976).
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premium pricing coupled with geographic price discrimination, 
" sales below average total cost, or specific intent to exclude
- competitors, or a combination of all three not being economically 
’inevitable—convinced the majority to draw the inference of. 
unlawful monopolization. Commissioner Pitofsky concurred be­
cause o f this, stating that intent was too “ambiguous an indica­
tor” for the conduct element and geographic price discrimination 
koo blunt a test for conduct which might sacrifice worthwhile and 
justified competitive responses by a monopolist.266
Instead, Commissioner Pitofsky relied on a narrower test to 
the effect that pricing below average total cost in a market with 
high entry barriers is presumptively unlawful predatory pricing. 
-"Commissioner Pitofsky pointed to Borden’s ability to command a
< premium price by virtue o f a “pronounced consumer preference” 
due to Borden’s strong brand recognition.267 That recognition was 
due to image not product superiority and placed on competitors 
r high entry costs, costs not traceable to efficiency or innovation 
but to past and current expenditures by the monopolist for 
.advertising, sales promotions and distribution expenses building 
cordial relations with retailers. An equally efficient producer of 
■equivalent processed lemon juice could be driven to the wall by a 
deep pocket monopolist able to command a preferential price in 
these circumstances if the monopolist were free to price at average 
variable cost without taking into account past advertising, promo­
tional and distributional expenses which contributed to monopoly 
■power in the first place. A  new and equally, or even more, 
efficient entrant required to charge a price below the premium 
realized by the monopolist pricing at average variable cost could 
never make the necessary investment in fixed costs or a profit 
•sufficient to remain in business and would therefore be driven 
from the market by means not honestly industrial.
, 266 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e e  (CCH) [1976-79 Transfer Binder] at 21,517-518. 
r 267 Id. at 21,521.
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Thus Commissioner Pitofsky’s standard would normally draw 
the line o f predatory pricing at average variable costs except 
where there are substantial entry barriers traceable to fixed costs.- 
In those cases the standard would apparently presume predation 
where prices are below average total or full costs and there is no 
justification or excuse offered on a sort o f rule o f reason basis 
taking account o f the fact that the pricing is being done by a 
monopolist. Since this was the case in Borden, and Borden 
offered no justification or excuse for its pricing practices, Com-; 
missioner Pitofsky concluded that Borden’s pricing conduct was 
“unreasonably exclusionary” conduct justifying a finding o f un->/ 
lawful monoplization.268
Borden, Inc. is an important third wave monopolization 
opinion, one where pricing conduct and the ongoing debate over 
short-run marginal cost, long-run marginal cost and the ambi­
guities o f each are explored. The Areeda-Turner test o f marginal, 
costs or average variable costs was rejected in favor o f average 
total cost as the test for predation, but it is difficult to ascertain 
whether this will be so in all cases or only in those cases involvin 
a plus factor like artificial and high entry barriers or a specifi 
intent to exclude a competitor. Nor is it clear whether a less 
efficient monopolist pricing above its average total costs and
_____________________________________________________
268 Id. at 21,522. The Commission’s analysis of predatory pricing r
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 3 T r a d e  R e g .R e r  (CCH) 121,770 
(1980) appears to come down to the same test of “unreasonably 
exclusionary.” In du Pont, the pricing tactics did not entail an analysis 
of “predatory pricing” in the sense of pricing below marginal or average 
cost. The claimed “predation” was one of strategic pricing coupled with 
an expansion of capacity, causing an alleged increase of entry barriers 
for titanium dioxide producers using a less efficient manufacturing 
process. In finding du Pont’s conduct not predatory, the Commission 
held the increased difficulty of competitors to expand in the future as a 
result of du Pont’s conduct “is not the product of artificially induced; 
conduct that is unrelated to market conditions, cost differences, or scale 
economies.” The Commission concluded, therefore, that du Pont’s 
pricing behavior was not “unreasonable” conduct from which it could 
be inferred that du Pont had unlawfully attempted to monopolize. 3 
T r a d e  R e g .R e r  (CCH) at p. 21,982.
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Isupporting that price with higher prices in other markets would 
|jescape section 2 liability. Although such a practice may shelter 
Jfnore efficient competitors by a price umbrella it would also 
'Jg|hisallocate resources by allowing a monopolist to remain in a 
jmarket where it should no longer be predominant. Unlike the 
I ‘^ fransam erica  court, neither the majority nor the concurring 
^ffcppinions in Borden, Inc., suggested that prices above average full 
J-fefflBbst are conclusively presumed lawful, although Commissioner
- Pitofsky appeared to go a long way down that road.
C v  /  . .
For wave 111 monopolization litigation, it would also appear 
 ^ S | h at neither Transamerican nor Borden, Inc., have conclusively 
' . settled the predatory pricing issue, much less the extended, and at 
**;times esoteric, academic debate on the question. Neither opinion 
forecloses the broader and deeper jurisprudential debate concern­
" ing the goals o f section 2 o f the Sherman Act, i.e., whether the 
SStatute ought to be interpreted only to achieve economic effi­
c ie n c y  goals in the sense o f maximizing short-run consumer 
;:fi||lwelfare by curbing anticompetitive exercises o f economic power 
whether section 2’s purpose ought to be interpreted in a 
iptroader sense. Namely, as mandating a regime o f competition and 
„ prohibiting displacement o f that regime by monopoly no matter 
|p i|ib w  monopoly power is acquired, maintained or exercised be-
• cause o f long-run economic, political and social goals, as well as 
|vp|hbrt-run economic concerns with unchecked economic power in 
society..Mi;
,11 [. B eyond w ave III
sfv.U'V1' ' ■
J ijf  Several tentative conclusions and suggestions for improving 
:$^future litigation may be offered about wave III monopolization 
^litigation subject to the following caveats: First, most o f the law is 
feeing made in the context o f private litigation where the added 
g||elem ents o f standing, causation and proof o f the fact and amount 
jgfSf antitrust damage become intertwined and, on occasion, con- 
I'lfcfused with the substantive elements for proof o f violation. Confu-
sion o f standards for violation with those o f causation and
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majority may have a penchant for conservative neoclassical anal­
ysis emphasizing narrow efficiency goals as the sole purpose of 
the Sherman Act, it is well to remember the present Court has 
been activist in other areas o f antitrust.270 Generous precedent is 
available permitting the Court to justify legalistically a decision 
imposing strict proof o f markets, monopoly power, and predatory 
exclusionary conduct; or, one adopting a “no conduct” standard 
of unlawful monopolization in structural cases of persistent 
monopoly power in a significant industry. Predicting where the 
Court would go in monopolization litigation like Berkey or the 
computer cases is hazardous at best, since the precedent would 
tend to support anything the Court wishes to decide if it chooses 
to ignore the behavioral-structural dichotomy, the facts unique to 
each past decision and the multiplicity o f economic, political, and 
social goals past cases have attributed to section 2.
A third and more subtle caveat concerns the ideological 
struggle over the goals o f antitrust policy, one which has been 
going on since wave I and which still persists in the litigation as 
well as the academy. The ideological debate in the opinions 
seldom surfaces above mechanistic tests for markets, monopoly 
power, and conduct. Buried deep beneath the manipulation of the 
legal concepts in Berkey, Telex, and Transamerica on the one hand 
and Borden and Greyhound on the other, are different under­
standings of the goals o f antitrust policy in general and section 2 
in particular. The clearest clash is between the view that the 
antitrust laws should be limited to curbing behaivior inconsistent 
with maximizing short-run consumer welfare as defined by neo­
classical price theory versus the structuralist view and those who 
define the goals o f antitrust policy in broad economic, social, and 
/political terms. Telex, CalComp and Berkey represent the former
tf™ In particular, the narrowing o f the Parker v. Brown state action 
doctrine. See generally, 1 A r e e d a  &  T u r n e r ,  supra note 13, at 57-118; 
Flynn, Trends in Federal Antitrust Doctrine Suggesting Future Direc­
tions for State Antitrust Enforcement, 4 J.Corp.L. 479 (1979); Rogers, 
The State Action Antitrust Immunity 49 C olq.L .R ev. 147 (1978).
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view, while ALCOA, United Shoe and Greyhound represent the 
latter.
A difference in methodology is also apparent with courts in 
the Telex and Berkey line o f cases proceeding upon the legal 
positivist path while opinions like Borden and Greyhound follow 
the legal realist tradition. An awareness o f these underlying and 
contending ideological and methodological differences is essential 
if one is to understand subtle shifts in doctrine, differences in 
analytical methodology, and the receptivity o f particular courts or 
agencies to one kind o f evidence but not another and ongoing 
tendencies to favor one side as opposed to another. A court’s’ 
underlying ideology serves as the bridge by which one type of 
evidence, for example a particular economic theory or social and 
political concerns with size, is imported into, and given weight in, 
the process o f  deciding. Ideology also serves as the connecting t 
tissue between the analytical elements o f decisionmaking or as the ,~ 
agent dictating the balance between the various elements consid- a 
ered relevant to a decision. So long as law remains a human, 
institution dependent upon inductive and deductive thinking 
processes and the value system o f  the decisionmaker, ideology will 
play a predominant and inescapable role in shaping the direction 
and evolution o f doctrine. i
In the pursuit o f an understanding o f where the courts are- 
going in wave III monopolization litigation, (gne ignores shifts in 
ideology at his or her periDPretenses that the law can function 
with the mechanical efficiency o f  a computer or a “gumball 
dispenser” oblivious o f the underlying ethical and metaphysical ,j 
choices o f the decisionmaker or the models relied upon is a form 
o f long-discredited legal positivism. To the extent that much wave 
III monopolization litigation exhibits these surface tendencies, it 
represents a pernicious tendency in the law obscuring the underly-'fi 
ing reasons for decision and a guarantee o f further litigation or 
legislation seeking to conform law to evolving reality and percep­
tions o f reality. 'r
fSCL 
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With these caveats in mind several general conclusions may be 
derived from wave III monopolization litigation and suggestions 
for improvement may be made. The struggle to pin down the 
t policy goals o f section 2, identified in wave I long ago, continues. 
One view o f section 2 sees as its purpose the dissipation of 
monopoly power for economic, political and social reasons. It is a
- part o f the populist traditions o f antitrust law which seeks to use 
the law to dismantle monopoly power and control the unilateral 
"abuse o f power unfairly injuring competition and competitors. In 
this tradition, threats to the fundamental goal o f protecting and 
, maintaining a competitive process are seen as twofold: the persist- 
l>ent maintenance o f presence o f monopoly power in a significant 
‘ part o f the economy and conduct unreasonably fixing prices or 
■excluding competitors in a way inconsistent with the competitive
* -process. Both threats are seen as requiring legal condemnation in 
'order to avoid the long- and short-run economic, political and 
„ social evils o f monopoly power or its exercise in the economy.
 ^ .-Legal intervention is seen as necessary, because the market is 
vunable to correct itself within a reasonable time and because the 
policy o f the law is one o f guaranteeing to competitors and 
consumers that a competitive process shall govern trade free o f  
the distortion or displacement o f that process by the exercise or 
'possession o f monopoly power.
e A second view holds the sole or primary purpose o f section 2 
’• is to promote economic “efficiency” in the narrow sense o f  
maximizing short-run consumer welfare in accord with the models 
of neoclassical economic theorizing. This tradition uses economic 
theorizing according to the narrow limits o f neoclassical models 
as the primary or sole means for defining the law’s constraints. In 
some o f  its manifestations, for example, the writings o f Professor 
Bork, 71 this tradition carries heavy overtures o f  libertarian politi­
cal philosophy and views legal intervention in the affairs o f
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cases o f predation. Others assume a more schizophrenic pos­
ture— for example Areeda and Turner—decrying the populist 
tradition on the one hand, yet tempering their devotion to the ' 
market as maximizer o f consumer wants without government , 
intervention on the other hand by supporting no conduct monop- -r 
oly proposals.272
The “economic efficiency” view emphasizes a narrow defini- $ 
tion o f “efficiency” ; one that finds its meaning in artificial,- 
economic models predicting consequences that the model and its ~ 
assumptions call “efficient.” The assumptions o f the models, 
metaphysical ones seldom explicitly examined or at work in an 
area o f the economy afflicted with monopoly power or its 
exercise, provide an analytical straitjacket dictating what facts are" ’ 
relevant, limiting what values and insights from other disciplines 
are admissible, ignoring the implications o f time and power in the 
analysis, and—where applied rigorously—denying the use o f  legal V 
intervention in any case where the invisible hand has any theoreti­
cal potential to operate. In its most extreme form, “empirical” 
justification o f the models is a case o f analyzing the models in 
light o f a rigorous preselection of the facts according to a strict' 
deductive methodology in the belief that law is a science, not an *J 
art, o f projecting consequence from quantified and quantifiable 
facts in accord with the dictates o f  the model. Unfortunately, the 
human and institutional quality o f the facts and evolving human, 
behavior refuse to be put down or confined to artifically deduced , 
formulae which avoid exploration or the reasons for failure o f the 
model and economic disequilibrium infecting economic activity. 
While economic models may shed some light and be a useful' 
beginning point for analysis, it advances knowledge little to>; 
examine repeatedly the light and not what it is intended toj 
illuminate.
272 Compare A r e e d a  &  T u r n e r ,  supra note 13, at 8-31 with 3 A r e e d |T  
T u r n e r ,  supra note 13, at 35-71 (1978). See also, Fox, Book Review:^  
Clarion Universe of Microeconomic Policy, 54 N.Y.U. L .R e v .  
(1979); Schwartz, Book Review, On the Uses of Economics: A Surveyi 
of the Antitrust Treatises, 128 U . P a .L .R e v .  244 (1979). ;|J
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sjr The courts in wave ITT rpflert ,
-academy over the policy goals o f s e c t io n " ? lie n e e s  o f  the
fscendancy o f  neoclassical economic theorizing ^  ♦ notlceable 
Sbility o f its models to predict * st in tlie
J g  over tha,
r ‘° Pr nt “  W  a i o 7 S “
the end o f wave II. Affirmative nm f ^ f * at W^ ch Prevailed at 
exclusionary behavior is now clearly r e q u ir e T tV T T ^
,at least in treble damage actions, by courts like th T »  ’
arid the definition o f what is honestlv  i J ♦ u y  court’
generous if not better defined. Hard com petitioJT  beC° me m° re 
-is tolerated rather than nnlv tl0n by a monopolist
probable consequence will be some * °o r t? 1Cally mevitable- The 
.sumer benefit at the exnense „ f T  " prom°tion o f  con-
'Ihe; long run,
philosophy is followed in government cases J L l  P
monopolization. The artificiallvnr^H- ♦ a ? g structural
of specific conduct consei)IjencK
.the litigation, rather than .h e T o a d t  J o n t  J w i T * ?  ^  ° f
•Competitive process, for a variety o S  ‘ I
•economic reasons, from displacement by the p“ sisten n™ ’ “
, of monopoly Dower or nr.™., Persistent possession
Prices o r L ^ d e  co m " « trs ° f *  «*
^ h i l e  a blind adherence to a policv nf • 
institutions to equate more nearly w U h [
farmers expanding to fill an untamed anH - J  yeoman
• .unrealistic and inconsistent with Z d e m  ™ ,i v T ™ " '  *
fS m d  adherence to frozen models r o C  i„ n  8  ,he
■ tions about human nature and motivation7n J  , 1' assump‘ 
'itgWnated by large i n s t i l m ™ ,~ ' a t ,o n in a «>‘M y  increasingly
»  ° f  communication,
perceptions o f w tat is valued and what h Z ' u
■Cdicate for organizing economic affairs L  t  f L ^ f t S g
reality, it cannot afford to become locked into any single ideolog 
of what reality is or ought to be.
A  more tolerant view is required, recognizing the complexit 
o f reality and its evolution; one rooted in that reality rather thi 
the frozen assumptions o f  an era no longer relevant or a realit 
that cannot be. “Efficiency,” however defined, is entitled to i l  
due where it can reasonably be identified in fact; but so, also a iff | 
the other goals we seek to achieve by the establishment anj§§ 
maintenance o f a competitive process as the rule o f trade. It is tf|J  
art o f the legal process which finds a sensible balance o f thesfl 
competing and sometimes apparently conflicting goals in light ^  
the facts and circumstances o f particular cases. w |
- f f l
Wave III market tests, with the exception o f  cases like Telex£ 
continue to evolve on a more complex analytical basis than 
followed in wave II. There appears to be a willingness to fragm eiij 
markets further in the analytical process o f identifying the p i | | ! 
ence or absence o f  monopoly power with primary reliance placed| 
on market tests evolved in merger cases. Yet the opinions tend|tS  
use market tests as devices producing a concrete conclusion! 
describing a physically identifiable and frozen thing in a tangiM  
area o f space. The function o f defining relevant markets^™ 
monopolization litigation should be understood and used injj] 
-more subtle way. Market definitions are only the beginning offanl 
analytical process leading to a judgment on the intangible q u e || 
tion o f whether it is appropriate to determine that a defendan t^  
structure and/or behavior have displaced the competitive proc^|| 
in the context o f the facts and circumstances peculiar to the caslg 
. and in a way inconsistent with the goals o f antitrust policy.
IL
[The overall goal o f the Sherman Act is to insure that co m p el 
tion to the greatest extent practicable under all the circumstanced 
serves as the mechanism for determining price, entry and exllfl 
resource allocation, innovation, entrepreneurial success 
failure, and individual economic decisionm aking^ection 1 of'tHel 
Sherman Act prohibits joint action unreasonably interfering w 1m 
or unduly hampering these objectives, while section 2 extendsjtnja
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mstraints o f the law to unilateral conduct or industry structure 
4J P Iacmg the comPetitive process in a significant area of 
g n o m i c  activity. The language o f the statute does not command 
. anyone to compete, nor does it reward the winner o f the race. The
^ > v at^ . " eqUlreS a cIualitative judgment, not a quantitative one, by 
^ p p h ib itm g  agreements not to compete and behavior or structure 
^unreasonably displacing competition as the rule o f  trade.
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J  *!! determining whether industry structure or unilateral behav­
i o r  displaces competition, market definitions may be helpful in 
organizing the analysis so that it is practical, significant, economi- 
4 -cally sensible, and manageable in the context o f the judicial 
, process. But market analysis is subservient to the broader qualita-
quest,0n 0 f Whether the P°licy o f the law has been £
, fg id  on occasion market analysis should be dispensed with where 
the level o f  predatory behavior is obviously destructive o f a 
.competitive process. The persistence o f  dominance in a significant 
| |g r e a  o f economic activity may also warrant a common sense 
. c onclusion that power is present in a form inconsistent with the
f ?  " ' I !116 PUblk imereSt ^ UireS *  be constrained 
i  Persistence o f dominance is likely and its
j j | g f u n  by the market is unlikely even though some theoretical
I I I P 11161^  about the metaphysical concept o f markets may be 
’ advanced to escape liability. y
- that I* T  ‘ definitions sh»“W understood in a way
H im  T 'S 01'^ 0 “*• fUnCti0” °f ruk of "»*>“ i"
' - " S r e  or h h « » * * «  that industry 
& i d l ,  T , K Cf S,Sten‘ ° r with the corn­
s' S I S ?  ^ ‘ analysis servcs ®  a mechanism for deter­
™ " ‘S ’ iUSt' PraC<iCal’ and economicaIly sensible
» i e  th , f 8" ? '  “  “ “  ° f  eConomic * * * * *  •» M  area
• the f a l s  o f  antitrust policy can work and to make
fe- whether they are at work in light o f  all the facts
J ■ funliionUmftanCet ° f 1)16 industr?‘ A  t0°  “ S'131 attitude about the 
If- °  mar concepts in the analysis can be equally
l  : S r nd,r: SUlt ‘*1 f*ndinS a violation where there is none,
I  violation where the violation is o f some other law or
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policy, or the imposition of the wrong remedy for structure or’ 
behavior inconsistent with the competitive ideal. Market analysis, 
can serve to avoid these hazards if its function is more careiully^
understood.
As in section 1 rule of reason cases, the function o f W  
analysis in section 2 cases aids in drawing the line o f illegal ty. he, 
methodology requires a balancing o f all the facts and circum­
stances, judgments of policy, and a well developed use o f com* 
mon sense. Economic models, understood as working hypotheses' 
and a place to begin analysis, can be o f aid in t e Proc®“  “ 
cannot be a substitute for the judgment o f a trained judge alert to 
the policy goals of the law, the practical limitations o f th<* judraal 
process the realities of the industry involved, the need fort 
predictability in the law, the short- and long-run 
the facts and the propriety o f visiting s a i ^  UP“  ^  
dant involved or extending or denying the protection of the law to^
the plaintiff involved. ^
Aside from Judge B row n in g’s opinion ™ G r o u n d  and the 
F.T.C. opinion in Borden, the leading wave U lo p im o n sex h ib ite d  
few of these qualities in market analysis bu t 
tendency o f wave II opinions to treat m arket < 
mechanically and as conclusions to the analysis rather th a r tt*  
beginning o f it. A reliance upon mechanical tests to d elta  
markets is understandab le  in light o f the complexity of the issues 
presented and the facts involved. But that 
excessive when the function of market analysis as “
the ends o f  the analysis is lost sight o f by decisions like Telex attd.
CalComp. >’J
Tests for monopoly power have evolved little over 
precedent with primary emphasis still placed oili market s h a g  
Evidence o f excessive profits and actual use o po Qf higlf
or exclude competitors is highly relevant, while an abse^  
profits or non-use o f market power still does not serve to ^isp g  
monopoly power In close cases where market share is below 701 
and above 50%, profit and conduct evidence can make th
■ %
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difference between a finding of monopoly power and the absence 
*of it. Inferring monopoly power from a persistent and unex­
plained market share, particularly where accompanied by factors 
■like high profit rates and excess capacity, is appropriate where the 
possession of power is persistent and significant. Indeed, it has 
“been argued that such a showing should suffice in a government 
s proceeding were a standard of “no conduct” monopoly developed 
and applied in light o f the presumed adverse effects o f persistent 
monopoly power and with consideration o f efficiency defenses in 
the remedy phase o f the case.273
On the other hand, excessive reliance upon market share, big 
or small, can be misleading. It is a case o f piling an inference 
upon an inference in the belief that one can tangibly discover the 
.answer to the intangible question o f whether the competitive 
process has been displaced by structure or behavior to the point 
where legal intervention is wise, just, and appropriate under the 
■antitrust laws. Care in the selection o f cases is essential if a no­
conduct standard is to be followed or argued for in the interests 
*of efficiently administering the law and dissipating without 
„ penalty, the adverse consequences o f persistent monopoly power. 
, In such circumstances, greater sensitivity to proof o f monopoly 
power will be required than the present tendency to rely upon 
mechanical measurements o f market share to answer the intangi­
ble question o f whether monopoly power is present or not.
'V  Behavioral cases and private damage actions alleging struc­
tural or behavorial monopolization, on the other hand, require 
vsome showing o f a use o f monopoly power. The possession of
V*
■ - i ■ —  i • — i. I. ii ii — 1 —----------  ■ —
IPm  See 3 A r e e d a  &  T u r n e r ,  supra note 13, at 63-64; Dougherty, 
$Elimination o f the Conduct Requirement in Government Monopoliza­
tion Cases, 48 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 869 (1979); Dougherty, Kirkwood & 
-"Hurwitz, Elimination of the Conduct Requirement in Government 
*Monopolization Cases, 37 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 83 (1980); Flynn, 1979, 
Isupra note 218; Fox, Monopoly and Competition: Tilting the Law 
fltowards a More Competitive Economy, 37 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 49
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monopoly power by the defendant does not suffice for the private . 
plaintiff in damage cases, since it must be shown that the antitrust 
violation alleged is also the violation that “causes” the injury to 
the plaintiff. Proving that permissible competitive conduct o f one . 
possessing monopoly power caused injury to the plaintiff is not « 
legally sufficient to sustain a damage claim since there must be a - 
nexus or factual connection between what it is that violates the 
law and the injury claimed before it is appropriate to award 
damages. Wave III cases, particularly Berkey, have tended to 
become lost in the labyrinth o f distinguishing between evidence of 
monopoly power, proof o f conduct that will suffice to show an 
exercise o f monopoly power vis-a-vis the plaintiff seeking dam­
ages, and the function o f conduct as an added element o f the - 
offense and its role in private damage litigation for linking a 
violation to an injury which ought to be compensable under the 
antitrust law.
[  Considerable progress may be made and confusion avoided in ' ^ 
defining the conduct element in private damage litigation if a 
methodology o f thinking about the issues were followed which , 
kept analysis o f questions o f conduct for proof o f violation! ' ! 
distinct from those o f “causation” for proof o f damage.yThe 
problem is not a new one; it has plagued the field o f  torts for/w  
centuries and has generated such nonsensical concepts as “proxi-j-:*% 
mate,” “supervening” and “remote” cause to mystify courts,'rA# 
juries, clients and lawyers since Henry VIII. Dean Leon Green’s « 
system of duty-risk analysis in tort litigation,274 where followed/ 
has significantly cleared the tort arena o f metaphysical notions of/ 
causation, maintained an appropriate division o f judge and jury 
functions rather than confuse the one with the other, clarified 
analysis o f  the policy reasons for extending the law or refusing to; 
do so, and has generally avoided the misuse o f concepts like;,, 
standing in tort litigation as a surrogate for straightforward policy,
274 Dean Green’s major writings on the topic are collected and re­
printed in G r e e n ,  supra note 185. A succinct summary by one of DeanS
Green’s prominent students and followers may be found in ThodejgS 
supra note 184.
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^analysis o f the law in v o lv ed -a  problem which has come to 
plague antitrust analysis.
! •  stated/ the methodology o f duty-risk analysis) as out-
Jined by Dean, Greent and applied to antitrust treble damage 
mf T n wo^ld organize the analysis into four distinct questions:
ii. Is there a factual connection between plaintiff’s injury and the 
defendant. 2 Does the legal system’s protection extend to the 
^lUerest that p o n t if f  seeks to vindicate; and if  some protection is 
^fforded, what standard o f  care does the legal system impose on
S T l i  ^  thC St3ndard o f  care Reached by the .defendant? 4. What are the damages? ^
L  \  ^  t5erena factual connection between plaintiff’s injury and 
he defendant? Underthis heading, questions o f  morality, fault,
' . y’ 2tarf et area” direct-indirect, motive and so on are 
-.irre evan Standing tests, like CalComp’s  “indirect ripple ef­
fort or direct causal injury” t e s t -  do not present questions o f a 
factual connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
plaintiff s injury Nor does the establishment o f a factual connec­
t io n  establish liability since three additional elements o f the claim 
.(discussed infra) must be established before liability may be 
Jmposed.
JSfTi-
! ^ h ile  toe factual connection issue is not usually disputable if  
■the plaintiff has carefully thought through the complaint, there 
are occasions where a factual connection between the conduct 
claimed unlawful and the injury suffered is clearly nonexistent or 
presents a disputed question o f  fact for the jury. In Berkey, for 
, example, the plaintiff’s reliance on Kodak’s potentially unlawful 
Refusal to sell film in the past injuring competing camera manu- 
acturers as a basis for claiming damages for refusing to predis-
^ ________
^ R E v ^ ? ^ Q k ^ heThaT al Relati° n ISSUe in NesHgence Law, 60 Mich. l .K h v . 543  (1 9 6 2 ) , T h o d e ,  supra n o te  1 8 4 , a t  2 3 -4 . 
v  * • • *
f i c f S ?  ComPuter Prod-> Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 732
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close the new 110 film format, without more evidence o f factual '• 
nexus, lacked the requisite factual connection between the con- ‘ ,] 
duct claimed unlawful and the claimed injury to establish the firsl : 
step o f imposing liability on Kodak in the camera sales phase of •* ^ , 
the case.277 On the other hand, in Greyhound, sufficient evidence '*.v 
o f factual connection between some o f IBM’s marketing practices , ! 
(eliminating the technological discount, increasing the ratio of „r , 
IBM’s purchase price to its lease price and “unbundling”) and - 
injury to Greyhound, justified sending the issue o f factual con- ,4 
nection to the jury.278 More often than not, however, factual-1; j 
connection is not a controversial issue and should not consume < |  
court time if the plaintiff’s attorney has carefully thought through . J -  
the claim and the nexus between what is claimed to be unlawful^ 
and the source of the injury claimed by the plaintiff. \ -|
1
2. Do the policies o f the antitrust laws extend to the interest „v I 
that plaintiff seeks to vindicate, and if some protection is af- , 
forded what standard does the legal system impose on the defen- . r 
dant?279 This heading presents two questions o f law for the court: ■_ 
(1) to determine whether the risk or injury to which the p la in tiff^  
has been subjected is within the scope o f the duties imposed on J 
the defendant by the antitrust laws and the risks plaintiffs areY | 
protected from; and (2) what standard of proof o f a breach o f the. 
duty by the defendant must a plaintiff establish to impose  ^^  
liability? ; |
/ ’I
In both public and private antitrust litigation the questions of^g  
the duty imposed by the particular statute involved and the^f 
definition o f the standard for proof o f its breach are frequently”'1 j 
the heart o f the case. In the remainder, the central issue is usually J
' • 3 3|
277 603 F.2d at 285.
v* !
278 Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v. IBM-Corp., 559 F.2d 488,v|j| 
498-502 (9th Cir. 1977). * 1
2*79 See, Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 28 J
Colum.L.Rev. 1014 (1928), 29 Colum.L.Rev. 255 (1929); Green, suP%iM 
note 93; Thode, supra note 184, at 26-30. *Jj3
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an issue falling within the third step o f the inquiry; the factual 
issue for the jury o f whether the defendant has in fact breached 
the duty. Several sources of confusion can arise at this point in the 
analysis because the same statutory formula for illegality has been 
made the basis for public and private remedies ranging across the 
spectrum from criminal penalties, to civil damages to equitable 
relief. Additional complexity is generated because o f difficulties 
in distinguishing conduct which is procompetitive from that 
which is not, since both “injure” competitors and the underlying 
industry structure or other circumstances may significantly alter 
the legal characterization o f the selfsame conduct from case to 
case as conduct which is in keeping with a regime of competition 
to a labeling o f it as conduct antithetical to a regime o f competi­
tion.
Confusion generated by the differences in remedy stemming 
from the same statutory formula o f illegality can be minimized by 
increasing the standard o f proof to show a breach o f the duty— 
but not the definition o f the duty which a defendant must comply 
with to avoid liability. For example, a court may require proof of  
a purpose as well as an effect to fix prices where criminal remedies 
are sought for conduct claimed to be price fixing; while in a civil 
or equitable proceeding the standard may only require a jury to 
find a purpose or effect o f fixing prices.280 In each case, the duty 
iis one o f not combining or conspiring to fix prices; proof of a
• breach o f the duty may be o f a higher standard where the 
J sanction imposed is o f greater consequence.
In the case o f criminal sanctions, liability is imposed to punish 
antisocial behavior and deter others from doing the same, and 
»proof o f some level o f intent to violate the law is required before 
-criminal sanctions are employed. Damage actions seek to make 
'plaintiffs “injured in their business or property by reason o f a 
violation of the antitrust laws”211 whole as well as deter violations
280 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 
(1978); Garvey, supra note 115.
28> Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15.
of the law by trebling the damages found. The effect o f injury ,, 
may be sufficient to impose liability without proof o f an intent to , 
do so once breach o f the duty is shown since the statute expressly £  
so provides. Injunctive relief, on the other hand, seeks to restore 
a regime o f competition where it has been displaced by private ;  
agreement or the possession or exercise o f monopoly power, as 
well as to prevent and restrain threats to competition. Since no 
penalty is imposed, proof o f  either purpose or effect to violate the 
law is all that is required. These differing objectives o f relief 
justify different definitions in the level o f proof necessary to show 
a breach of the duties imposed by the antitrust laws before a 
particular remedy is imposed; distinctions which may only now be  ^
evolving in recent antitrust litigation.
Confusion generated because conduct in one case constitutes a t 
violation of the law and in another does not, may also be 
attributable to the difference in relief sought causing a difference. - 
in the level o f the standard o f  p roof  required to show a violation 'f 
related to the particular plaintiff bringing the suit—rather than a 
difference in what it is that is illegal. Proof that the injury to the,?- 
competitive process is also the source o f the injury to the plaintiil/^  
and that the injury is one which the antitrust laws protect against ?) 
are required before damages may be awarded. In the antitrust^ 
context, particularly structural monopolization cases, this subtle 
issue demands that greater attention be paid to the context and 
environment in which the alleged violation occurs in view o f the 
difficulty in attributing the injury claimed to the presence o f an,, 
unlawful monopolist.
i. “
Some additional conduct o f  the defendant must be shown to" 
prove both monopolization and the factual connection to the- 
injury claimed by the plaintiff. The fact that the con uc is;^  
otherwise lawful when done in a competitive context should not, 
be the end o f  the inquiry. As Judge Browning observed in­
Greyhound, a firm possessing monopoly power is “preclude^ 
from employing otherwise lawful practices that unnecessanl^ 
exclude . . . competition. . . .”J,J ________ ^
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282 559 F.2d at 498.
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The fact that the conduct in question is engaged in by a 
monopolist is a fact o f significance which should not be dismissed 
by vague generalities about the efficiencies o f size, the benefits o f  
integration, or the degree to which the conduct is predatory or 
“sinister.” When a court does so, perhaps because o f doubts 
about the fact and amount o f damage in private cases like Berkey, 
the definition o f the duty imposed by the law becomes vague and 
confused and the court can trespass on factual issues within the 
province o f the jury. The Berkey opinion departs from wave II 
monopolization standards by sanctioning exclusionary but avoid­
able conduct by a monopolist, thereby confusing the substantive 
standard for defining a monopolist’s duties under the antitrust 
laws. Avoiding the imposition o f treble damages in close cases o f  
causation or in circumstances o f conduct that is ambiguous vis-a- 
vis a competitor need not require confusing or changing the 
definition o f the duties consistently defined as ones imposed by 
■the law.
' Under the duty-risk framework o f analysis, the level o f proof 
to show a breach o f the duties imposed by the law or the factual 
‘ connection between injury and the breach may be increased in 
'light o f the punitive nature o f the remedies sought. In this way 
consistency may be maintained in the definition and understand­
ing o f  the duties imposed by section 2 o f the Sherman Act without 
impairing the need for flexibility to adjust the standard o f proof 
■required to show a violation of the law in light o f the remedies 
’sought. To the extent Berkey holds otherwise, it should not be 
considered persuasive precedent in subsequent litigation seeking 
‘-consistency with wave II standards. Rather, it is a case where the 
court should have imposed a high standard for proof o f a breach 
_,of the duty, rather than minimize the duty imposed, in order to 
minimize the risk o f the jury basing liability on permissibly 
f  competitive conduct by a monopolist or finding liability where 
"there was no factual connection between the violation and the 
injury claimed.
The underlying issue is the definition and scope o f the duty 
JUjftposed by the antitrust laws upon firms operating in a free
market economy where the antitrust laws are designed to guaran­
tee the maintenance o f a regime o f competition. Antitrust cases * 
seldom conceptualize the analysis in this manner but treat the law -r* 
as an identifiable series o f lines beyond which one must not go on 
pain o f the remedies imposed by the law. The meaning of the 
lines, however, shifts and changes depending upon the charac­
teristics o f the industry, the power o f the firms involved, the 
quality of the conduct in view o f the competitive ideal and the'^ 
context in which it occurs, the nature and characteristics o f the 
specific firms involved, and all the facts and circumstances o f the 
case.
The fundamental duty imposed by the law is that the competi-;'- 
tive process govern trade and business behavior. Joint or unil- * 
ateral conduct displacing that process is potentially an antitrurt 1 
violation. The scope o f the duty and who may complain about ils 
breach and what remedies may be available all entail legal quer- 
tions to be decided by the court. The analysis unavoidably 
requires policy judgments concerning the legislative purposes of 
the antitrust laws, precedent, practical administration o f  the law, ^ 
justice as between the parties, and other considerations arising^ 
out o f the facts and circumstances o f the case.
The Sherman Act should be explicitly viewed as guaranteeing ^  
a corresponding right o f competitors to compete under the aegis 
of a free market; a regime where opportunity and individual i 
initiative may operate free o f unreasonable distortions created byff 
monopoly power dictating, rigging, or unreasonably tampering" 
with the forces o f the market in either the short run or the long ' 
run.283 The antitrust laws should be viewed in the treble damage^
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283 “The right to trade is one of the ‘natural’ rights of men in that it /> 
has developed over the centuries as a means of livelihood and the- 
acquisition of wealth. It is a group right in that it can be exercised only.?, 
if there are other persons with whom to trade. The interests of the trader® 
are thus largely relational, and much law has been developed to protect*}
his trade relations as well as to protect those with whom he trades."St 
Green, Protection o f Trade Relations Under Tort Law, 47 V a .L .R ev.*H
’* context as protecting the competitor from these risks and as 
imposing a corresponding duty upon those possessing monopoly 
. 'power to avoid behavior imposing those risks upon competitors 
by actions displacing competition as the rule o f trade. A corre- 
" sponding duty o f the monopolist to avoid unnecessarily exclu­
sionary behavior in line with wave II precedent should be recog­
nized, rather than a presumption in favor o f hard competition by 
 ^ the monopolist like that indulged in by Telex, Berkey and 
CalComp. The latter approach emphasizes short-run consumer 
benefits and ignores the long-run consequences o f aggressive 
conduct by a firm possessing monopoly power. A more balanced 
e approach is needed, otherwise we will not have the benefits of 
competition, since there will be no competitors to insure the 
s benefits in the long run.
 ^ Defining the duty and whether it includes the particular risk 
’imposed on the plaintiff (the scope o f the duty) ultimately rests 
upon the broad policies which underlie the antitrust laws in 
•particular and all law in general.284 One part o f this analysis may 
jnclude the question o f standing in the narrow sense o f whether 
problems o f proof or remedies are beyond the capacity o f the 
judicial process to adjudicate. The majority o f  “standing” ques­
tions invoking meaningless concepts like “ripple effect,” “direct 
or indirect, target area, ’ and so on, however, are not standing 
jissues in the technical sense o f case or controversy or the limits of 
*tlje judicial process but involve the question o f the scope o f the 
duty imposed by the antitrust laws. The resolution of the duty 
question is a policy one for the court to be resolved by recourse to 
the factors enumerated above rather than by reference to mean­
ingless concepts which confuse, rather than clarify, by claiming to
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’559, 560 (1961). The Berkey opinion analyzed Kodak’s actions in terms 
>ot what duties Kodak owed to a competitive market. It did so on the 
fremise: “[T]o avoid the proscriptions of § 2, the . . . [monopolist] 
'must refrain at all times from conduct directed at smothering competi- 
-’tion.” 603 F.2d at 275.
!\,284 See Green, supra note 93, at 45.
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deny a factual connection between the conduct of the defendant 
and injury to the plaintiff.
There is a significant line o f monopolization cases where this| 
form of duty analysis and even the imposition o f affirmativ| 
duties upon a monopolist have been implicitly recognized.285 T h | 
Greyhound opinion implicitly followed the duty-risk line o f ana||u , 
ysis, as does Berkey and Transamerica. In all three cases, thfe| 
courts grappled with the issues of pricing, marketing and innova^ 
tion tactics by firms possessing monopoly power from the view:, 
that such firms at least have a duty not to “smother” or suppress| 
competition or “unnecessarily” exclude competitors by their cow 
duct. Where the cases differ, is in their sense o f the scope o f thai 
duty and whether the facts would support a judge or jun 
conclusion that the firm’s conduct “unnecessarily”286 excluded o  
“smothered” competition.
285 See cases cited supra note 127 and the discussion therein.
286 “ fUlnnecessarily excluded competition” is the standard adopted b |g  
Judge Browning in Greyhound, 559 F.2d at 498  ^ ™ s  standard would ^  
appear to be more in line with wave II precedent hke ALCOA and J  
United Shoe, narrowly limiting the conduct of a monopolist, than is the j  
Berkey standard of “conduct directed at smothering a competitor. 603, 
F.2d at 275. The “unnecessarily” standard also suggests a rule of reason^ 
analysis in section 2 cases similar to that which has evolved in section 1 |  
cases on difficult issues like product innovation, pricing practices and so^ 
on. A further implication of the standard is the employment of th? , 
“least restrictive alternative” principle in the analysis. See, Struve, > 
Least-Restrictive Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, m  
H arv. L.Rev. 1463 (1967). Viewed from this perspective, many ot t h | |  
issues in Berkey surrounding Kodak’s introduction of a new film fo rm ^ | 
without predisclosure should have been viewed as presenting junfe 
questions in accord with appropriate instructions. The circuit o p im o n i|| 
Berkey however, took most of these issues from the jury by endorsing  to  
narrower duty of care by a monopolist to competition or, conversely, b|g 
endorsing hard competition by a monopolist so long as it was n o |  
“predatory.” It is at this juncture that Berkey can most clearly be said to | 
depart from the standards of wave II. In E .I. du Pont de Nemours
Co , 3 T r a d e  Reg.Rep. (CCH) 1 21,770 (F.T.C. 1980), the C om m issio |
’ _ . i . _____________ J ____ a  I —  />M  n t t o m n t  liltadopted Judge Browning’s standard to assess conduct in an attempt tg
Telex and Berkey tend to confuse definition o f the duty with 
^*§ftandards for proof o f its breach and whether the facts support a 
Ci finding o f a breach. Confusing definition o f the duty with 
PlSgtandards for proof o f its breach engenders unnecessary ambi- 
\  guity in the law; while confusing definition o f the duty and the 
Slitandards for proof o f its breach with the question o f whether the 
t^facts support o f finding o f a breach, constitutes an invasion of 
f  lfury functions by judges or an invasion o f trial court functions by 
J^lpjppellate courts. When the process of decisionmaking becomes 
Ei^lcSnfused in these ways, it is difficult to determine how a decision 
" /squares with precedent; what are questions o f fact and those of 
M|\V; which side has the burden o f proving what at trial; what is 
’the burden o f proof for purposes o f motions, trial and jury 
‘ 'instructions; and, what is the scope o f review upon appeal.
3j *
'■" All these characteristics are apparent in many o f the wave III 
. irnonopolization decisions, with considerable ambiguity over what 
duty does section 2 impose upon a defendant and what risks are 
-plaintiffs protected from by section 2. Telex and Berkey are most 
pronounced in their confusion o f trial and appellate functions. 
, \T h e  Berkey opinion is particularly insensitive to the jury function;
\the court’s opinion reading like the deliberations o f the jury 
' rather than the review o f a jury’s findings.
J 1! The difficult line between questions o f law and those o f fact 
‘becomes even more obscure when appellate courts go to such 
Jlengths to reverse trial courts. The definition o f the duty, the 
c ' (evidence necessary to prove a breach and the standard o f proof 
Squired to show a violation o f the law ultimately become ad hoc 
‘factual judgments by appellate judges, rather than questions the 
( litigants and a trial judge can determine by legal analysis o f prior 
t- leases for submission to the fact finder. At a minimum however, 
\tfie wave III cases appear to recognize a negative duty imposed on
* |monopolize case. The Commission’s analysis, resulting in a finding of
* ’no violation of the law, is more in line with wave II standards than is the 
 ^gBerkey case. See discussion, supra note 248.
a monopolist to avoid the use o f its power to displace c o m p e t i t i^  
in its own market and in other markets where the m o n o p o ly !  
competes, in line with the wave II cases, even though the s c o p e .g l  
the duty is considerably lessened by the confusion in analysisgg|
Telex, Berkey and CalComp.
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The law should go further and also recognize affrrmati|§| 
duties o f a monopolist owed to the regime of competition m a p | 
dated by the Sherman Act in markets adversely effected b y ^  
monopolist. The recognition and imposition of affirmative duti£g 
on a monopolist were made explicit in F.T.C . Commissioner 
Pitofsky’s opinion in The Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. case; 
case subsequently reversed by the Second Circuit.- In D onndfw  
the refusal o f the sole publisher of the collected airline sc h e d u ^  
to integrate the schedules of certificated, intrastate, and coig^
288 Official Airline Guides, Inc. v 
(2d Cir.).
F.T.C., 1980-2 Trade Cases 1 63,f
_
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______ _________________ ____________— jjgS%
«  3 T r a d e  Reg.Rer (CCH) 1 21,650 (F.TX. 1919). A ■ g ie .o tc r a ^  
the context of refusals to deal by a monopolist have been read as co™n| .^ 
“perilously close to establishing an absolute duty to deal since ttog| 
permitted a finding of unlawful mQnopQlizationin the| congxt o^  J |
uniustified or unexplained refusal to deal. Byars v. Blutt Uty rsqran unjustitiea orun  ^  ^  ^  Jhe cQurt ated ^
discussed Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (19j3» 
“ o“ na> v. United States, » U i W S I  
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 ^
Purhanee Inc v National Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334 pm
Te’rt denied 401 U.S. 912 (1971); United States v. K learflj
[taen Looms, 63 i s m .  »  IP- 1945>' T 3_ nf caSes where the defendant monopolist s control ot a scarp,
finding that the
give competitors reasonable access to it. . , p ^
cited United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., supra, Associated Pressj^ 
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R^R^As . 
224 U.S. 383 (1912) and several lower court cases. E ^ h ^ * e s e c a ^ e s y  
is submitted, was carving out circumstances in 
ought to be imposed on the monopolist in order to comp y 
more basic duty imposed by the Sherman Act of maintaining a r e g | |  
of competition.
■ii$Jputer air^nes was f ° und to be an act o f unlawful monopoliza- 
fefefiSn- The Commission found that Donnelley’s publication was the 
K  fJBible” o f all airline schedules and fares in North America; that 
, :*the publication was a distinct market for airlines, travel agents 
f '-and others to obtain flight information and book flights; that 
?H5 flD6nnelley had a monopoly o f the market by virtue o f being the 
I |bie publisher o f  all the airline schedules in one place; that refusal 
'  ■ to integrate flight information o f certificated, intrastate and 
' , commuter airlines injured competition between them since those 
.using the publication encountered certificated carrier listings be- 
•Bforp those o f intrastate or commuter lines and thereby tended to 
book flights with certificated carriers;289 and, that Donnelley’s 
'"-.'/refusal to integrate flight schedules was unjustified and not 
H  iexcused by the defenses offered.290
■ ■
At this juncture o f the opinion, Commissioner Pitofsky noted 
s; & lwt the case was a unique one since it did not present the
* "traditional circumstance where it is claimed that the acts o f the 
| 8|^ tenopolist allegedly maintained or enhanced its own monopoly 
$qwer in the market.291 Rather, Donnelley’s refusal to integrate 
p ^ |M ;schedules was o f no observable benefit to Donnelley but was 
“'Viewed as conduct injuring intrastate and commuter airlines by 
ylfacing them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis certificated 
gciirriers with users o f Donnelley’s publication. Because o f this
c . posture o f the case, the Commission framed the issue as follows:
■ t .[W]hether Donnelley as a monopolist, had some duty under the FTC 
Act not to discriminate unjustifiably between the competing class of 
# ^  carriers so as to place one class at a significant competitive disadvan­
tage. Stated another way, we must determine whether, as a matter of 
-, law, the owner of a “scarce resource” . . . must exploit that resource 
in a manner which creates no unjustified or invidious distinctions 
JV.v^gniong competitors seeking access to the scarce resource. If it is 
B|fiMletermined that Donnelley did have such a legal duty, then we must 
- V
Si&sfe__ _ _ ____ _______ _________  _________
lli||Sf$ 3 T r a d e  R e g . R e e  (CCH) at 21,804-805. 
IS&>Id. at 21,805-809.
91 Id. at 21,815-816.
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consider whether Donnelley breached this duty and thereby violated  ^
the FTC Act. . . .29J
A *
The Commission’s analysis found a duty on the part o f the- '^| 
monopolist not to be “arbitrary” in the sense o f engaging in*7j 
conduct which “results in a substantial injury to competition and, 
lacks substantial business justifications” ;293 and further that Don-i'J 
nelley breached the duty not to be “arbitrary” in violation o f the>f> 
F.T.C. Act. The opinion clearly follows a duty-risk form ofw 
analysis. Although the case is factually unique and an interpreta’-' 
tion o f section 5 of the F.T.C. Act, it is a methodology and" 
substantive conclusion which should be followed in all antitrust^ 
cases.294
The Second Circuit, however, refused to allow the imposition^ 
of a duty not to be “arbitrary” under section 5 o f the F.T.C. Act}** 
on the appeal o f the Donnelley case. The court did so on thfe.* 
premise that such a result “would give the F.T.C. too much power 
to substitute its own business judgment for that o f the monopolist^ 
in any decision that arguably affects competition in another 
industry.”293 The court reasoned that “ [s]uch a decision woullf 
permit the F.T.C. to delve into . . . ‘social, political, or person®] 
reasons’ for a monopolist’s refusal to deal.”296
r ' i
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However, the Commission’s judgment was not based u p on || 
showing that Donnelley‘s practice had an “arguable” effect upor| 
competition among certificated and commuter airlines; the e ffe ||
p i ,
'S&Jl
292 Id. at 21,815.
293 Id. at 21,819. _
294 it is the implicit analysis followed in a long line of monopolization] 
cases. See cases cited supra notes 127 and 287.
295 1980-2 Trade Cases t 63,544 at p. 76,919. There was little deferen|e|
given to the expertise of the administrative agency or the standard Sal
review of F.T.C. determinations of “fairness” set out by FTC v. S p e f jH  
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972). “
296 1980-2 Trade Cases 1 63,544 at p. 76,919. •"Id
*4
iw
practice was shown to create a real and significant competi­
t i v e  disadvantage to the commuter airlines. Nor was the C om --  
f i s s i o n  s decision one which delved into, nor which would
- ^necessarily permit a delving into, the social, political or personal
■ reasons for a unilateral refusal to deal. By portraying the 
», Com m ission s opinion as an open-ended grasp o f  power to
supervise all business judgments by a monopolist, the court was
- J relying upon the reliable old stand-by o f  a “floodgates” argu-
- Jient—a venerable but generally discredited device to avoid a 
^deeper and more complex analysis in defining the duties imposed 
; #  the antitrust laws in the factual context o f the case for
r Siecision.297 The fact that all refusals to deal ought not be 
, remedied by antitrust policy, does not mean that some should not.
Areeda and Turner advance additional, but obliquely 
4 t^pM-ed, reasons for their opposition to using section 2 against 
* 'arbitrary refusals to deal by a monopolist, despite what they call 
superficial appeal and a certain logic to support it.”2’8 They
# r j^mply that courts are ill-equipped or “ill-suited” to establish tests 
y~' "Of legality by a common law process in this area; that regulating 
tCt,. refusals to deal under section 2 will necessarily draw on
• ‘'.^public utility notions o f fair dealing rather than central antitrust
^/concerns; that developing standards for sensibly drawing lines 
; i ,M Ween !he “arbitrary” and the permissible will be difficult; that 
policy must also direct itself to discriminatory terms 
. 7 ^ f  dealing as well as absolute refusals to do so; that the danger o f  
a monopolist arbitrarily refusing to deal are minimal 
even a monopolist will usually act rationally to maximize 
p rofit; and that any abuse which does occur may better be
\  29? This is not, of course, to say that the court was not confronted with 
and complex issue of sorting out the boundaries of antitrust 
£ t tpolicy from other fields of law which may or may not impose duties on 
or firms in a competitive business to deal with men with 
$,*. a?”® ^air or require monopoly newspapers to publish advertising from 
llpcigarette manufacturers. See 3 A r e e d a  &  T u r n e r ,  supra note 13, at 270-
Id. at 273.
remedied by state and federal legislative action directed to situa^j 
tions deemed significant.299 ^
rn
There is considerable force in some of these arguments for\ 
concluding that all “arbitrary” refusals to deal by a monopolists 
ought not to be actionable under section 2 o f the Sherman Act. 
Indeed, the analysis parallels some of the factors Dean Greens
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^  Id. at 274-76.
300 The objection that courts are “ill-suited” or “ill-equipped” to ' 
fashion standards in this area is not elaborated upon. Courts appeal to - 
have little difficulty in fashioning sensible, predictable, and limited * 
standards in the analogous field of torts under similar circumstances.^ 
The objection that courts will draw upon public utility notions of fair^’ 
dealing is also not elaborated upon. It may have merit where an 
effective remedy would require day-by-day supervision of business’’, 
judgments. The objection would not appear to have merit however, 
where an effective judicial remedy could be implemented. Drawing [ 
upon public utility notions to determine the legality o f the conduct 
would seem appropriate in many circumstances where the vice of the^i 
conduct is an unfair wielding of monopoly power damaging the com-. - § 
petitive process. The argument that legislative action is preferable to J| 
court action may have force in some general circumstances but not in '9  
others where the facts present a unique circumstance not easily remedied) ’§ 
by the gerierality of legislation or the politics of the legislative or 1 
administrative process. See, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 It 
U.S. 1 (1979); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); City. ’I  
of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.' , | 
1980). Posing the analysis as an all or none choice, ignores the' J  
unwillingness of reality to conform to predetermined criteria and the“ J  
flexibility of the legal process to adjust to the facts of the dispute. As 1  
Dean Green has said: “A process which assumes the very ends it is |  
employed to discover will in the end betray its futility . . .  In the 3 
administration of law, both the judge who surrenders this power [of 1 
thought] to phrases as well as the judge who spends his time attempting £ 
to pattern phrases to control succeeding judges in the cases to come, can. 
only do his science ill. His function primarily is to pass an acceptable ? 
judgment in the case before him. When the next case arises a different^ 
judgment may be desirable.” Green, supra note 279, at 1016, 1018-19. • 
The court in Donnelley appeared intent on controlling cases to come 
while not satisfactorily arriving at an acceptable judgment in the casejK 
before it. '
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r, claim ed as the “most significant [factors] in influencing the 
^determination o f duties and through them the limits o f the 
.protection afforded by law.”301 Yet one may still conclude that 
'som e  arbitrary refusals to deal by a monopolist ought to be 
^actionable under section 2  and sensible standards can be carved 
out to define the duty, avoid a regulatory remedy and foster the 
4 'goals o f antitrust policy.
l^ 'I f  one begins with the premise that the function of the 
antitrust laws is to maintain and promote a regime o f competition 
as a matter o f fundamental public policy and that the antitrust 
laws impose a duty on any person engaging in trade to refrain 
from conduct unreasonably displacing competition as the rule of 
'trade, and in some limited cases o f monopolization, affirmative 
duties to protect competition,302 the analysis o f difficult conduct 
issues like those presented by wave III monopolization cases 
'would be considerably clarified. Resort to the fundamental poli­
cies of the law, rather than cliches and models detached from the 
" facts, would be required, as well as a careful evaluation of all the 
facts and circumstances in which the case arose.303
1 30i Green, supra note 279, at 1034. Dean Green categorized the factors 
as follows: “ 1. The administrative factor, 2. the ethical or moral factor, 
3. the economic factor, 4. the prophylactic factor, 5. the justice factor.” 
Id. Dean Green analyzed these factors extensively in the above cited 
article and a second part to the article appearing in 29 C o l u m .L . R ev. 255 
(1929). Two other articles are also relevant: Green, Foreseeability in 
Negligence Law, 61 C o l u m . L . R ev. 1401 (1961) (stressing the environ­
mental context and factual context in which the issue arises); Green, 
Protection o f  lYade Relations Under Tort Law, 47 V a .L . R e v . 559 (1961) 
(reviewing the common law evolution of duties imposed in competitive 
and commercial business activity).
y*-. J?.: ■ '
3°2 See cases discussed supra note 287; S u l l i v a n ,  supra note 13, at 
§ 48, pp. 125-132. 
j ■ ' ■ - 
j 303 Commissioner Pitofsky discussed one fear with recognizing affirm­
a tiv e  duties on the part of a monopolist in Donnelley. That is the fear 
that the antitrust laws would be converted into a policy to right all 
wrongs attributable to a monopolist. 3 T r a d e  R e g .R ep. (CCH) at 
(21,818-819. As Commissioner Pitofsky indicated, the duty imposed
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In cases like Donnelley, a common law process may be the 
only way to remedy a displacement or unnecessary distortion of  
the competitive process in the relevant market. The unique status 
o f the Official Airline Guide, the absence o f a justification or 
excuse for the refusal to integrate commuter schedules, the impact 
o f the action upon competition between certificated and com­
muter airlines, and the availability o f a workable remedy justified 
the imposition o f a limited section 5 duty on the publishers of the 
Guide, Fears o f a floodgate o f litigation, the imposition o f public 
utility duties by court decree, and a standard banning all refusals 
to deal by outlawing some are unfounded in such circumstances.
The duty-risk methodology forces a grappling with the facts 
peculiar to the dispute, rather than facts not before the court. 
Difficult questions will not be automatically solved by the duty- 
risk methodology, but at least a grappling with the fundamental ’ 
reasons for the decision in the context o f the dispute before th e /  
court and not hypothetical cases generated by the imagination of 
the litigators will be fostered and a greater sensitivity to the facts 
in dispute will be encouraged.
The analysis o f these issues by wave III litigation has not been 
generally illuminating, although the Berkey, Borden, Greyhound 
and Transamerica opinions may be read as proceeding upon a 
duty-risk path o f analysis. Berkey’s platform for analysis o f a' 
monopolist’s duty, however, is constructed from unexamined 
assumptions o f not turning on the successful competitor who does 
what section 1 “tells him to do” although section 1 carries no;i 
specific affirmative instructions; the benefits o f “efficient size ’
must be understood in terms of the purpose of the antitrust law s— “ to ., 
protect a competitive process by outlawing arbitrary monopoly behavior , 
that inflicts a competitive injury.” Id. at 21,818. Conduct not injuring- 
the competitive process may violate some other law, community mora s 
or even business ethics but would not be converted into an antitrust, 
violation absent an injury to the competitive process. To borrow ana,-< 
magnify a much abused cliche: The antitrust laws are intended to*< 
protect the competitive process, and not just competitors, short-iun 
consumer welfare or whatever else might aggrieve the unhappy citizen.,,,
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without determining whether Kodak’s size was “efficient”; and, 
the benefits o f “integration,” without examining whether there 
were any benefits o f integration beyond Kodak’s decision to do 
so. There is a similarity to wave I standards, particularly the 
United States Steel analysis, in the court’s assumptions and 
methodology for resolving the Berkey case. Not surprisingly, like 
the United States Steel case o f 1920, Berkey’s assumptions led to 
a narrowing o f the duties o f a possessor o f monopoly power owed 
to the maintenance o f a competitive market and to competitors in 
that market as a matter o f law.
The court need not have gone that far from wave II precedents 
and the long range goals o f antitrust policy if it was concerned 
with imposing damages for chameleon-like conduct where a jury 
would have difficulty in sorting the anticompetitive from the 
procompetitive. Varying the level o f the standard o f proof o f a 
' breach of the duty required in such circumstances, by requiring a 
' showing that the conduct was “unreasonably” exclusionary, that 
it is “arbitrary” and unjustified or that it was specifically intended 
to be unnecessarily exclusionary, would narrow jury discretion on 
^such difficult issues as innovation, tying film formats to cameras, 
.»and predisclosure o f new photofinishing requirements without 
distorting definition of the duty imposed by the law. The issues of 
defining the duty and the level o f proof required to prove a 
breach are separate questions and they are questions of law for 
:the court. Whether there has been a breach o f the defined 
standard where there is sufficient contested evidence is one o f fact 
•for the jury and not for an appellate court taking over the 
function o f the jury.
Definition o f the standard required to prove a breach was also 
a.crucial issue in the computer cases and in Borden. Few would 
argue with the proposition that a monopolist has a duty to refrain 
jrom  anticompetitive or exclusionary pricing practices. Defining 
what is an anticompetitive or exclusionary pricing practice is part 
.o f the process of defining both the scope of the duty and the 
standard by which a breach of the duty is proven. The Grey­
hound, Transamerica, and Borden analyses grappled best with
these issues, while CalComp and Telex appeared to adopt a rigid 
and inflexible rule without much regard for the factual setting of  
the case, the long-run policies o f the Sherman Act, or the 
appropriate division between questions o f fact and those o f law.
3. The third major element o f duty-risk analysis, one not 
extensively analyzed here, is whether the standard o f care has 
been breachied by the defendant. This is a question o f fact for the 
jury, when reasonable minds could differ. Along with factual 
connection issues, any defenses raising factual issues and factually 
based damage issues, these questions are within the province of 
the jury or the trial judge where there is no jury, to be decided 
according to appropriate instructions defining the duties imposed 
by the law and the standards for proof o f its breach.304
A major advantage o f the duty-risk method o f analysis is that 
it more clearly separates the judge and jury functions and the 
distinction between questions o f fact and those o f law for appel­
late review purposes. Once the court has defined the duty, its 
scope, and the standard of proof necessary to sustain a finding 
that the duty has been breached, the determination o f whether the 
evidence is sufficient to show a violation is a question o f fact for 
the jury unless reasonable minds could not differ over the analysis 
o f the evidence presented.
Wave III litigation generally fails to pay much attention or 
respect to the fact-law dichotomy, save the Greyhound opinion, 
where the court consistently measured each issue in terms of the 
jury function.303 There, questions o f causation in fact were kept 
distinct from questions o f the duty imposed by the law and the 
standard of proof necessary to show a breach o f the duty. The 
failure o f the other wave III cases to pay much attention to the
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304 See Thode, supra note 184, at 30.
3°5 See also, Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624
F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980); International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. 
Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980).
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fact-law distinction, particularly Telex and Berkey, is a subtle but 
pronounced feature o f wave III litigation resulting in an inappro­
priate expansion o f the scope o f appellate review and growing 
ambiguity over what kind, and how much evidence is required to 
go to a jury in a private section 2 case.
Following a duty-risk method of analysis will more clearly 
define the line between questions o f fact and those o f law for the 
purposes o f defining the jury function and the scope o f appellate 
review. More predictable and understandable standards should 
result; standards preserving the constitutional right to jury trial 
and ones aiding those seeking to comply with the law and the trial 
and review o f  those cases that are brought.
4. The fourth, and final, issue to be overcome before a 
plaintiff may succeed in treble damage litigation is proof o f the 
fact and amount o f damage. As in the case o f determining 
whether there has been a breach of the duty, these too are jury 
questions to be decided by appropriate and workable standards 
defined by the court in its jury instructions. Here too, the court 
function o f defining the standards for proof o f damage may be 
varied according to the facts and circumstances o f the case. 
Remote, consequential and indirect damages may be found to be 
beyond the duties imposed by the antitrust laws—not because of  
some rubric like “target area”—but because an analysis o f the 
policies o f the antitrust laws and the statutory language o f section 
A  o f the Clayton Act limit the scope o f the duties imposed by the 
law.306 In such circumstances and in cases like Illinois Brick Co. 
v. Illinois307 where the courts (rightly or wrongly) find policy 
reasons beyond the antitrust laws for limiting the scope o f the 
duties owed others or where the injuries claimed are not an
• antitrust injury as in the Brunswick case, no damage issue would 
be submitted to the jury since the analysis o f the duty issue would 
'preclude recovery. Otherwise, however, unless there is a clear
306 1 5 U.S.C. § 4. See Tyler, supra note 172.
!307 43i U.S. 720 (1977).
failure of proof, determination of the fact and amount o f damage 
is within the province o f the jury subject to instructions by the 
court defining the requisite standard of proof and method for 
proof o f antitrust damage.
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IV. Conclusion
Adoption o f a duty-risk methodology for analyzing damage 
litigation in general and section 2 monopolization damage litiga­
tion in particular, will not resolve all the subtle and difficult issues I 
presented by modern antitrust litigation. Many o f the cases are|l 
structural cases which could and should be resolved by govern-
ment proceedings, preferably proceedings on a no-conduct mo- ' 
nopolization basis where the monopoly power appears to be| 
persistent and substantial. Dissolution of monopoly power by ’ 
such proceedings should be more expeditious and more consistent 1  
with the long-range goals o f the Sherman Act than government Jfj 
suits where conduct becomes the principal issue or private damageJI 
actions where conduct issues become the unavoidable issue.? 
Moreover, successful elimination o f persistent monopoly power 
will alleviate pressure to bring complex private cases like those j  
that have predominated wave III to date. Proof o f a displacement’!  
of competition and injury to the plaintiff only further complicate^ 
the complex by confusing definitions o f the duties imposed by the| 
law, the standard of proof o f its breach, and the function of] 
judge and jury and trial and appellate courts.
The duty-risk framework o f analysis in private cases, however;! 
whether the case is a structural one or a behavioral one, will serve) 
to clarify the premises of analysis, avoid confusion of issues,^ 
relieve pressure to distort standards for proof o f a violation tof 
avoid questionable awards o f massive damages or punish reprej 
hensible behavior, and serve to define rationally the line betweenj 
judge and jury functions. More attention will also be paid to thejj 
facts giving rise to the controversy and courts may thus avoid thejj 
tendency toward deciding cases by fixed rules based on unrealistic!
odels o f what reality is rather than the realities o f the con- 
:roversy before the court in light o f the goals o f the law.
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Inflexible rules which fail to account for the reality o f the 
v-pgpircumstances of the case, the policies o f the law, changing 
$ f |ju s in e s s  practices and justice between the parties mask the only 
|^ ||c er ta in  conclusion nine decades o f section 2 litigation can justify: 
t '%no matter how much the facts and judges change, the fundamen- 
IrV/jtal issues o f section 2 litigation remain the same.
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